FMT: Shocking racial disparity in civil service.... by Joseph Tawie

Shocking racial ‘imbalance’ in civil service

Joseph Tawie

 | August 20, 2011

The Chinese community make up less than two percent of the Malaysian government service.

KUCHING: Change, like charity should begin at home.  Likewise Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak should have begun implementing his 1Malaysia concept within the civil service first before attempting to ‘teach the world’.

Alas this has not happened and Najib, according to Sarawak DAP has failed miserably in improving the racial composition of the civil service.

The situation is a poor reflection of his seriousness in implementing the 1Malaysia concept.

“He (Najib) has been shouting about the concept for the past two years, and yet the racial composition between the Malays and Chinese in government departments has not improved,” said Sarawak DAP secretary Chong Chieng Jen.

According to Chong,  he had asked the PM, during the recent sitting of Parliament, to disclose the total number of civil servants in all the ministries and the racial breakdown of Malays, Chinese, Iban and Bidayuh staff.

He said he had asked for the update on number of civil service staff in the government’s employ up to 31 March 2011.

The revert, he received was shocking.

“In the Prime Minister Department, there are about 31,297 Malays to 797 Chinese. This is about two percent.

“And it is no better in majority of the other ministeries.

“Based on the reply given to my question in Parliament there is a big discrepancy between the Malays and Chinese civil servants.

“The worst is in the Rural Development and the Federal Territory Ministry where there are 2,442 Malays to 18 Chinese or less than one percent of the Chinese,” said Chong, who is also Bandar Kuching MP.

Listing out the detailed breakdown of Malay and Chinese civil servants, Chong said there was a clear ‘imbalance’ in racial compositions in all government departments, agencies and ministeries.

“It also clearly shows Najib’s 1Malaysia slogan is a mere slogan.

“There is no concrete policy to implement the 1Malaysia concept.

“There has been no improvement in the racial composition even after he announced the concept…even his department is worse than average.

He said: “There is no improvement in the racial composition based on the racial breakdown in the

“It shows that Najib is not the PM for all, but the prime minister for one single race,” Chong said after releasing the Malay to Chinese staff breakdown in the various ministries.

Breakdown

He listed out the reply from the PM’s department as below:

Ministry of Youth and Sports 2,980 Malays, 32 Chinese,

Ministry of Home Affairs 40,263 Malays to 614 Chinese;

Ministry of Works 6,221 Malays to 156 Chinese,

Ministry of Health 130,106 Malays to 9,500 Chinese,

Ministry of Finance 15,835 Malays to 508 Chinese,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1,215 Malays to 53 Chinese

Ministry of Education 273,791 Malays to 43,669 Chinese

Ministry of Tourism 455 Malays to 19 Chinese

Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development 5,461 Malays to 75 Chinese

Ministry of Information, Communication and Culture 8,839 Malays to 402 Chinese

Ministry of Higher Education 15,012 Malays to 334 Chinese

Ministry of Transport 9,028 Malays to 205 Chinese

Ministry of Defence 12,078 Malays to 113 Chinese

Ministry of Housing and Local Government 11,363 Malays to 173 Chinese

Malaysia's Phony War on Affirmative Action.... by John Lee

Malaysia's Phony War on Affirmative Action

Policies favoring the Malay majority over Chinese and Indian Malaysians must change, but progress so far has been slight, writes columnist John Lee

By John Lee  March 3, 2011

When then-Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad launched his Vision 2020 in 1991, Malaysia's reputation as a prosperous and harmonious multi-ethnic country was the envy of much of Asia. One of the key pillars of the blueprint to propel Malaysia from a rapidly developing to a fully industrialized country was to accelerate and deepen policies that transferred economic power and resources to indigenous Malays in order to ensure the "fair and equitable distribution of wealth."

Since then a number of World Bank experts and veteran Malaysia watchers, such as Professor Hal Hill from the Australian National University, are becoming increasingly worried about the country's long-term future. Even the current Prime Minister, Najib Razak, admits that reform in the sensitive but critical area of affirmative action appears to have stalled. In Najib's New Economic Model (NEM), which he announced in March 2010, a Malaysian leader for the first time criticized important aspects of these decades-old policies and linked them to many of the country's structural problems.

Najib is correct that Malaysia cannot make the transition from a middle- to high-income country without winding back these long-standing affirmative action policies. But there are significant barriers working against the possibility of meaningful reform.

As any Malaysian will tell you, the 1969 race riots between indigenous Bumiputra (the Muslim Malays who were then 50 percent of the population and constitute 65 percent of the current population) and Chinese-Malaysians remains the defining event in the country's history. The acceleration of affirmative action policies from 1971 onward was an understandable response to the national trauma of the violence. Even so, given that the race riots were largely caused by social-economic racial divisions within the country, many believe Malaysia's leaders could have responded by attempting to move the country away from ideologies and policies that emphasized and entrenched racial differences.

But one has to concede that in important indicators, such as poverty reduction among Bumiputra Malays, much progress has been made over 40 years. It is arguable that overall national economic growth is as much, if not more, responsible than pro-Malay policies in raising the living standards of Bumiputras. Nevertheless, the number of Malays living in absolute poverty has fallen from 60 percent in 1971 to between 5 percent and 10 percent today.

A Legacy of Deficits

The obsession, however, with improving the lives of Bumiputra-Malaysians rather than all Malaysians has come at a heavy price. Improving the lot of the poorest—the majority of whom remain Malays—is essential. But implementing an ever-expanding program of state-led economic "restructuring" and "redistribution" initiatives is a seductive but dangerous path for governments to take. The National Economic Policy (NEP) began in 1971 and formally ended in 1991. Many NEP affirmative action policies are still in place today (and some have even been extended). This living legacy is behind much of the pessimism surrounding the country today.

There are several major reasons for this. First, many economists are rightly skeptical of the benefits of an ever-expanding role of the state within a "free market" economy—particularly when interventionist policies are designed to engineer social objectives rather than promote growth. The primary problem is one of numbers.

In a global policy environment rightly wary of ballooning budget deficits, the fact that the Malaysian government has been in deficit every year since the introduction of the NEP in 1971 (except for a period from 1993 to 1998) is troubling. This is particularly the case since Kuala Lumpur spends much less on social services than do Western governments. The economic numbers look even more troubling when one considers that around 40 percent of the government's revenue comes from the state-owned oil and gas giant Petronas. This is the case for two reasons.

First, Petronas is forced to pay a massive 60 percent to 70 percent of its profit in dividends each year—74 percent in 2010—just to sustain the government's spending programs. And second, the company's Malaysian-based reserves (which constitute the majority of Petronas' known reserves) are due to expire in around 15 years.

Second, an essential pillar of any successful economy is the emergence of a strong, independent entrepreneurial corporate class capable of competing with the best in the world. This is where Malaysia potentially has a problem. Although it is overreach to damn all Bumiputra-run businesses as lacking creativity and dynamism, there is no doubt that economic protection in the name of affirmative action can lead to unproductive and wasteful habits. If nothing else, foreign perceptions that Malaysia's affirmative action economic environment makes the country an uncompetitive place to invest is damage enough.

Decline in Foreign Direct Investment

Much of Najib's tough talk in his NEM is to make Malaysia once again a preferred destination for foreign capital. Malaysia's net foreign direct investment (FDI) fell from $2.56 billion in 2004 to negative $7.67 billion in 2008 and recovered to only $1.95 billion in 2009—the worse decline among its developing and developed neighbors. The U.N.'s World Foreign Investment Report 2010 revealed that Malaysia's net FDI trailed such neighbors as Thailand, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Indeed, in an embarrassing comedown for the former rising star, Cambodia, Myanmar, Brunei, Laos, and East Timor are the only countries in the region attracting less FDI than Malaysia. Worryingly, even domestic entrepreneurs are voting with their capital, as public investment exceeds private investment in the economy.

Third, just as companies seek to retain their best talent, Malaysia has a reputation for pushing away its best Chinese and Indian citizens. More than 250,000 people left Malaysia from March 2008 to August 2009 (not including students studying abroad). There are no figures on the racial mix of those leaving, but overwhelming anecdotal evidence suggests that a high proportion of ethnic Chinese and Indians are in this group. Once again, not all exits can be blamed on affirmative action policies, but even Najib has admitted it is a priority to make the country more attractive so as to encourage thousands of the skilled (non-Malay) diaspora to return.

The honest appraisal of not just Malaysia's problems but the reasons behind these is admirable. But formidable obstacles block Najib. Most significant is the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) reliance on such an affirmative action political and social contract between the party and Malay elites to remain in power. Among countries that hold elections, UMNO has been in government longer than any other party in the world. It is not surprising that Najib has few supporters in his own cabinet to revise and wind back existing policies significantly.

In 2004, UMNO gained 63 percent of the popular vote. After the party's shellacking in the 2008 general elections, when it gained only 50.6 percent of the popular vote and lost its two-thirds majority in Parliament for the first time since Malaysian independence (and with it the capacity to make amendments to the constitution), it is even more unlikely that the UMNO's brain trust would seek to alienate its strongest supporters—or precipitate an all-out civil war over reform.

One such manifestation of early internecine strife is the rise of Perkasa after the 2008 election. Perkasa is a nongovernmental, nationalist group lobbying to preserve and extend the economic, social, and cultural privileges of Bumiputras, and it claims to have more that 300,000 members—at least 60 percent of whom are UMNO members. Many Malays abandoned UMNO not because they wanted to abolish the affirmative action policies but because they wanted a larger slice of the affirmative action pie.

Furthermore, the role of Malaysia's 1.2 million public servants in implementing any reforms is critical. The problem is that these civil servants are the strongest supporters of affirmative action, since many of their jobs were created by a growing state apparatus designed to implement these policies. In the current political climate, Najib can hardly afford to alienate this constituency. The Prime Minister is also relying on these civil servants—95 percent of whom are Malays—to overcome the deeply entrenched pro-Bumiputra culture.

It is still too early to assess the capacity of the Malaysian government to introduce genuine reform. So far, little has been done to roll back pro-Bumiputra restructuring and redistribution policies or initiatives that would reduce the role of the state in the economy. Significantly, Najib has backed away from abandoning the four-decade-old sacred tenet that Malays own at least 30 percent of all corporate assets in the country. The Prime Minister's NEM is a brave political gamble—and a necessary economic one. But the battle has only just begun.

John Lee, who was born in Ipoh, Malaysia, is a research fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney, Australia, and the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. His paper, "Malaysian Dilemma: The enduring cancer of affirmative action," was released by CIS this week.

Malaysia Chronicle Malaysia: Now, a gap between image and reality by Wong Choon Mei

Malaysia: Now, a gap between image and reality

by Wong Choon Mei, Malaysia Chronicle

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW Former U.S. ambassador John Malott created a major stink here with a recent opinion-editorial entitled The price of Malaysia’s racism published in the Wall Street Journal earlier this week.

Not only did Malaysia's famous cyber community come out in full force to either praise or criticise his article, but the BN government and its support groups also rushed in to counter what they called his "spin".

No less than Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin ran him down, as did Perkasa chief Ibrahim Ali. The government-controlled mainstream press did what they could to damage-control and the New Straits Timeseven ran an op-ed of its own hotly, refuting Malott's views and accusing him of being a stooge for Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim.

Malaysia Chronicle decided to seek some answers and sent off several questions to him, which he has kindly taken the trouble to reply to. The Q&A is published below without editing changes to any of his answers.

In his reply, Malott reveals that he had offered to write an exclusive op-ed for NST to explain his stand. He suggested the title “There Once Was a Dream Called Malaysia”but does not think the paper will accept his offer.

The former ambassador sees the Pakatan Rakyat as a credible opposition but declines to predict who will win the next General Election. He also believes Malaysians are a "patient lot" and this is why a Tunisian or Egyptian scenario is unlikely to play out here.

Very tellingly, he complains that Malaysia is now overly about image these days and what you see may not be what you get. He counter-accuses the Najib administration of "spinning", "condoning and even provoking" racial and religious tensions.
 
"If anyone is spinning today, it is the Malaysian Government. There are few foreign experts on Malaysia, and it is rare for the foreign press to report on Malaysian developments. I thought it was important for people outside Malaysia to know that there is a real gap between the image they are trying to convey overseas and the reality on the ground."

"There are religious and racial tensions in every country, but I wanted people to know that in the case of Malaysia, the Government itself is condoning and even provoking those tensions."

Appended below is the full text of the Q&A conducted through email:
(1) Chronicle: You have been accused of writing your WSJ op-ed for ulterior purposes - spinning was the word DPM Muhyiddin used. Is this true and why?

Malott: I had no ulterior motive. I have been thinking about this subject for a long time, and I wrote the article out of growing concern for Malaysia’s future. I don’t think I was spinning anything.  I tried hard to keep it factual. Years ago, when I wrote speeches and memos for the State Department, I learned that you will be challenged, so be sure that you are accurate and can prove everything you say. It is interesting that people say I was spinning or had my facts wrong, but no one has pointed out anything that was incorrect. People can disagree with the analysis and my conclusions, but the examples and statistics I gave are all documented.

It is not at all unusual in the US for former government officials to write or comment on their areas of expertise. When you watch CNN today, there are plenty of former US Ambassadors and State Department officials talking about the situation in Egypt, for example. There is no ulterior motive. They just want to help people to be better informed.

(2) Chronicle: Both the DPM and Ibrahim Ali have accused you of having links or being sponsored by Anwar Ibrahim. Is this true? If not, why do you think they made such conclusions?

Malott: I am not sponsored by Anwar, I do not lobby for him, I am not his advisor, he does not tell me what to think and say, and no one pays me to do what I do. I never consult with him or anyone else before I write about Malaysia. He sees my articles when everyone else does.

My wife and I became close to Anwar’s family after I left the State Department, during the time that Anwar was in jail.  We stayed in touch by phone and email, but it was all personal and not political. We wanted them to know that someone cared and that they were not forgotten. I am sure that the Special Branch was monitoring Azizah’s phone and emails, so we would never talk politics. I did not want to put her in a difficult position. We would call up the daughters on their birthdays and send cards and so on. My wife even wrote a book about Azizah, called “Struggle for Justice.”

As most people know, I was very vocal in those days, supporting the call for Anwar’s freedom. As the Ambassador at the time he was arrested and beaten up, I knew what the truth was, and when I became a private citizen in 1999, I decided that I would speak out. To my mind, Anwar was a political prisoner, and I knew that a great injustice had been done. I was not going to remain silent, especially at a time when so many others were afraid to speak up. Nobody could arrest me, because I was in America. I would tell people that my goal was Anwar’s freedom, but it was up to the people of Malaysia what his political future would be.

When I was Ambassador, I knew Anwar only on a professional and official basis, just like the other Ambassadors did. When he came to Washington to be a visiting professor at Johns Hopkins and Georgetown, it was the first time that I got to know him personally. Anwar was traveling a lot in those days, making speeches, so we did not see him as much as we did the family. Sometimes the girls would come over and we would barbeque chicken together, or Hiroko would teach them how to make sushi.

Anwar refers to Hiroko and me as “family friends.” But we have no professional or official relationship with each other. Since some people in Malaysia like to call him an American agent, I think the last thing he would want is to be connected to me in other than a personal way. We are friends, but I do think we share a common vision of Malaysia’s future and the kind of country it could be.   
   
(3) Chronicle: What was the real motivation for your article? Given the responses so far, do you think you have achieved your objective? Did you have an objective when you wrote the story?

Malott: As I said earlier, I am very concerned about developments in Malaysia. The growing racial and religious tensions are one part of that. I had something that I wanted to say, and I said it. I also think that the Malaysian economy should be growing faster than it is, that its competitiveness is declining, and it is losing its attractiveness for foreign investors.

If anyone is spinning today, it is the Malaysian Government. There are few foreign experts on Malaysia, and it is rare for the foreign press to report on Malaysian developments. I thought it was important for people outside Malaysia to know that there is a real gap between the image they are trying to convey overseas and the reality on the ground. There are religious and racial tensions in every country, but I wanted people to know that in the case of Malaysia, the Government itself is condoning and even provoking those tensions.  Even today I read that the Government’s Islamic Affairs Department wants to ban Valentine’s Day because it is a Christian celebration. I don’t know any Christian who thinks that Valentine’s Day – exchanging cards or giving someone chocolate -- is a religious ritual.

I have been surprised by the positive reaction to the article. It has gotten more attention than anything I have ever written. And I am very pleased to see so many Malaysians engage in a good discussion of the issues in the comments sections. Of course there are a few cybertroopers who are bashing me, but just like Ibrahim Ali, they just rant and rave and call names, but they don’t have anything to say about the substance of the issue, and they can’t point out anything that is incorrect.

(4) Chronicle: Some commentators have said you wrote from the point of view of only the non-Malays and did not take into account the sensitivities and struggles of the Malays? Do you think there is some basis to this view and why?

Malott: I agree with criticism that I did not focus on the attitudes that some Chinese and Indians have towards Malays. But that is all at the private level. We cannot stop people from believing what they believe. But what I was talking about, and the examples I gave, were the words and actions of the Government and its senior officials. They were not speaking as individuals or like a “man on the street.” They are the Government. In addition, the government, as a matter of policy, has institutionalized some forms of discrimination, like the two examples I gave -- the 30% set-aside for stock and housing discounts.

Toward the end of the article, I pointed out that there are now two clear and different visions of Malaysia’s future – are we a Malaysian country or a Malay country. Those differing views are also held within the Malay community. In a way Mahathir represents both views. Years ago he was Mr. Bangsa Malaysia, and now he talks about Tanah Melayu.

When I read the comments on the different websites, I saw that there were many Malays who wanted me to know that it was not just Chinese and Indians who are leaving the country, but also Malays who feel that their personal future is bleak. But I don’t know whether that is because of the economic slowdown, or because getting ahead is still all about connections and who you know rather than what you know, or because they side with the opposition and not the Government.

As for the struggle and sensitivities of the Malays, I have been following that discussion. But it seems that just as not everyone can agree on Malaysia’s future, people also cannot agree on Malaysia’s past. I don’t think I could contribute much by jumping into that kind of internal discussion. I am not an expert on that part of Malaysia’s history.

(5) Chronicle: Given the feedback that you have received in the past two days, do you still stand by your story and would you retract any particular part or make any amendments?

Malott: No, I am very happy with the article. I would not take out or change anything. Like any op-ed, there is a limit on the number of words you can write. In some places I wish I could have said more, but there wasn’t enough space.

I saw that the New Straits Times had an op-ed criticising what I wrote. I read it three times but still don’t understand what the writer was trying to say. But I did send an email to them saying I would be happy to write an op-ed for them, explaining my views. Of course, I am sure they will never agree.  But I do feel like I would like to say something more on this subject, at the right time. I already have a title in mind – “There Once Was a Dream Called Malaysia” – that’s a takeoff from the movie “The Gladiator.” But the editors always write the titles, not the author. The editor at the AWSJ wrote the title over my op-ed. I thought he summed up the article very well. There will be a price to pay if the Government doesn’t change its actions.

(6) Chronicle: You spent several years in Malaysia and we understand you keep very close contact with the country and the developments in the neighboring nations as well. What sort of immediate political future do you see for Malaysia when the next GE takes place? Who do you think will win? Also, a lot of people have predicted Egypt and Tunisia scenarios happening here, do you think so?

Malott: There is an American baseball player, Yogi Berra, who is famous for saying, “I never make predictions, especially about the future.”  There also is another saying, “a week is a lifetime in politics,” meaning that things can change very rapidly. So I really don’t want to predict the outcome.

I think that BN and PR present very clear alternatives for Malaysia’s future. Even between the two Malay parties, UMNO and PAS, I think there is a clear difference. All Malays are Muslims, but I think UMNO is more about race and being Malay, and PAS is more about being Muslim. Race is the starting point for UMNO, while Islam is the starting point for PAS.

Malaysia now has a credible opposition for the first time in its history. I think the Malaysian people will be given a real choice about their country’s direction.  It is up to the Malaysian people to choose.

As an outsider, my concern is that the elections should be fair. I have seen and studied elections in many countries. I think it is hard for the opposition in Malaysia, because they have to campaign with one hand tied behind their back. The Government controls the airwaves, and opposition newspapers cannot be sold to the general public. The police can deny permits or harass political gatherings, as we have seen.  The Election Commission is not truly independent, and so on.

I don’t see a Tunisia or Egypt scenario playing out in Malaysia. In general I think Malaysians are a very patient lot, and other than 1969 there is no real history of political violence. If anything starts to happen, I think the RMP would not hesitate to crack down, as they have in the past.

(7) Chronicle: Lastly, could you tell us if you hold any official role currently?

Malott: No, I do not hold any official government position. I left the State Department in 1999, and I don’t have any intention or desire to return to government. I am happy with what I am doing today.

MySInChew: No solo race, but multiculturalism — by David D. Mathew

No solo race, but multiculturalism — by David D. Mathew

February 10, 2011

Feb 10 — There is a non-profit organisation in Malaysia called the Perdana Leadership Foundation which was set up to be the leading institution for the study of Malaysia’s prime ministers.

Every former prime minister has a page on the foundation website and there is a quotation attributed to the late Hussein Onn on his page which reads as follows: “Our successes have been founded on moderation. In a multiracial country, moderation requires strong disciplines. It demands sacrifices by all communities in the overall interest of the nation. It requires us to seek solutions which are acceptable to all communities rather than to any particular community.”

The nation’s Father of Unity believed in a very important fact — that the nation’s success was dependent upon policies that suited all communities. He subscribed to the fact that the overall interest of the nation was more important than any particular community.

In a speech he delivered as Umno president during the party’s 32nd general assembly on June 26, 1981, Hussein told Umno members that: “We inherited a multi-racial nation. Umno, as the most important party in our multi-racial nation, has to give attention to the problems of all citizens. This fact has always been acknowledged by Umno and it is with this understanding that Umno has been fair towards all races. In fighting for the welfare of the Bumiputera race, we do not ignore the interests of the other races. What we seek is the opportunity to progress with the other races.”

Due to poor health, Hussein passed away on May 29, 1990 at the age of 68.

One wonders whether the Father of Unity was listening from above when his successor Mahathir Mohamad delivered a speech at the Tun Hussein Onn Memorial on February 1, 2011.

In his speech, Mahathir said that “this country belongs to the Malay race.”

He told his audience at the talk on “The Malay race and the future” that “we must be sincere and accept that the country is Tanah Melayu.”

Mahathir went on to say that the former Philippine President Aquino was Chinese but she identified herself as Filipino and Thaksin Shinawatra is Chinese but he speaks the Thai language and lives the Thai culture.

According to Mahathir, things are different in Malaysia because “we still introduce ourselves according to race” and “this is why the question of race will continue to haunt us.”

Apart from conveniently ignoring the fact that a Chinese had no problem becoming president and prime minister of the Philippines and Thailand respectively, Mahathir’s comments were an insult to the memory of Hussein Onn. To add salt to the wound, his comments were made at the Tun Hussein Onn Memorial.

Do we really introduce ourselves according to race?

Maybe up there in Mahathir land people go about introducing themselves by saying with a smile “Hello Mahathir, my name is Mammooty and I’m Indian Malaysian, originally from Kerala. How are you?”
I don’t know. Maybe that’s because Mammooty carelessly assumes that Mahathir is from Kerala.

But down here where the rest of us live, race does not form part of a casual introduction.

In fact, it does not even form part of a formal introduction. No one says “We now invite Nazri to say a few words. He is Malay. A round of applause please.”

When Malaysians are overseas, they introduce themselves as Malaysians. Not Indians or Chinese.
The question of race is, however. present in other places.

Think scholarships, there is race in the mix. Think government contracts, there is race as a factor.
Fancy a discount on a new apartment? What race are you?

The majority of political parties in this country exist to further the interests of the particular races.

This is why the question of race continues to haunt us. It would not be the case if, for example, one thinks about scholarships and the only thing in the mix is the question of need.

It would not be the case if, for example, retired politicians stick to charitable causes and quit reminding a particular race that they are different from the others.

While Hussein spoke about “progressing with other races”, Mahathir speaks about the Malays needing crutches and having to be fearful of other races.

One spoke in 1981, and the other speaks in 2011.

One was a visionary, and the other a living relic.

The facts today are these.

Lee Chong Wei is the world’s number one badminton player. Tony Fernandes is the 2010 Forbes Asia’s Businessman of the Year and Zeti Akhtar Aziz is among the world’s top seven best central bankers for 2010. They have one thing in common. They are all Malaysians.

And they are a testament to the fact that the secret of our various successes lies in our multiculturalism. — mysinchew.com

malaysiakini: Dislodging Article 153 will tear society apart.... Prof. Shad Saleem Faruqi

Dislodging Article 153 will tear society apart

Shad Saleem Faruqi
Feb 2, 11
5:01pm

I am shocked and sad at the S Pathmawathy's report about my paper at the Tenaganita/Bar Council seminar on Jan 29. Parts of the report, especially the first four paragraphs, are distorted and contained mischievous and materially false statements.

The first four paragraphs of the report deliberately falsify and fabricate the thesis I sought to present.

The first paragraph that “A constitutional expert has outlined how he thought the special position of the Malays had subtly evolved into ethnic hegemony” is very far from what I said. I never used the words “ethnic hegemony”.

I used the word “ketuanan” to describe the recent interpretation of Article 153. You are entitled to interpret “ketuanan Melayu” as “ethnic hegemony”, but you should not attribute this wrong interpretation to me. The only time I used the word hegemony was to describe the hegemony of the West over the rest of the world.

In the second paragraph, you lied blatantly when you said that Emeritus Professor Shad Saleem Faruqi “eloquently described the atrocities against equality in the constitution.” I never used the words “atrocities against equality”.

In fact, my seminar paper had a portion about 'The Malaysian Constitution's Promise of Equality'. In this portion, I had pointed out how Article 8(1), 8(2), 8(3), 8(4), 136, 12(1), 12(2), electoral laws, posts in the federal service (except for the position of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong) are ethnicity free.

I also pointed out that the constitution guarantees cultural freedoms, business opportunities, membership of professions and citizenship irrespective of race or religion. Yet you falsely accused me of talking of “atrocities” against the ideal of equality.

My presentation had tried to point out both sides of the story - how the constitution honours equality and how it permits exceptions.

I had also taken great pains to point out that “no constitution ideal is as worthy and yet as unattainable as the ideal of equality before the law”. Throughout the world, massive exceptions including some systemic, structural departures from the ideal of equality abound. What the law says and what the reality on the ground is wide apart. I had pointed to the system of justice in the USA where 70 percent of the inmates in prison are non-whites.

What rankles me most is that you fabricated the statement that “such provisions (the affirmative action provisions) are no longer relevant”. In fact, I had cautioned against revolutionary changes and had recommended evolutionary developments. I had pointed out that any attempt to dislodge Article 153 would tear society apart.

My paper which was shown on powerpoint was entitled 'Race, religion and equal protection under the law'. Your heading to the article 'When special position evolved into ketuanan' created the impression that this was the heading of my speech, which it was not.

You correctly pointed out that I recommended the setting up of an Equal Opportunities Commission but you adroitly omitted the word “subject to Article 153".

You also did not emphasise that I had insisted that both public and private sectors must be subjected to the Article 8 requirement of equality by an Equal Opportunities Commission or tribunal. I had emphasised that discrimination in the private sector contributes to discrimination in the public sector and vice versa.

Your story paints me as someone who has no respect for the constitution. In fact, I believe that the constitution was a remarkable piece of compromise, compassion and tolerance. It dealt with the existentialist reality of Malay backwardness and took a path of compromise and pragmatism. Some of its provisions, while not in line with traditional constitutional theory, were a very moderate and pragmatic response to the realities of Malaysian society.

The gist of my presentation was that in 1957, there was an ethnic bargain and that if non-Malays seek to renegotiate the social contract on Malay special position, then many Malays may ask “if privileges must go, what then happens to the citizenship of the non-Malays.”

I had said that only one part of the social bargain cannot be jettisoned. To reopen the 1957 compromises is a game both sides can play.

You were correct in reporting my belief that Article 153 was left in the hands of politicians and mostly benefitted the rich elite. That is why I had suggested that Article 153 implementation needs to be scrutinised, any over zealousness needs to be checked, and the real provisions of Article 153 need to be studied and adhered to.

I request you to please print this reply and to please be more careful in not putting your own beliefs (to which you have a right to) in the mouth of others.

Professor Emeritus Dr Shad Saleem Faruqi
Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM)

Editor's note: We regret the misinterpretation of certain portions of Shad's speech, but this was not due to deliberate falsification or fabrication on the part of the journalist.

East Asia Forum: Can Malaysia graduate?... by Hal Hill, ANU

Can Malaysia graduate?

East Asia Forum
January 19th, 2011
by Hal Hill, ANU

Malaysia is one of the developing world’s great success stories. Few countries outside of East Asia can match its development record. Since its independence over 53 years ago per capita incomes have risen more than eight-fold, and absolute poverty has been all but eliminated.

But it currently faces three key, interrelated challenges, some generic to upper middle income developing countries, others specific to Malaysia itself.

The first, how to graduate to the rich-country club, has been clearly articulated by the country’s Prime Minister, Tun Najib: ‘We are now at a critical juncture, either to remain trapped in a middle-income group or advance to a high-income economy … We now have to shift to a new economic model based on innovation, creativity and high value added activities.’

The second, shared by some of its Southeast Asian neighbours, is the country’s slower development trajectory since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. Even before the current global financial crisis, which it has navigated quite successfully, economic growth in the 2000’s was about two percentage points below that of the decade 1986-96.

Particularly worrisome is the slump in investment, which has been stuck at little more than 20 per cent of GDP since the late 1990s. This is 10-15 percentage points of GDP lower than the country’s historic ratio. With savings remaining buoyant, the country’s external position has been transformed dramatically. In 2002, the country had net liabilities equivalent to 35 per cent of GDP. By 2008, this had been transformed to net assets of 20 per cent of GDP. Put simply, Malaysians have been finding overseas investment increasingly attractive, while foreigners have been less attracted to Malaysia.

The third challenge relates to the development of high-quality institutions to underpin a modern market economy in a country that has experienced continuous one-party rule for over half a century. Malaysia’s ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) is in fact the world’s longest-serving governing party currently in power among all ‘quasi democracies’. Not surprisingly, elements of UMNO exhibit the problems of complacence and arrogance that one expects from entrenched one-party dominance.

Malaysia’s strengths are not to be underestimated. It has always been one of the most open economies in the developing world, to both trade and foreign investment. It has rarely had a severe macroeconomic crisis, in large part because of this openness. It derived a major early mover advantage from its adoption in the early 1970s of export oriented industrialisation through foreign direct investment, before it was fashionable to do so.

Among emerging economy manufactured goods exporters, it has progressed from 15th ranked and 1.2 per cent of the total in 1969-70 to 5th ranked and 5.2 per cent of the total in 2006-07. It is a major player in the global electronics industry. In 2006-07, it accounted for 3.8 per cent of global parts and components exports, in East Asia behind only the highly industrialised economies of China, Japan and Korea.

But Malaysia is struggling to shift out of low-skill activities, where it is no longer competitive with lower wage neighbours. These problems have been exacerbated by its vigourous promulgation of one of the longest running affirmative action programs in the developing world. Designed to redistribute employment and wealth to the dominant Bumiputera – principally ethnic Malay – community after the nasty communal conflict of May 1969, the so-called New Economic Policy (NEP) and its successors played an important role in promoting racial harmony in the country where there are large differences in living standards across racial groups.

But these programs have created a culture of entitlement, and they have resulted in institutionalised leakages that permeate practically every aspect of Malaysian commercial, social, political and educational life. The programs to advance Bumiputera development have benefited spectacularly the politically well-connected within this community, through preferential contracts, share allocations, and general commercial advancement, while all too little has trickled down to the general community. The programs can hardly be justified as anti-poverty programs when the principal beneficiaries are already egregiously wealthy.

As a result, some of the country’s industry policies have backfired. Malaysia might have been expected to be the leading Southeast Asian automotive producer, but Thailand has become the ‘Detroit of Asia’ owing to Malaysia’s disastrous national car program. In addition, the ‘spillover’ benefits from the large multinational presence in manufacturing have been limited by the fact that Malaysia’s small and medium enterprises (SMEs), that are predominantly owned by the ethnic Chinese community, prefer to stay small, below the threshold above which Bumiputera employment quotas become mandatory.

The country’s public universities, once among the region’s best, have also slipped in East Asian rankings owing to these ethnic quotas as well as heavy bureaucratic control. The civil service is bloated and in need of reform, while there is a very large state enterprise sector that functions in a non-transparent manner and subject to little public accountability.

Moreover, Malaysia has missed out on emerging service sector opportunities owing to the slow pace of liberalisation in that sector, itself a product of the very large presence of state-dominated firms and the NEP-preference schemes. And the country continues to experience a substantial brain drain as a result of the exodus of skilled professionals from the Chinese and Indian communities.

It is fashionable in Malaysia to attribute its current malaise to China, a country that is able to out-compete Malaysia in low-end and increasingly a sophisticated range of manufactures. While the ‘export similarity index’ (that is the composition of their exports) for the two countries is quite high, and thus there has some been some loss of market share to China from Malaysia in third-country export markets, the notion that the rise of China explains Malaysia’s current difficulties is untenable. That view overlooks the positive sum game for Malaysia from China’s rise.

As a resource-rich economy, Malaysia has benefited from the general China-fuelled rise in commodity prices, for example its exports of palm oil and oil and gas. Similarly, commercial opportunities in tourism and education have been rising rapidly, with two-way investments rising very quickly. And Malaysia is a central player in the increasingly China-centred East Asian production networks that export to the world.

Hal Hill is HW Arndt Professor of Southeast Asian Economies at the Australian National University. With Tham Siew Yean and Ragayah Haji Mat Zin, he is co-editor of ‘Graduating from the Middle: Malaysia’s Development Challenges’, forthcoming in 2011.

We have to speak up.... by P. Ramakrishnan, President of Aliran

We have to speak up

by P. Ramakrishnan
President of Aliran
12th January 2011

JAN 12 — We have every reason to be concerned. We wonder where this nation is heading for and what is in store for us.

From the civil servant to the Umno politician, it is the same story: The non-Malays are “pendatang” (immigrants) and don’t have any citizenship rights. The rights conferred by Article 8 of the Federal Constitution are not respected or protected.

When an extreme group like Perkasa questions the citizenship rights of the non-Malays, the national leadership does not take them to task.

When extreme elements in Umno berate and denigrate the non-Malays, the top Umno leadership does not chastise them.

When one Umno delegate at the recently concluded general assembly had the temerity to suggest that the non-Malays be given the right to do business but should be denied the right to vote, nobody pointed out that it was against the constitution and that he should not be talking through his nose!

It is this disturbing silence when atrocious things are said which affect our unity that is worrying. It is this unbecoming conduct that encourages the extreme elements amongst us to be outrageous in their conduct and prompt them to continue with their seditious remarks.

It is this vocal minority that is predominant in our society and influences the trend of policy. Our political leaders dare not condemn them outright.

Utusan Malaysia fans the race-baiting and gives the widest publicity without bothering to be responsible or sensible. When the powers-that-be that own and control this press do not force it to fall in line, what do we make of this?

A nation can make or break depending on the unity of its citizens. Today our unity is threatened. And if concerned voices and responsible leaders and caring Malaysians do not rise up and speak up, we will be a fragmented nation.

By our silence, we will contribute to the chaos that may ensue.

Malaysian Digest: Open Letter to Chua Soi Lek.... By Kee Thuan Chye

Open Letter to Chua Soi Lek

By Kee Thuan Chye
Wednesday, 12 January 2011
Malaysiandigest.com

Dear Soi Lek,

You are a highly educated person and one with the ability to think. As such, you are probably aware that the welfare of this nation rests on more than just the MCA winning its share of seats at the next general election and remaining in the coalition that holds the power to decide the fate of Malaysia.

You are probably aware that the way forward for Malaysia is renouncing the way of the Barisan Nasional, led by Umno, falling back on an outdated decades-old formula. And that if you and the MCA continue to collude with the other parties in BN to retain power, you are subscribing to practices that could lead the nation to racial rifts and economic ruin.

Would you not agree with me that at this point in our history, as we stand at this crucial crossroads deciding which is the best path to take, national politics should no longer be race-based?

If you do agree, what then is the rationale for the MCA to continue to exist as an ethnocentric party?

What is the rationale for you and your party members to stick with Umno which avowedly fights for the Malays and the MIC which avowedly fights for the Indians?

How long more do you see this ethnocentric equation taking hold of the lives of Malaysians, causing strife from time to time when disputes arise over who should get what and how much? We’ve had 53 years of that; isn’t it enough?

Which is more important for you and your MCA colleagues: To stay on in BN in order to reap the rewards of being in government positions, or to do something that will ensure the honour and integrity of your party and of yourselves? I cannot tell you what that thing is which you could do to gain rectitude. You have to find it yourself.

But as you search for an answer, perhaps you would like to reflect on how strong the MCA’s position really is within the BN coalition for the party to achieve its aims. Are you, for instance, contributing to inter-racial understanding and harmony? How could that be when you have to speak up against any threat to the position of the Chinese? How could that be when Umno must speak up against any perceived threat against the Malays?

It’s a game full of contradictions, isn’t it? You can’t have one and the other, can you? In fact, your attempts over the past several months to speak up for the Chinese – indeed, for the country as a whole – clearly illustrate this.

Last August, after the Malaysian Chinese Economic Congress, when you called on the Government to gradually remove the 30 per cent Bumiputra equity in all sectors of the economy, you were immediately jumped upon by Umno deputy president Muhyiddin Yassin. He even warned you about May 13.

A few days later, in your interview with a Malay-language newspaper, you had to soften what you had said, clearly showing your vulnerability.

Even Umno vice-president Hishammuddin Hussein told you to “stick to the struggles of BN”. What are they? Do you know?

You were even a target of criticism at the Umno general assembly last October. A delegate slammed you for saying that the social contract should not be discussed openly.

Then at the BN convention last month, you called for a ban on the use of the term “Ketuanan Melayu”, and you told Umno it should not approve government policies during its supreme council meetings. But straight away, Hishammuddin said you had upset many BN leaders, including those in the MCA.

This boggles the mind. What you said was absolutely right – how could Umno take it upon itself to decide on government policies when it is only one of the component parties of BN? Does the MCA have no say? So how could MCA leaders be upset by what you said? Have they become Umnofied themselves? Have they become slaves of their masters? Or, as former Perak menteri besar Nizar Jamaluddin said, “running dogs”?

If so, what dignity is left in them? And in you, if you continue to serve the MCA within the BN fold?
Isn’t it obvious, too, that what you say doesn’t count for “doodley-squat”, as the American novelist Kurt Vonnegut would call it?

To be brutally honest, what good is your speaking up when you are still within the same cabal and your partners not only disagree with you, they don’t respect what you say?

As you have probably been informed, people outside don’t give much credence to your speaking up, anyway. They think it’s just a sandiwara act to merely give the impression that you are standing up for what is right. But it’s just an act.

I admit that going by the issues you have been bringing up recently, you are highlighting the fact that things are not being done right, and that your political partners should be held accountable. I might even hazard that you are at least concerned. What I fail to see, though, is your commitment.

For instance, at the MCA general assembly last October, Umno president Najib Razak told your party right within your own premises to be less communal and less demanding. Did you have an answer to that? Did you tell him in return to ensure that Umno would be less communal too? Did you tell him that the MCA was not being more demanding, that it was merely asking for what is guaranteed all Malaysians?

You see, I believe you know what is right for the country, but you are not willing to go all the way to ensuring that what is right prevails. If you were, you would not continue with the current regime. You would press for reform.

Surely, you would not disagree with me if I said the judiciary needs to be independent, that it needs to regain the trust of the people? The same with the police, the mainstream media and the civil service?

Surely, you would not disagree with me if I said our education system needs to be totally revamped to institute quality and regard for merit?

Surely, you would not disagree with me if I said that the way we award government projects needs to be transparent to eliminate cronyism? Or is that too tough a call after your appointment as Penang Port Commission chairman, a move that raised many eyebrows?

Above all, surely you would not disagree with me if I said we need a government that is clean; tells the truth; follows the rule of law; uses public funds for the people’s sake rather than for its own; and upholds the country’s institutions rather than abuses them for its own advantage?

Do we have such a government today?

If we did, you would not have said what you said last Dec 5 – when you called for each BN component party to have an equal voice and to share power “genuinely”; when you said BN had to change to be inclusive, multi-racial and to put the people first.

I know how to read between the lines, Soi Lek, and what you said that time said a lot about the coalition your party is part of.

Do you think it is capable of responding to your calls for change? Right now, looking just at the Cabinet line-up, we can see what a far cry it is from the days of Tunku Abdul Rahman. Will we ever see an inclusive government that has non-Malay ministers for the portfolios of Finance, Trade and Industry, or Defence? That no longer looks at skin color but at ability, integrity and character?

I think you might better serve the people by taking the first step that leads away from race-based politics. If you choose to do that, you will be blazing a trail. And that could bring honor not only to you but your party as well. Unless, of course, you’re a politician first and a public servant last. Then all I’ve been saying here would be worth doodley-squat.

Sincerely,
Chye

malaysiakini: Malaysia's lost decade... by Josh Hong

Malaysia's lost decade

Josh Hong
malaysiakini: Dec 31, 2010, 2:24pm

After much dithering, I picked up the courage 10 years ago this month to return to Malaysia. Prior to that, I had spent a good 11 years in London, where the 'miserable comfort' was both real and surreal to me.

I knew I had to put up with some serious miseries in Kuala Lumpur: horrible traffic congestion, notoriously disorganised public transport, and an economic 'miracle' that had been brought to its knees by the financial crisis in the late 1990s.

But there were hopes too. The general elections in November 1999 had dealt a severe blow to Mahathir Mohamad's autocratic and megalomaniac style of government, while a new political course was struggling to make its voice heard, one that was no longer premised on race and the feudalistic loyalty that it demanded, but on one's civic duties as a dignified citizen that respect the rule of law, fair play and justice.

In other words, I wanted to see the end of the Mahathir regime, which was plain racist, arbitrary and corrupt to the core, and see it replaced with an alternative that truly championed the people's causes. Ten years on, my initial hopes have largely evaporated.

Since Mahathir's 'retirement' in late 2003, we have had two more prime ministers, but neither of them has grasped the opportunity to reform the country root and branch.

If anything, political culture in the country has only gone from bad to worse. Malaysian politics is divisive; it always has been. But it was the power-crazy Mahathir whose 22 years of rule that had sharpened the religious, ethnic and class differences. Every time when his power was threatened, Mahathir showed no qualms of resorting to racist and communal politics for survival.

Throughout the last decade, there was one word that made the most frequent appearance in the Malay press: pengkhianat (either of bangsa or Negara). 

 

Whenever Umno is pressed against the wall, the party leadership is quick to accuse its detractor of being an ingrate or a running dog to a foreign power. This is a tried and tested formula, engendered by Mahathir and perfected by his successors. Their latest tactic is to hide behind the Malay rulers, oblivious to the fact that national/religious/racial is no substitute for our dignity as individuals who cherish freedom.

Mahathir brought in Anwar Ibrahim in 1982 to shore up Umno's Islamic 'credentials', and did not hesitate to demonise PAS throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. Extremism begets extremism, and one would only expect the opponents to fight back with more vigour and determination, hence the increasingly conservative religious climate across the Peninsula. Soon, Sabah and Sarawak will succumb to it if Umno has its way.

The aftermath of pandering PMs

Both Abdullah Ahmad Badawi and Najib Abdul Razak have failed to respond to this. Instead of putting the nation (or are we a nation in its classical sense?) back on the secular track as envisioned by the Federal Constitution, Mahathir's successors have only managed to pander further to the religionists, albeit in a different way.

Religious authorities are now emboldened to threaten members of the public, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. People like Azwan Ismail risk becoming social outcasts unless they keep their true identity hidden. Meanwhile, removing non-Islamic symbols is an unwritten requirement if one desires the prime minister to grace one's religious occasion.

In the event of lack of public support and state protection, I would suggest Azwan to emigrate. Facing threat from naked religious power and confronted with an indifferent society, emigration is always the safest bet.

This is not a time to engage in scholarly or religious debate over the issue of sexuality when one's life is at risk. No fiddling when the weak minorities are being cursed, please.

As for non-Muslim bodies, there is one simple way to save yourselves the dilemma of having to avoid using religious signage: stop inviting politicians for religious functions.

After all, it is not the presence of the prime minister that saves one's soul. If one insists on such feudal practice, then be prepared to live with the humiliation and stop complaining.

At the societal level, ethnic divisions have only become more visible. Every single issue can conveniently become tinged with racial or religious colour, and the public's attention is easily shifted. Despite the March 2008 political tsunami, people on the street now only feel more alienated from each other.

Corruption maggots' endless feast
Yes, Teoh Beng Hock died a tragic death, and it is only right that all conscientious Malaysians are aggrieved by it.

But there are many more innocent deaths too, such as that of Gunasegaran and Aminulrasyid Amzah, and it is time that we have a concerted and nationwide effort to bring justice to their bereaved families. Sadly, cross-ethnic solidarity remains slow in coming.

Finally, none of our leaders has demonstrated the actual will to root out corruption and overhaul our economic structure. The appointment of Mohd Isa Samad, the tainted former menteri besar of Negri Sembilan, as Felda chairman is the latest case in point.

Furthermore, our economy remains anchored in the fraternity between tycoons (predominantly Chinese but increasingly multiracial) and the ruling elite. The 'loveable rich' pledge their allegiance to Umnoputras in return for economic favours, required by the 'political and economic architecture to bribe as well as to lobby', as described by Joe Studwell in Asian Godfathers.


The end result is the rapidly widening inter and intra ethnic income gap evidenced by the mushrooming of modern condos and service apartments in Malaysian cities that cater mostly to the super-rich. Liew Kee Sin of S P Setia Bhd., a top property developer, has indeed thrived under the New Economic Policy, but he does not speak for the majority of Malaysians who merely eke out a living.

Still, it is nearly an insurmountable task to make this raw reality plain to the general public (the Malays especially) because of Umno's media manipulation and its camouflaging of class dominance with ethno-populism.

Tony Benn, a British Labour veteran and a staunch socialist, attributed Britain's social malaise in the 1980s to Margaret Thatcher's philosophy that measured 'the price of everything and the value of nothing'. Listen to his excellent speech in Parliament, and one will be astounded to know how much the issues elaborated by Benn are relevant to Malaysia's lost decade.

What would become of Malaysia in the next decade to come? I certainly hope I will live long enough to see it. Happy New Year!

CPI Commentary: The Islamisation of Malaysia (Pt I)... by Michael D Barr & Anantha Raman Govindasamy

The Islamisation of Malaysia: religious nationalism in the service of ethnonationalism

Commentary

Written by Michael D. Barr & Anantha Raman Govindasamy

Thursday, 30 December 2010 15:47

The relationship between religious, ethnic and national identities in Malaysia has long been fraught with uncomfortable tensions-especially for the 50 percent of Malaysians who are outside the dominant Malay-Muslim communal grouping.  Until the accession of Dr Mahathir to the prime ministership at the beginning of the 1980s, it was clear that ethnic identity trumped religious identity, even though being Muslim was already intrinsic to being accepted as Malay.  Being a non-Malay Malaysian was to accept a subordinate, but not a drastically uncomfortable role in the nation. Since the 1980s, however, religious identity appears to have replaced ethnicity as the central element of nation identity as the society has been systematically-even aggressively-Islamised.  Yet appearances can be deceiving, and there is a strong case to be made that Islamisation in Malaysia is basically a variation of the original Malay ethnonationalism, using the nearly complete symbiosis between Malay and Muslim identity as the point of articulation that allows religious nationalism to serve as a cipher for ethnonationalism-but a version of ethnonationalism that is much less accommodating of minorities than was traditional Malay nationalism.  This article places contemporary events in a historical context and then focuses on just one aspect of Malaysia’s program of Islamisation that is both contemporary and central to national identity-developments in the education system, and particularly within the secondary school history curriculum-to demonstrate that in this instance at least, religious nationalismis operating as a surrogate for ethnic nationalism and has, in fact,intensified ethnic nationalism by raising the stakes for the communities that are outside the core national group. Introduction The Federation of Malaysia came into being in 1963 as an expansion of the earlier Federation of Malaya-which in turn had only been formed in 1957. Since the early 1980s, it has been the scene of an aggressive government sponsored Islamic project that is built upon an ongoing project of ethnicnationalism by the demographically and politically dominant Malays, all of whom are Muslims by law. The dominance of both Islam and Malays has generally been accepted with a remarkable level of equanimity by Malaysia’s religious and ethnic minorities2, on the assumption that the overall policy is basically one of benign tolerance for those outside the core national groupings. The proponents of this contemporary religious nationalist project, beginning with former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, have never overtly declared or acknowledged that there was a shift in policy from ethnic to religious identification, but we argue in this article that they have rested the religious project on the foundation of the more overtly acknowledged ethnic project, and on the historical reality of the close symbiosis between being Malay and being Muslim (see, for example, Mahathir 2000). In this we build upon an extraordinarily prescient observation made by Judith Nagata right at the outset of this process: Malay[ness] no longer provides a sufficient distinction between Malays and non-Malays as a basis for ethnic identity. The erosion of the first two elements of ‘Malayness’ - language and adat - has left only one effective distinguishing feature - Islam (Nagata 1980: 409). This sleight of hand was not designed to fully disguise the shift in emphasis between the Mahathir era and that which went before it, either for scholars or for Malaysians themselves, but it has effectively papered over the tensions between the ethnic element in the Malay-Muslim identity (looking primarily towards the Malay world*/Nusantara*/for anchorage) and the religious elements (looking towards the universal Muslim community*/the ummah). These two forms of communal identity have been present in Malay nationalism since at least the Kaum Muda (‘Young Group’) movement of the 1920s (Roff 1994: 56:90) and remain a point of significant contestation today (Frith 2000;Hooker 2004), though this contestation is well hidden in the official discourses.3 With most participants failing to actively separate the two agendas and even some academics taking the historical claims of Malay and Malay-Muslim identity at face value (for example, Hng 1998: 85-109; Lukman 2005; Mutalib 2007: 36-7), the new program of religious nationalism has successfully claimed its place as a logical extension of the older ethnic nationalist program. In this article, we contend that it is misleading to regard Malaysia’s lslamisation program either as a simple extension of the old ethnic nationalist agenda or as a new project in its own right, but that it should rather be regarded as a tool in the service of that ethnic agenda*/a program of hegemony designed to reinforce Malay occupation at the heart of Malaysia’s nation-building project and to condition non-Malays and non-Muslims to accept their assimilation into the Malaysian nation as subordinate, peripheral partners. We also argue that this project has had the entirely predictable effect of reducing the comfort levels of the non-Muslims minorities. Malay nationalism The metamorphosis of Malaysia’s ethnocentric nation-building project into one centred on religious nationalism could never have been predicted*/and, indeed,was not predicted*/or even seriously contemplated during the late colonial decades that marked the high point of Malay nationalist activism, or at any time during the first two decades after the original Federation of Malaya was formed n 1957. UMNO*/the politically hegemonic United Malays National Organisation*/was formed explicitly to defend what was perceived as the special place of Malays and Malay traditional rulers (sultans) in their own land. Islam was an important social element in Malayness, but its role was not intrinsic (Roff 1994:67). Rather, the essential criterion for being Malay was being vaguely*/very vaguely*/a native of the Malay-Indonesian archipelago and having ‘Malay’ mores and language. This loose formula was really a code for not being Chinese,European or Indian, which was highlighted by the fact that some Malay ‘states’ welcomed Thais and Arabs as fellow Malays (Shamsul 2004: 141).4 The exclusion of Chinese, Europeans and Indians from ‘Malayness’ firmed spontaneously and spectacularly when Dato Onn Jaafar, the founding leader of UMNO and a Malay nationalist leader for several decades, tried to expand UMNO membership to include Chinese and Indians and change the M-word in UMNO from ‘Malays’ to the ethnically inclusive ‘Malayan’. He immediately found himself marginalised within UMNO (Hooker 2003: 191) and was forced to resign from the organisation in August 1951 (Straits Times  1951a, 1951b). The more ambivalent place of Islam in Malay identity was indicated by the rather different treatment meted out to Onn’s successor as UMNO leader,Tunku Abdul Rahman, when he tried to dilute the link between being Malay and being Muslim. He, too, found that he had overstepped the mark, in his case by suggesting that Christian and other non-Muslim indigenes of Sabah and Sarawak could be properly regarded as full Malays because their language was similar to Malay (Milner 2008: 160; Straits Times 1961). His initiative did not gain traction, but he was allowed to remain as head of UMNO and went on to become Malaysia’s founding prime minister. Significantly, Tunku’s great unforgivable offence* and the one that led directly to his political demise at the end of the 1960s* was that he was regarded as being soft on the Chinese(Milner 2008: 155-61) by his promotion of a multicultural Malaya, albeit one that placed Malays in a dominant and central role within the multicultural national identity (Cheah 2005: 102). This is not to say that Islam was not an important element in Malay identity or Malay nationalism. Indeed the dakwah (Islamic revivalist) movement of the early decades of the twentieth century was an intrinsic element in building an anticolonialist and nationalist reaction among Malays, but the primary purpose of its founders and activists was, in fact, to challenge many of the elements on which Malay identity depended: the centrality of sultans to the social order, adat (village customary law,which often contradicted Islamic law), and animist-inspired Malay superstitions (Means 1969; Milner 2008; Mutalib 1993: 21-3; Roff 1994: 56-90). By any construction of Malay identity, this was a challenge that could not be regarded as a friendly encounter-whether one’s notion of Malayness is based uponthe genealogical paths leading back through Melaka to Srivajaya and Alexander theGreat; on the centrality of the sultanates as kerajaan (the condition of being the subject of a raja or a sultan) (Milner 1982: 9, 112-16; Milner 2008: 30), or Malay mores; or on a Sukarno-like notion of Indonesia/Melayu Raya (‘Greater Indonesia/Malaya’) such as inspired the Malay Nationalist Party (Andaya 2004; Kahn 2006:92-3; Milner 1982, 2002, 2008; Shamsul 2004). Furthermore, there can be no doubt that it was a challenge that the sultans- and, by extension, ‘Malayness’-won with British help (Roff 1994: 14). From the late nineteenth century onwards, the tentative control that the traditional rulers exercised over the conduct of Islam was systematically strengthened by treaties, laws, colonial practices and some sharp politics by a few of the sultans (Harper 2001: 20; Roff 1994: 67-74). When it came time to write the constitution for the Federation of Malaya, no one questioned that the traditional rulers were the proper people to run Muslim affairs. Even in the abortive British proposal for a modern, egalitarian ‘Malayan Union’, the sultans were still to be given this role. Furthermore, the Malay nationalist leaders of UMNO, who were themselves mostly scion of the feudal Malay aristocracy, showed no inclination to challenge this aspect of the status quo, despite their deep disappointment with the performance of most of the sultans, and despite their desire to privilege popular sovereignty ahead of the traditional role of the sultans (Harper 2001: 85; Noordin Sopiee 1974: 24).5 Upon achieving independence, Islam became the state religion of the new Federation of Malaya (thus securing a special and protected status in an otherwise secular and pluralist constitution)6 and, to this day, the regulation of Islam in Malaysia remains a state-as opposed to a federal-responsibility, resting in the hands of the traditional rulers (Martinez 2001: 477-8).7 The Malay version of Islam is therefore ntensely localised, with its own parochial lines of authority, practices and social relationships.8 In both a social and a political sense, therefore, Islam in Malaysia has long been operating in a context of Malayness and been subordinate to it. Islamisation The subordination of Islamic identity to Malayness appeared to begin changing with the Islamisation program initiated by Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad, and there cannot be much doubt about Dr Mahathir’s motivation. As Cheah (2002: 213) expressed it succinctly: Dr Mahathir ‘attempted to curb[a recent rise in] Islamic extremism and militancy among some sections of Muslim intellectuals by playing an ‘‘Islamic card’’’. The causes of the original rise in Islamic consciousness and militancy cannot preoccupy us in this short article, but we might note that Chandra (1987) explained this outburst of Islamisation as the outcome of spiritual alienation faced by Malays in the rapid urbanisation and westernisation of the country. On the other hand, Amrita(2003: 258) put some of the responsibility for escalating it onto Mahathir himself by arguing that the political rivalry between the ruling UMNO and the opposition PAS (Parti al-Islam Se-Malaysia) was itself a driver of Islamism. Farish (2003: 199) came close to making the same point when he referred to ‘the Islamization race between PAS and the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional (National Front) government that took place in the 1980s and 1990s’. Regardless of the origins of the rise in Islamic militancy under Mahathir’s predecessor (Cheah2002: 159-84), there can be little room to doubt that in the 1980s, the resurgence was largely the work of the Malaysian government through its program of Islamisation (Camroux 1996: 855) and that by the end of the 1990s, t was occupying a prominent and contentious place in discourses over national identity (Cheah 2005: 111). The Islamic resurgence was not intended to convert non-Muslims to Islam; it was rather about targeting Muslims to have deeper Islamic knowledge and stronger Islamic identity, and to bring the practice of Islam under closer government control and scrutiny (Martinez 2001). This, however, created an oppressive atmosphere for the 40 percent of the population that was non-Muslim. They felt increasingly brow beaten into accepting a subordinate status. It was not a coincidence that the vast majority of Muslims were also Malays, and could be expected to identify fully with the newly emerging national identity just as they could with the old.9 With Dr Mahathir’s accession to the premiership in 1981, the UMNO dominated Malaysian government began implementing-slowly at first-policies and programs that were designed variously to highlight Muslim’s religious identity, impose Islamic mores, or regulate Islam. This program did not pose a major problem for non-Muslims in the early stages. The first stage of Islamisation included some initiatives in education, but most of the focus was on Islamising the architecture of new government buildings, and reforming the dietary and dress practices of Muslims.10 The second stage focused on establishing and expanding Islamic institutions, such as Islamic banks, Islamic centres and mosques. These measures were accepted with complaisance by the non-Muslim community. Throughout both these phases, however, the public culture had been systemically altered to make it more Islam-centric. For instance, the federal government had launched programs of building more Islamic schools, offering more Islamic courses in local universities, and sending more students to the Middle East to become Islamic scholars (Milne and Mauzy1999: 84-5). The state-controlled section of the media had also increased their offerings of Islamic television and radio programs. Perhaps most significant of all, the Islamic Centre (Pusat Islam) was created under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Department, and it came to play a central role as a driver in a much broader Islamisation program than is indicated by this brief survey of initiatives (Milne and Mauzy 1999: 85). From the perspective of interrogating the relationship between ethnic and religious nationalism, it is worth noting that the educational and cultural aspects of Islamic revivalism were packaged as partof the mainstream economic programs-New Economic Policy, National Development Policy and National Vision Policy. The first two of these programs were, in part, targeted at uplifting the Malays economically, which provided another point of articulation between Islamic and Malay political assertion (Mohamed 2005: 86). Thus, by the time Malaysia entered the third stage of Dr Mahathir’s Islamisation program, the national culture had already been transformed into one that made non-Muslims feel marginalised, if not defensive. The third stage, beginning in the late 1980s, proved to be an intensification of this pattern, and it brought non-Muslims and Muslims into direct confrontation. The third phase focused on expanding the capacity and jurisdiction of the Syariah courts and legal apparatus, and standardising various states’ Islamic organisations (Hamayotsu 2003: 56). In 1988, the Malaysian Parliament approved constitutional amendments in the Federal Constitution and added Article 121 (1A)(Malaysian Federal Constitution 2006), which reads: ‘The [civil courts] shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts.’ This initiative was followed by all the other states in Malaysia in restructuring their Islamic legal institutions. The climax of Islamic resurgence occurred in September 2001 when Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad declared Malaysia to be an Islamic state (Martinez 2001: 474). These changes had a direct impact on the non-Muslims. Local government followed the state religious departments’ lead by introducing local initiatives that reflected the Syariah values being entrenched at the higher levels of government. For instance, even in the ethnically and religiously heterogeneous state of Melaka, state-sponsored ‘snoop squads’ of up to 60 members began monitoring social activities among the youth, looking out for immoral activity. This ‘moral policing’ targeted Muslims in particular, but little care was taken to distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims (Kent 2005). Local governments also began limiting non-Muslim places of worship by refusing building permits and land allocations, and pro-actively destroying non-Muslims’ worshipping sites (Lee1988: 412). Moreover, on a national level, the civil courts began refusing to consider child custody cases when any party was a Muslim, claiming that jurisdiction on such matters lay solely with the Syariah courts.11 The non-Muslim political parties in the Barisan Nasional never fully and publicly confronted UMNO on these matters. The Islamisation policies wereregarded as part of an internal Malay-Muslim program and therefore exempt from critical assessment by non-Muslims. When non-Muslim Opposition Members of Parliament have tried to engage in debate on these issues, they have been rebuffed in precisely these terms.12 Nevertheless, there were a few occasions when the non-Malay political parties within the Barisan Nasional coalition tried to voice their concerns. For instance, in 1989, when the Selangor State Assembly passed a controversial bill that allowed the conversion of minors to Islam without their parents’ approval, the bill was opposed by eight Chinese members of the Barisan Nasional. Yet the outcome merely confirmed the hegemony of the Muslim nation in Malaysia: the Chinese dissenters were not only defeated, but they were forced to publicly admit their ‘mistake’ in opposing the bill (Hamayotsu 2003: 71).13 The impotence of the non-Muslim component parties in the Barisan Nasional gave UMNO a free hand to introduce more Islamic-oriented policies.  The most recent phase of Islamisation is that ushered in by Dr Mahathir’s successor, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, who took over in 2003. In one of his first initiatives, Abdullah shifted the framing of the national discussion about Islam from Dr Mahathir’s conceptions of ‘modern’ Islam and ‘moderate’ Islam, to Islam Hadhari or ‘civilisational Islam’: highlighting the glories of Islamic civilisation and building an aspiration to reach such heights again (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia 2005).14 Religious nationalism supplants pluralism At one level, the elevation of Islam Hadhari to centre stage was simply a change in the rhetoric by which Islamism was being injected into the heart of the body politic, or at most another phase in the contestation of political ascendancy in the Muslim constituency (Chong 2006: 26), but we contend that, at a deeper level, it was much more. The significance of this development was that it was intended as a national ideology for Malaysia as a country-not just for Muslims and not just for Malays. Taken together with Dr Mahathir’s declaration only two years earlier that Malaysia was an Islamic state, this represented an attempt to impose Islam at the heart of the Malaysian national identity, so that outsiders-that is non-Muslim Malaysian citizens-can have no more than a relationship with the Muslim core of the nation. This was not a new or startling lesson for the minorities, since, as we have demonstrated immediately above, they had been becoming accustomed to this status gradually over the previous 20 years. A relatively benign regime of Malay ethnocentrism had gradually been replaced with a much more assertive and personally intrusive form of Islamic religious nationalism that has successfully elevated Muslim identity to the status of being a central element of Malaysian national identity. What had changed was that the notion that Malaysia was the product of many varied historic forces and ethnic groups had been completely supplanted by a vision of Malaysia as the product of a glorious 1400-year-old Islamic civilisation. In practical terms, Islam Hadhari had very little impact on government, and it may prove to have an ephemeral life that passes into history with Abdullah Badawi’s retirement in 2009, but the one area where its footprint has been deep and probably lasting is in education. This should not come as a surprise, since exercises in both ethnic and religious nationalism routinely target the education system for special attention because it provides unique access to a new generation of citizens. This is not the place to expound at length or in detail on the many instances of this nation-building praxis, but even without leaving the immediate region, we find clear examples of such usage of education in Singapore on behalf of ‘Chinese values’ (Barr and Skrbis? 2008), in Sri Lanka on behalf of Buddhist nationalism (DeVotta 2007), and in India on behalf of Hindutva (Pardesi and Oetken 2008). The purpose of such education is to imbue an acceptance of the official vision of society in the next generation: building up the self-importance of members of the dominant group, and presenting the outsiders with the reality and rationale of their ‘natural’ subordinate and marginalised status. It is also in the education system that the defining characteristics of individual nation-building projects reveal themselves most transparently: hence, the remainder of this article is devoted to studying recent developments in the education system. We intend to use these developments to show that Islamic religious nationalism in Malaysia acts primarily as an instrument of Malay ethnic nationalism*/but a harder, less tolerant version than traditional Malay nationalism. ************* This paper was first published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.64, No.3 of June 2010. Notes 1. The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers who made such useful recommendations for the improvement of this article. 2. Of the total population, 39.6 percent are members of religions other than Islam, including Christians, Hindus, animists, and followers of Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist Chinese religions (Riddell 2005: 163), and 52.8% are not Malay. These are mainly Chinese, Indians and non-Malay indigenes (Daniel 2006: 711). 3. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore it in detail, but it should be noted that the conception and direction of Malay nationalism was also the subject of serious contestation over the twentieth century, with the raja-centric, conservative version that became dominant struggling at times against the broader concept of a Melayu Raya (‘Greater Malaya’) and even that of a Indonesia Raya (‘Greater Indonesia’, including Malays on the peninsula) (Rahim 2009: 150). These were based more on modern concepts of Malays as a ‘people’ (bangsa) rather than Malays as the subjects of a raja. Malay nationalist activists and movements have spanned the political spectrum and some have been overtly leftist in their politics (see Barnard and van der Putten 2008). 4. In one state of colonial Malaya, Indians could be accepted as Malays, but this was the only exception to the rejection of Chinese, Europeans and Indians from ‘Malayness’ (Shamsul 2004: 141). 5. Dato Onn did take some steps to build opposition to the rulers’ leadership role in Islam, but only in the last days of his membership of UMNO, when he was desperately looking for new bases of support within the organisation. It did not gain traction, even among the ulama, who stood to benefit if the bid had been successful (see Harper 2001: 337 8). 6. This describes how the relationship between Islam and the state has developed in Malaysia, but Shad Saleem Faruqi (n.d.: 40) argues that the architects of the original Malayan constitution never intended Islam to have more than a ceremonial role that would barely impinge upon the de facto secularity of the state. 7. It is important to note that these state powers are circumscribed somewhat by federal control over important matters like corporal punishment, and that Melaka, Pinang, Sarawak and Sabah do not have traditional rulers, so responsibility for Islam in these states defaults to the federal government. 8. This is not intended as a commentary on the ‘authenticity’ or otherwise of the Malay version of Islam. Barr has argued elsewhere that because of its lack of a transnational authority of governance, Islam is ‘localised’ in this fashion everywhere, which is why contemporary anthropologists urge that the study of doctrinaire Islam not be isolated from the study of reallife Muslims (Barr 2002: 130-1). This observation on the localisation of Islam should not be assumed to apply only to the rulers’ and UMNO’s version of Islam. It is beyond the focus of this article, but it is significant to note that the main Islamic-based opposition party-Parti al-Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS)-claims to advocate a purer form of the faith, but Farish (2003) argues eloquently that it, too, has adopted a highly localised interpretation of the faith. 9. This observation does not presume that all Malays actually did or do fully identify with this Malay-Muslim identity, or that they all did so in the simplistic UMNO-centric fashion that UMNO desired. Indeed, the results of the 2008 general elections, where many Malays voted for non-communal parties or for PAS, suggest that the roots of this identification may have been more shallow than had been previously thought. 10. For extensive explorations of the impact of the Islamisation program on government building architecture, see King (2008) and Willford (2007). 11. For a selection of reports on these matters, see Bernama Daily Malaysian News (2004), New Straits Times (2003) and Straits Times (2006, 2009). 12. An example of such a parliamentary exchange can be viewed on YouTube at <www.youtube.com/watch?v=EaE79RWoiL0>. 13. This pattern of non-Muslim subservience within the governing coalition has continued under Dr Mahathir’s successor. In 2006, nine non-Muslim members of the Federal Cabinet submitted a memorandum to then Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi asking the government to review Article 121 (1A) of the Constitution which established the supremacy of Syariah courts over civil courts (Malaysiakini 2006a). Two days later, the memorandum was retracted under pressure from UMNO (Malaysiakini 2006b). 14. The basic principles of Islam Hadhari are officially set out as follows: ‘Faith in and piety towards Allah, a just and trustworthy government, free and liberated people, a rigorous pursuit and mastery of knowledge, balanced and comprehensive economic development, a good quality of life for the people, protection for the rights of minority groups and women, cultural and moral integrity, safeguarding of the environment and strong defence capabilities’ (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia 2005: 12).