The predictability of politics II: Social mobility and political entrepreneurialism — Farish A. Noor
May 02, 2012
MAY 2 — Remaining focused on the developments in Malaysia and the countries around us, let us go back to the topic of predictability in politics, and consider its relation to social mobility and political entrepreneurialism.
How I wish I could force every single ASEAN citizen to revisit their respective pasts and national histories, and learn from the lesson of bygone years. Our region has grown ever so jaded, disillusioned, tired — and in our fatigue and frustration we scream ourselves hoarse against the injustices of the world; without realising that injustice itself is a human construct, that it is the result of differentials of power, that it is institutionalised and therefore cannot be entirely divorced from that messy domain we call politics.
Yet this raises another question altogether: Is politics, therefore, the problem? And if so then how do we get ourselves out of this infernal mess?
Press the rewind button and revisit those fateful decades between the 1920s to the 1940s when the whole of Southeast Asia was clamouring for independence. Politics was the means, the tool, the vehicle for this rebirth of nations that were denied their sovereignty and histories so long. That the first generation of nationalists were demanding power is hardly surprising to anyone, for the aim was state capture and the capture of power.
Today many younger Southeast Asians have no idea what it is like to live under foreign occupation. Yet our parents will be able to tell us of how they — when they were kids — were made to sing the national anthems of Britain, Holland, France under the tropical sun; and how they were made to read history books that told of the heroism and valour of pirates like Stamford Raffles, Lord Minto, Robert Clive and so on. Under such circumstances even a bookworm like myself would have put down the book and picked up the pen to write against the injustices of colonialism.
Power has been at the centre of politics even before Southeast Asia gained its independence, and rightly so: For without the winning of power and the capture of the state, there would never have been that moment of true liberation from colonial subject-hood.
But in the rush for power, the older generation failed to ask what power was for, and what other uses it could be put to. And here for me lies the heart of the problem: We forget that until the mid-20th century none of the Southeast Asian countries were ever real democracies. They were certainly not democracies during the ancient time of their venerated God-Kings; and they were certainly never democracies during the time of colonialism.
Overnight, Southeast Asians had to fight for their independence and then almost immediately learn to govern themselves in a democratic manner.
Is it a surprise then that almost all the early nation-states of Southeast Asia floundered? (Burma, 1948-1963, Indonesia, 1945-1965, Philippines with its martial law and civil war.)
Colonialism had created deeply divided societies that were boxed according to horizontal and vertical cleavages of power, and embedded in these divided social groupings were primordial centrifugal demands (for autonomy, independence, local power) that would have torn apart many of the countries of the region. (Burma, the hill tribe rebellions; Indonesia, the Darul Islam/PRRI/Pamesta revolts, etc.)
The older generation seized upon the most pragmatic, and perhaps the only available, option of the day then: The Modern Nation-State with all its attendant powers of social engineering, hegemonic power, panoptic surveillance and education-control.
The nation-state would be the be all and end all of political struggle; the final goalpost to the long-cherished nationalist dream: Defeat the imperialists, bring down their flag and hoist ours, and all will be hunky-dory from then on! (Or so we believed).
So what happens over the next five decades? In Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines and other parts of the region we see the rise of the new logic of capital-driven governmentality: The paradise on earth would be the capital-driven one, where the old villages and quaint little rivers and forests would be surpassed by the new Technicolor dream world of megacities and skyscrapers. How we loved modernity and capital-driven progress!! (Note that on the first day that McDonald’s opened up in Malaysia and Singapore they sold more burgers than anywhere else. We gobbled up modernity, ate capitalism with relish, and supersized our appetite for more.)
And when the bubble burst in 1997/98 what did we see in Bangkok, Jakarta, KL? Used-car shops choc-a-bloc with flashy (and vulgar) Porches, Ferraris, and all the other accoutrement of the newly rich.
The present act: Political fragmentation and social mobility
It cannot be denied, and it has to be understood, that to a large degree the economies of Southeast Asia were indeed successful from the 1980s to the late 1990s.
The reasons for this success are manifold, and it cannot be discounted that among the reasons was the fact that ASEAN was “neutral on the side of the West” throughout the Cold War and the governments of the region played their cards right and bet on the right horse. *(Apologies for the gambling metaphors there)
This success was translated into tangible gains that included:
a. Urbanisation, which led to the creation of new towns, cities, ports and industrial zones;
b. The connecting of countries that were previously disconnected thanks to the new communicative infrastructures that were built (road, rail and air transport);
c. Universal education, which led to the creation of millions of young Malaysians, Indonesian, Thais, Filipinos and Singaporeans who were better educated, better informed and better at communicating compared to their parents.
However, these developments also brought with them social and political costs that were not readily anticipated:
a. Urbanisation also meant the creation of gigantic cities like Bangkok, Jakarta, Surabaya, Manila that were over-populated and where social alienation and anomie was the norm for millions of new Urbanites who had been cut off from their organic pastoral roots;
b. The communicative infrastructure that allowed the state to deliver its services (education, policing, welfare) to the people was also a tool that allowed people to talk to people directly,thereby bypassing the state and reducing its hegemonic power.
c. Universal education was given based on the naive belief that everyone who got a degree would get jobs, and would immediately be integrated into the urban middle-class. But what happens when the capital tap runs dry and the job market begins to shrink? Universal education had raised the levels of public knowledge and awareness, but also public expectations: After all, why would anyone waste ten years in a university if there were no promise of some reward at the end, in the form of a job, house, car, spouse, two kids and two pets?
Fast-forward to 1998 and we witnessed the uprisings in Bangkok, Jakarta and KL, which were in many ways middle-class urban-based uprisings.
Compounding matters was the fact that as the stream of foreign capital into the region began to slow down to a trickle, the perception grew that the economic pie was shrinking. Entrenched elites began to fear (rightly) that the good ‘ol days were coming to an end, and in that fear — always an irrational response — they clung on to the few measly pieces of the pie that were left.
What we are seeing across ASEAN today is therefore a region in crisis, and it is a particular sort of crisis. Our crisis is one of rising social expectations that are not (and perhaps cannot) be met due to finite supply — of jobs, opportunities, etc. But Southeast Asia is NOT made up of failed states, unlike some other parts of the world. Southeast Asia is made up of successful states that are now trapped in the middle-income gap and are beholden to democratic populism instead.
In Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and elsewhere we are witnessing the sorry spectacle of weak governments giving in to populist demands after being made hostage to populism; and the demise of old structures of social mobility and political advancement. Just look at Indonesia’s Golkar party, that was the dominant party from 1971 to 1998, during Suharto’s time. Following the fall of Suharto, Golkar’s pulling power has been reduced dramatically as it no longer commands the patronage machinery of the state. And as Golkar grows weaker, its ranks break apart and new parties emerge like Hanura (Wiranto), Gerindra (Prabowo), Nasional Demokrat (Surya Paloh). Then even Megawati’s PDI-P has fragmented, giving birth to Yudhoyono’s Partai Demokrat.
Fragmentation, fragmentation everywhere, and no appeal to national unity will suffice by this stage. Why? Because for more than three decades ASEAN citizens have been fed the same story by ASEAN elites: That in the promised land of postcolonial independence everyone will get an education, a job, a home, and a tiny share of paradise on earth. The way to that capital-driven paradise was, and remains, politics. And so every ambitious young ASEAN political entrepreneur knows that the way up is the political way, to join a party, to be a populist hero, to rally the masses, to get them to enact this sad pageant of politics.
I believe that what is happening in/to Malaysia at the moment is (a) not unique to Malaysia and (b) structurally-institutionally comprehensible.
But to address this structural problem that has become a regional epidemic, Southeast Asians need to realise that democracy cannot and should not simply be seen as a tool for individual social-economic-political advancement. Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers, Governors, etc are not jobs for making money or to get yourself a swanky new house with a humongous swimming pool. These are responsibilities that ought to be taken seriously, and with the understanding that governance is a serious and boring vocation (that is not a business or family enterprise).
Now ask ourselves honestly: Have we seen this sort of sensibility on the rise anywhere in our region? Or have we instead been fed the same spectacle of populist politicians who talk about how they “care for the poor” while they are wined and dined by their corporate buddies in Washington or Europe? If, like me, you opt for the latter answer then you will understand why I have grown so suicidally depressed of late. As I’ve written many times before, this coming decade may well be the most difficult and trying for the whole of ASEAN. I only hope and pray that enough of us can see the need for change and adapting to the geo-economic realities around us as soon as possible, before change is forced on us, and overwhelms us for good.
* Dr Farish A Noor is a Senior Fellow at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
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