malaysiakini: Upholding the nation’s origins... By Clive Kessler

Upholding the nation’s origins

By Clive Kessler

NOV 8 — Their royal highnesses, the Rulers of the Malay states, following their recent October meeting as the Conference of Rulers, have urged all Malaysians to heed the nation’s history. Citizens, they remind us, must recognise the obligation upon all Malaysians to share the land and its benefits equitably. Their highnesses accordingly call upon all Malaysians to respect and uphold “the social  contract”.

More recently, in his regular “Reflecting on the Law” column in The Star (“Unifying Role of the Rulers”, November 3), the nation’s leading constitutional scholar Prof Shad Saleem Faruqi voiced a similar plea. Again, he insists, history must be acknowledged, it cannot be denied. There is no skirting around its legacy. The land and its bounty are to be shared in a fashion that is mindful of and faithful to the nation’s historical foundations. All the nation’s citizens, both Malay and non-Malay in their various historically distinctive ways born of how they became incorporated into the one shared nation, are stakeholders in the nation, its present benefits and future destiny.

The same message of historical awareness and responsibility, according to a recent column by Dr Mohd Ridhuan Tee Abdullah in Utusan Malaysia (“Sifat Toleransi Kerana Islam”, October 31), has been voiced by two leading Malaysian scholars of Chinese origins, the eminent historian Prof Khoo Kay Kim and the linguist (and lively Berita Harian columnist) Prof Teo Kok Seong.

There is nothing particularly controversial in what all these various guardians of the national conscience and heritage declare. No responsible political actor or commentator seriously questions these basic ideas. They are widely held.

And yet … The nation is nonetheless still caught up in lively debate, and marked by serious political differences, over these issues.

Why? Because while there is little dissent over the essentials that the Rulers and national scholars have in common affirmed, there still remain some significant differences concerning what those commonly agreed essentials, what we might call the “national fundamentals”, mean and imply.

Eager to uphold national sovereignty and harmony, the Malay Rulers, in their recent statement following their October meeting, expressed the hope that “the people will not allow outside involvement and interference in the country’s affairs”. So I perhaps comment on these matters now, as in the past, at my peril. Not a Malaysian citizen, I may be one of those whom the leading journalist Datuk Kadir Jasin, in the volatile time leading to the 1999 national elections, branded in the New Straits Times as “clueless outsiders”. But one can only speak of the truth as one sees it. And a person of character not only can but must do so.

Shad urges everybody to heed the Malay Rulers’ call to honour the “social contract” that is the basis of the Constitution and through it the nation — a constitution in which their royal highnesses have a pivotal role, an acknowledged standing and in-built position.

What kind of a role, standing, and position these are — to what degree they are symbolic and in what measure politically instrumental, and, where instrumental or “effective”, to what extent their royal highnesses are to be seen as capable of autonomous political action on their own behalf and in what measure they are there more to “be” than to “do”, or simply to serve as the personified embodiments of constitutional principle and the Constitution itself — are significant questions. Matters of heated contestation in Malaysia over the last three decades, these are questions that will not be addressed here.

Setting those questions aside, let us return to the now central idea of the “social contract”. This is what their royal highnesses’ recent statement invokes. This is an idea or phrase that is also used by Shad and Ridhuan Tee as well as by many contemporary political actors especially from Umno and Perkasa.

They all use it to “telescope” together or summarise other things: namely and notably, their view of the nation’s foundations and the manner whereby those negotiated foundations of nationhood, patiently worked through in the “Merdeka process” of the years 1955-1957, were expressed in, and made effective by the promulgation of, the Merdeka Constitution.

The term “social contract” is now used as, and has become for some, a standard “portmanteau term” or summary label for that Merdeka process, for its terms and what the process of agreeing to them as the basis of modern national sovereignty involved.

But, it should be clear, it is a term not of that time but of this, of ours now.

The idea of a “social contract”, in those words or terms, is nowhere to be found in and is no part of the Constitution’s language. Nor was that expression at the time any part of the deliberations and negotiations (“the Merdeka process and agreements”) that made the adoption and promulgation of the Constitution, and hence the creation of nation upon which it stands, possible.

The term “social contract” is a later construction. It is not part of the Constitution but retrospectively offers a certain subsequent — a very partisan and contested — political interpretation of its meaning (namely, that which was famously articulated by Tan Sri Abdullah Ahmad in his “Ketuanan Melayu” speech in Singapore in 1986).

Now inseparably associated with that much more recently created notion of “Ketuanan Melayu” which Abdullah promoted in that same address, the idea of “the Malaysian social contract” is a retrospective, partisan and revisionist notion (or “reading”) of the essence of national constitutional principle that some have wished to “read back into” the Constitution.

By recourse to this means, this conceptual manoeuvre, they seek to “read back” into the Constitution itself not only the idea of the “social contract” but also its associated companion notion of “Ketuanan Melayu”. In this way, with this stratagem, they are able “read out” these contested notions from the Constitution as if they were there. They pursue this recourse of contriving to find these notions already implicitly embedded there precisely because they are not, and never were, there in the first place.

The “social contract” and “Ketuanan Melayu” are “read back into” the Constitution and not, as this argumentative stratagem and those who employ it seek to suggest, “read off from it”. They must be “read back” into the Constitution, by means of a kind of after-the-event conceptual “smuggling” operation, by creative anachronism designed to serve the ends of a disguised revisionism.

All Malaysians need to be clear — fastidiously clear and precise — about this point. There is no comfort, no support, no entrenched precedental foundation in any of this for the creatively anachronistic, the retrospectively revisionist, the doctrinally expansionist notions that the “new Malaysian social contract theorists” and champions of the notion of “Ketuanan Melayu” seek to find — and happily imagine that they can see — in the foundational constitutional guarantees of modern Malaysian nationhood.

Ironically, the key protagonists on both sides of this centrally important question are agreed that both the spirit and the letter of the agreements reached as the basis for the nation’s founding moment in 1957 must be upheld and honoured.

There is no difference over that point. Both sides insist upon it. But the two sides disagree fundamentally about what those agreements and their implications, what their letter and animating spirit, were.

On the one side are those who for long spoke of, and affirmed their allegiance to, the “Merdeka agreements” that emerged from the “Merdeka process” and the “Merdeka negotiations”. They see those agreements as laying down, with clear and conscious intent, the foundations for an emerging democratic, progressive and secular multiethnic society and nation.

That was for long not only the “orthodox” or conventional view of the matter but the only one that could be given any credence — that had any support, any claim to be taken seriously. It was not just the “default” position but the only one on offer, the only one to be considered.

But from 1986, a different view began to be developed, voiced and promoted, one based upon Abdullah Ahmad’s radical reconceptualisation of the foundations and character of Malaysian nationhood. This view saw the national Constitution that emerged from the Merdeka process as having been advisedly designed and pre-adapted, from the outset, to serve certain subsequently advanced claims of Malay ascendancy in national life.

The Merdeka negotiations and process, in the view of these later thinkers, had solemnised — within what they retrospectively saw and named as a “Malaysian social contract” — their own more recently crafted ideas of “Ketuanan Melayu”.

For them, both the originating legitimation for the broad agenda of “Malay political ascendancy in perpetuity”, and also the crucial enabling mechanisms for asserting and implementing it institutionally, were somehow deeply embedded or powerfully “hard-wired” within the Constitution itself.

As part of a foundational “Malaysian social contract”, the new doctrine asserted, they had been implanted there, by common agreement of all parties including all member organisations of the Alliance Party, from the time of post-imperial national birth by those pre-independence negotiations. For them it was the joint legacy of Malaya’s “Midnight’s Children”.

“Ketuanan Melayu”, Malay social ascendancy and political domination, were accordingly, on this reading, part of the darah-daging, the very flesh and sinew, of the nation. Both explicit and implicit, stated and implied, spirit and letter, tersurat and tersirat, they were intertwined and integral parts of the Constitution itself.

Both sides see as politically “sacred” the nation’s founding moment, the Constitution promulgated at its founding moment, and the processes that made agreement to the adoption of that constitution possible. Both insist that the nation’s founding dispensation be upheld and honoured. They simply disagree — and disagree vehemently — over what that founding national covenant stated and now means, what its essential terms are.

The Constitution and the nationally focal “Merdeka moment” from which it emerged are what philosophers refer to as “essentially contested ideas”. They have become so as a result of the promotion, three decades after Merdeka itself, of a radical reinterpretation of modern nationhood. By its “rebranding” of the Merdeka agreements as the “social contract”, this new view reads the notion of Malay ascendancy, through its association with those new ideas of an originating “social contract”, into the fabric of the nation and the terms of the Constitution itself.

This latter process is circular, not unlike the children’s party game of a treasure hunt. You only end up finding what you have yourself placed there to be later found. Without your efforts to implant it there and make it conveniently available, it would not be there to find. But the illusion — the appearance that it has been there, waiting all the time and available to be found by those who seek it in sincere and truthful determination — is beguilingly created.

The country, notably its major political elements, are these days divided not between those who uphold the social contract and those who would prefer to repudiate it. All sides, all the main political actors and commentators want what they see the nation’s foundational covenant as they see it — labelled by some as the “social contract” and by others, for much longer, as the “Merdeka agreements” — honoured. The problem, theirs and the nation’s, is that they disagree fundamentally what those agreements are, what that “contract” is, what the nation’s foundational covenant says and means.

* Clive S. Kessler is Emeritus Professor, Sociology and Anthropology at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.

malaysiakini: Old racial concepts still in new Umno playbook.... by Kua Kia Soong

Old racial concepts still in new Umno playbook

Kua Kia Soong
malaysiakini, Nov 6, 2010, 2:07pm

COMMENT In their moment of exuberance, the fat cats in the recent Umno general assembly really “let the cat out of the bag” when they poked fun at each other's immigrant backgrounds. Umno's biggest champion of 'bumiputeraism' as we all know has mamak origins.

Other Umno bigwigs who were on stage were goaded for their Bugis, Achinese and other foreign origins.

But by some conceptual trick, they are strictly 'Malays' no matter where they come from (even Kerala or the Middle East) and therefore qualify as bumiputeras who are entitled to special “rights”.
 
It so happened that on the same week as the 2010 Umno general assembly, the Galas by-election was in full swing, and the papers had highlighted the amazing fact that in the historic Hakka Chinese Kampung Pulai, which is part of constituency, have been living there for 500 years and they still don't have titles to their land.

Why? Because they are “immigrants” and they have not assimilated, converted to Islam and therefore are not entitled to special “rights”. There are more than 500 Chinese new villages in the country with a population of some two million and they all face this problem. 

They have existed for more than 60 years ever since the Emergency. At every election, a few households will be dished out land titles in the same way that citizenship is dished out to a handful every once in a while when thousands of Chinese and Indians face this problem.

How can there be economic transformation when the small enterprises in the new villages do not have the security of tenure to effect investment on their land?

Are these Chinese and Indian Malaysians asking for special “rights”? No, they are only asking for that simple birth right for having been born in this country and having lived and contributed to this country for so many years.

Cooked up controversy

It is astounding that the bugbear that was thrown into the Independence struggle to put the anti-colonial forces on the defensive – viz who are the 'pribumi' (indigenous people) and who are the 'pendatang' (immigrants) and therefore not qualified for citizenship – continues to divide our society in 2010.

I have been monitoring this rather contrived controversy since the 1970s and never fail to be bemused by the antics of Umno leaders. On Nov 8, 1983, then Umno Culture Minister Anwar Ibrahim (left) referred to non-Malays in Parliament as the “new immigrants” (but he has since recanted his foolish past).

Dr Mahathir referred to non-Malays as immigrants on Aug 21, 1985. During the rather contrived controversy between Umno and MCA over this issue towards the end of 1986, an “eminent historian” even suggested that “Malaysian Chinese are still considered 'immigrants' but can become 'pribumis' (indigenous people) if they are able to assimilate Malay customs and religion (Islam)”.

The eminent historian overlooked an elementary point of logic – namely, how could a 'non-pribumi' become a 'pribumi' simply by assimilating when the latter is strictly a historical category?

He unwittingly exposed the fact that the 'pribumi/non-pribumi' distinction is rooted in political consideration and has nothing to do with historical justification!

Isn't it amazing that with all the hype about “1Malaysia” and “transformational this and that”, this reference to non-Malay Malaysians as immigrants continues unabated?

The obsession with 'race'

Umno politicians are obsessed with race. It is not surprising when there is so much at stake for them in terms of economic largesse. Mahathir's 'Malay Dilemma' is rooted in that paradigm. He can be forgiven for his inadequacy because he has not been schooled in the social sciences. I would be embarrassed to have these Umno leaders in any enlightened social science faculty.

This obsession with race has little currency in the anthropology or sociology disciplines, not to speak of human rights in the international community. Roland Braddel, former president of the council of the Malayan branch of the royal Asiatic society and once legal adviser to Umno has pointed out:

“There is, strictly speaking, no such thing as the Malay race; there are Malay people, the Malay culture and the Malay language, etc.” ('The Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and Straits of Malacca', MBRAS, 1980:3)

Serious scholars of history, anthropology and ethnography are not concerned with the chauvinistic question of “who was here first?” in order to please racists and communalists.

They are more concerned with the humanistic and enquiring attitude. For example, RO Winstedt ('Malaya', 1923:86) states the theory by Kern that the home of the Malays is Champa, Cochin China and Cambodia. Braddell confirms this from pre- historical research.

If one is concerned with the strict definition of “race” (“a biological group based on a community of physical characters”), Elliot Smith ('Human History', 1930) differentiates between Indonesians and Malays racially.

Malays and Jakuns are generally considered to be of the Mongoloid race, while Indonesians and Polynesians belong to the Mediterranean race. But is one is talking about 'Malay culture', then the country where the earliest written specimen of the Malay language has been found, is Sumatra.

Even so, these theories by renowned scholars are by no means conclusive because of the lack of data, inadequate anthropological and ethnographic studies.

But such is the stuff of honest scholarship which puts to shame the obscurantist assertions of mindless chauvinists and racists.

The racists may like to know that the concept of race used by geneticists and the like has no relevance to the political differences between people. There is no concept of dominance (ketuanan) or subordinance (kehambaan?) as far as the rights of citizens are concerned in a democratic country.

Historical fact or conceptual trick?

The British poet laureate John Betjeman put it rather pithily when he said:

“History must not be written with bias,
Both sides should be given,
Even if there is only one side…”

As history is our witness and as the fat cats at the recent Umno general assembly also know, 'Malays' are also immigrants of sorts in this country, while the Orang Asli have the sole claim to the epithet 'original people'.

But alas, do the latter enjoy bumiputera special rights?

The non-Malays in this country are indeed sensitive to being referred to as “immigrants” or “pendatang” because their citizenship status in this country has been subject to manipulation ever since British colonialisation.

Thus despite the fact that the Chinese had settled in Kampung Pulai, Kelantan and Malacca for some 500 years while in Perak, Penang, and Singapore since the 19th century or longer, only 500,000 Chinese and 230,000 Indians held citizenship in 1950. (Federation of Malaya Annual Report, 1950:24)

This represented merely a fifth of the total Chinese population even though by 1947, more than three-fifths of the Chinese and half of the Indian population in Malaya were local born. (1947 Census, 1949:29)

A speech by Tan Cheng Lock, then senior Chinese representative on the legislative council of the Straits Settlements on Oct 19, 1932 is rather revealing: 

“I look in vain for any tangible sign or indication of any active interest, practical sympathy, and encouragement that has been shown by the government of late toward…the Straits-born Chinese who have formed a continuous colony in this country for more than 500 years, and the locally-born Chinese subjects of the Protected Malay States who have made this country their home.

“On the contrary, these loyal subjects of Malaya are, practically speaking, not to be allowed in future to own and cultivate rice lands in this country of their birth though foreigners from Sumatra and Java are granted that privilege...” (R Emerson, 'Malaysia', p.513)

At the time, according to 'A Report on the 1931 Census' compiled by CA Vlieland:

“Only a negligible fraction of the Malay population consists of descendants of pre-19th century immigrants…more than half of it has less than 50 years' prescriptive right to the title 'owners of the soil'. 

"The Malays are in fact merely immigrants of generally longer standing than the other migrant races represented in the peninsula and are in no sense an autochthonous population.”

British neo-colonial compromise

After the Second World War, with the birth of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights as well as the part played by the non-Malays in the anti-Japanese resistance and the development of the country, the British proposed a five-year residential qualification for citizenship and equal rights for non-Malays in the Malayan Union proposals of 1946.

Although it would mean little of significance in terms of democratic rights while under colonial rule, it would have enabled 83 percent of Malayan Chinese to become citizens.

Umno's opposition to the Malayan Union put paid to these British proposals to liberalise the citizenship rules and the British knew to whom political power would be handed upon Independence. When the Federation of Malaya proposals were subsequently drawn up, the new proposals required 15 years of residence before citizenship could be conferred.

Even so, as has been painfully emphasized by the minister of home affairs recently, citizenship is a “privilege” not a right.

Victor Purcell, who served as a colonial officer, wrote:

“But up to Independence, the fact remained that Malaysians (whether Malayan born or Muslim immigrants from Indonesia) were 'subjects of the rulers' and automatically Malayan citizens, whereas the Chinese, Indians, etc. had to satisfy certain conditions of the law in order to become citizens.”

Nevertheless, even in 1984, it was reported that there were still over 300,000 persons with red identity cards in the country.

Nationality is a right for all

The world community reaffirmed at the World Conference against Racism and Racial Discrimination at Durban in 2001 that “nationality” is a legal relationship denoting membership of a nation or sovereign state.

It implies duties of allegiance on the part of the individual as well as of protection on the part of the state. Nationality is regarded as an inalienable right of every person in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.

The status of nationality and citizenship has the crucial implication that every citizen is equal in the eyes of the law. It does not matter in the least whether citizens have been recently naturalised, or that their forefathers came here centuries ago.

This is provided for in our federal constitution (our “social contract”?) when we became independent in 1957. Further amendments to the constitution allowing for the so-called “quota system”, such as during the state of Emergency in 1971 after May 13, 1969 cannot be considered as part of the 1957 “social contract”.

This simple point of history has been subjected to gross manipulation.

This song, adapted from 'Natives' by Paul Doran says it all:

For all our languages, we can't communicate
For all our native tongues, we're all natives here
Sons of their fathers dream the same dream
The sound of forbidden words become a scream
Voices in anger, victims of history
Plundered and set aside
Grown fat on swallowed pride

With promises of paradise through quotas at a price
Champions and the warriors are racists in disguise
Ministers and their mistresses, they make us wait
Inherit the earth, they scream the enticing bait
With the touch of a young child's hand
Innocence turns to shame
The devil that dwelt within
It sleeps out in the rain

For all our languages, we can't communicate
For all our native tongues, we're all natives here
The scars of the past are slow to disappear
The cries of the dead are always in our ears
Only the innocent can talk of wrong and right
Of those who are forced to choose
Some will choose to fight

For all our languages, we still can't communicate…

malaysiakini: Malaysians ready to discuss 'social contract'... by Lim Teck Ghee and et al

Malaysians ready to discuss 'social contract'

Lim Teck Ghee and et al
Oct 28, 10
10:50am

 

 

We would like to provide some feedback to the speech made by Prime Minister Najib Razak on Oct 21 to the Umno general assembly in which he gave the impression that there is a 'social contract' whose terms are set in stone. He also told the delegates that no Malaysian should question it.

It is necessary to note that there is a range of views amongst us on the social contract issue and on how to respond to the prime minister's advice. One colleague has argued that it is not yet time for an “organised effort” of civil society to make such a statement as it may provoke negative reactions that may be harmful to our common pursuit of a fair and united nation.

Another has expressed concern that we must not play into the hands of politicians who will mobilise Malay support by trying to show that the non-Malays have reneged on their so-called promise to accept Malay political superiority in exchange for citizenship.

A third colleague has noted that there is really no need to contest what is 'written' in the social contract. Rather, we should question where a copy of the social contract is to be found so we can verify and discuss its contents and meaning.

Despite our different points of view, we are in agreement on three key points.

• It is important for Malaysians not to be gagged into silence on what is perhaps the most contentious issue standing in the way of better inter-communal relations in the country. The quicker we can reach consensus on what the social contract means – not only in terms of what was agreed by the nation's early leaders in the past but also, more importantly, on how this agreement should be understood by Malaysians today – the less divided and more hopeful will be our future.

• For us to reach this consensus, it is important to have the facts on what took place during that critical period of our history fully disclosed and available for public discussion. In particular, we will need to have the relevant reports of the Reid Commission so that Malaysians have the opportunity to read and understand the logic and wisdom of our early leaders and do not have to depend on politically skewed interpretations of what is supposed to comprise any agreement or social contract for that period.

• At the same time it is necessary for constitutional and legal experts, historians and other scholars to lend their expertise to the public understanding. Professional organisations such as the Bar Council, the Malaysian Social Science Association, and other bodies should organise talks, seminars and forums to ensure that the best minds on the subject can have their opinions disseminated to the public.

We believe that the Malaysian public has reached a level of political maturity so that we can have a rational and public debate on the way forward in terms of any inter-communal accord or understanding arrived at, and on what needs to be honoured and respected.

For that reason, we are opposed to the position of Umno and MCA which is tantamount to decreeing a ban on public discussion of the issue.

The danger is that in not debating the issue openly – which is what the two main BN parties seem to be driving at – there is a real danger not only of driving that debate underground but also of reinforcing or entrenching ethnocentric interpretations that do not reflect the true intent of the constitutional agreement reached more than 50 years ago.

The above statement is signed by Dr Lim Teck Ghee, Dr Mavis Puthucheary, Dr Azmi Sharom, Dr Toh Kin Woon and Dr Wan Zawawi Ibrahim.

Lim Kit Siang Blog: We all grieve for a Malaysia that could be!... by Romerz

We all grieve for a Malaysia that could be!

by Romerz
October 22, 2010

In his presidential address to the 61st UMNO general assembly, a lot of things said by PM Najib could be argued against simply on the basis of logic, history, proper understanding of Malaysia’s federal constitution, democracy and a host of other things. But I will not argue against Najib’s fallacious arguments because I’m tired of warped views and I believe my readers are of a higher mentality than those he was addressing.

Instead I will focus on only one thing he mentioned in the speech. Najib said “the Malays were hurt when the social contract agreed upon by the forefathers of various races who had agreed to make sacrifices to gain the independence, was now being questioned.”

In the first place I know of no such social contract as after 53 years of independence, no one can show me a written copy of this contract nor explain to me what was it that was agreed upon specifically by our forefathers. Even assuming that such an agreement exists (possibly and perhaps reached privately by the leaders of UMNO, MCA and MIC then, which may explain why we know so little of this often touted social contract), hadn’t this preceding social contract been documented and articulated in the Constitution of Malaya 1957?

In essence, isn’t Najib implying that the non-Malay citizens of Malaysia reneged on an agreement made by our forefathers by questioning certain provisions of the federal constitution? But what is it that we are questioning of the constitution? From the context of Najib’s speech, it would seem to refer to article 153 of the constitution. But he seems to forget that article 153 only allowed four areas of discriminatory practices when the rest of the constitution is about equality and freedom for all Malaysians of whatever ethnicity and religious inclinations.

Frankly, I do not think any rational, fair thinking and peace loving non-Malay Malaysians would dispute the original intent of the constitution. It is by this paramount piece of document (nor the inclusion of article 153 into the constitution), which we cling on to, that we hope can safeguard our existence.

All we question is how far article 153 had been taken away from its original intent by UMNO for political self-interests. Are these questions an attack on the Malay race which warrants threats of reprisal? How can Najib say that non-Malays intentionally hurt the Malays simply by asking for the “social contract” vis-a-vis the federal constitution be restored to its original intent?

If the Malays had been hurt, what about the non-Malays being cheated by a changing constitution, eroding at our constitutionally guaranteed rights, to suit those who had control over it for 50 years? If there existed a social contract (which required sacrifices as Najib put it), why is UMNO now reneging on an agreement made by his father and forefathers as well (by using the constitution above what it was originally intended)?

After the riots of 1969, the NEP was formulated by Najib’s own father. When Tun Razak first put forward the the intent and concept of NEP to parliament, he had to convince MCA and MIC and even the opposition to go along with affirmative action with the objective of bringing all Malaysians on par economically which hopefully will prevent another 1969 from happening again. This I do not dispute that it was needed then and even now. Today a large segment of Malaysian society still needs affirmative action but wouldn’t it be better if it was based on needs?

Documented history (parliament hansard) tells us compromises were made, promises declared and at the end of the day, most Malaysians of whatever ethnicity then allowed it to happen through an act of parliament.

But are these promises being kept today? What was supposed to help poor Malaysians then had now become a tool to garner support for UMNO by playing one race against another so is it any wonder that we question how article 153 had been used by our ruling elites?

So who is grieved more?

The answer is Malaysia the country is grieved the most! Not only the Malays or non-Malays but ALL citizens of a greater Malaysia are grieved! When our beloved country could have stood tall amongst the greater nations of the world but instead wallow amongst the wannabes simply because UMNO/BN do not know how to leave racial and parochial politics behind.

And for that, ordinary Malaysians suffer with threats of our well-being politically, economically and safety! Isn’t about time after 53 years on nationhood that we stop comparing race sacrifices, who is the bigger enemy of race and who is the greater defender of our nation?

Why can’t we simply move on and create a better country for all 27 million of humanity? Is it that difficult when all the majority of ordinary Malaysians want is to live in peace and help each other prosper so that our country can once again stand tall?

Shouldn’t we be Malaysians first (which can be proven with our legal citizenry documents), race second (which is subject to the interpretation of race when we cannot ascertain fully our bloodlines except that our blood is red), and religious inclinations third (when faith is a personal matter of the heart which keeps its secrets to itself)?

I will end by going to bed grieving for us all when we allow UMNO/BN to continue dictating the future of this country! But I will not simply go away grieving and instead do my little part for a better Malaysia. Are you one of the 3 million Malaysians who are entitled to vote but are not yet registered to do so? If you grieve as much as I do about the current state of affairs, then register to vote and get as many other non-voters to do likewise.

Let us give our beloved country some chance to survive and possibly prosper come the next GE!

malaysiakini: Consensus on 'social contract' imperative... by Prof. Clive Kessler

Consensus on 'social contract' imperative

Clive Kessler
Oct 22, 10
8:52am

COMMENT The nature of the current disagreement about “the social contract” should be clearly identified.

Nobody is seriously suggesting that “the social contract” be repudiated, set aside, rejected. Nobody is arguing that it is fictive, a pure fantasy, an illusion. On all sides, everyone in their own way is arguing that it should be honoured, respected and upheld.

People just need to be clear, and find a way to agree, what its terms were, what “upholding the social contract” means and entails.

People are broadly agreed that in the years between 1955 and 1957 certain basic inter-ethnic or inter-communal understandings were reached. Through them a national “accord” was solemnly affirmed and politically “enshrined” that made the nation possible.

Known informally in earlier times as “the Merdeka agreements” or “Merdeka understandings”, these were subsequently, in the 1980s, relabelled, or as people now say “rebranded” with a new identity as “the social contract”.

Embodied within the constitution, these agreements - this national “accord” or inter-communal “compact” - became the foundation of Malayan, and later Malaysian, nationhood.

Within the current debates, people on both sides of this question broadly agree on this.

There is basic disagreement, however, about what those agreements were, what they provided, what their terms precisely specified.

In retrospect, different parties have construed them differently and have, at times, enlarged or “inflated” the import of those parts of the agreements, or their preferred notions of them, that they found congenial, that seemed to their sectional political liking.

There is now an urgent need for people on both, indeed all, sides of this question - and all Malaysians generally - to understand what exactly those agreements now designated as “the social contract” in fact were.

Malaysians need to reach a historically well-founded consensus concerning “the social contract”, what its terms were at the nation's formative moment and in its founding experience, and what it means today and for the future. The coherence, strength and political sustainability of the nation require no less.

'Ketuanan Melayu' not part of the deal

It needs to be widely understood that, whatever they provided and mandated, “Ketuanan Melayu” was not part of what those agreements enshrined.

Any suggestion that Malay political domination in perpetuity, continuing Malay “ethnocratic” ascendancy over other Malayans (and now Malaysians), was any part of those foundational agreements now designated as “the social contract” is simply wrong.

Those who argue to the contrary that Ketuanan Melayu is a constitutionally guaranteed “foundational” component of Malaysia's national sovereignty and international public identity are disingenuous, mischievous, or simply ill-informed.

The attempt to “read back” subsequent notions of Ketuanan Melayu into ideas of “the social contract” and in that way to embed them within newly fashioned but quite dubious views of the constitution is simply an exercise in anachronistic revisionism.

It is the duty of serious historians and legal scholars to say so.

CLIVE S KESSLER is emeritus professor of sociology and anthropology at the School of Social Science and International Studies at the University of New South Wales in Australia.

malaysiakini: In defence of Nurul Izzah by John Mallot

In defence of Nurul Izzah

John Malott
Sep 7, 2010, 12:42pm

 

COMMENT Without question, racial tensions in Malaysia are higher today than at any time since the 1969 riots.

A high school principal makes racist remarks to her young students but goes unpunished by the government. A Chinese Malaysian rapper makes an offensive video claiming that Malaysia's wealth is thanks to the Chinese, insulting not only Malays but also Indian workers who have toiled on Malaysian plantations for generations.

A right-wing Utusan Malaysia columnist writes that those who disagree with his extremist views on the unwritten social contract can “go home” to China and India. When some Malays parade the severed head of a cow to protest against a Hindu temple, they are greeted as heroes by the home minister.

Fearful of losing political support, the government's actions have been selective - criticising statements coming from the opposition, while remaining silent when the racism comes from their own quarters. The prime minister's failure to provide leadership to deal with this growing racial and religious crisis and his inability to go beyond the sloganeering of 1Malaysia do not portend well for Malaysia's future.

Against this backdrop, Nurul Izzah Anwar, the MP for Lembah Pantai, has written a courageous and fascinating two-part article, 'Malaysia or Malaysaja?', calling for a constructive dialogue with Perkasa to discuss how to interpret Article 153 of the Constitution. She has said that she is willing to engage with other concerned Malaysians as well.

Perkasa chief Ibrahim Ali dismissed Nurul Izzah's challenge to a debate, calling her 'small fry'. And in a snub, he said that if she wants to debate, she can talk to the head of Wiranita, the Perkasa women's organisation.

For reasons that most people understand, the publicity-seeking Ibrahim does not want to share a microphone with anyone, let alone Nurul Izzah, who clearly is his intellectual superior.

As expected, Perkasa and its allies responded in typical fashion – not by countering Nurul Izzah's well-considered arguments, but by engaging in bluster, name-calling, and threats, filing a police report against her.

Nurul Izzah, not one to be intimidated by bullying, responded by writing another article, even more forceful and detailed than the first.

What Izzah has called for

Let us consider what Nurul Izzah said and did not say – and why her proposal for a constructive debate on the meaning of Article 153, and how it has been implemented over the years, has merit.

First, Nurul Izzah did not call for the repeal or amendment of Article 153. So the hot heads of Perkasa, as well as Home Minister Hishammuddin Onn, should back off. There is no element of sedition here. She also did not challenge Malaysia's unwritten social contract.

Nurul Izzah correctly pointed out that Ibrahim Ali and Perkasa are wrong when they insist that the words “Malay rights” appear in Article 153. They do not. The Constitution refers to the “special position” of the Malays and other bumiputera, but not to any inalienable rights.

Pardon me for talking briefly about my own country to make a point. Soon to be 223 years old, the US Constitution is the oldest written constitution in the world. Over the years, the US Supreme Court has been called upon countless times - now between 75 and 100 times each year - to interpret the meaning of the Constitution and whether specific actions and laws of the government conform to it.

So as an American, I think that debating the meaning and implementation of specific articles in the Constitution is a legitimate part of the political and governing process in a democracy. Even after two centuries, we still have that debate. For example, the question of placing an Islamic Centre near Ground Zero in New York raises constitutional issues of freedom of speech and freedom of religion.

Nurul Izzah is doing the same. She says, let's have a constructive debate about what Malaysia's constitution means in practice when it talks about the “special position” of the Malays.

Discounts on fancy homes a 'right'?

For example, nowhere in the Constitution does it say that bumiputera citizens should be given discounts when they buy fancy condominiums. Those are policies enacted by the government of the day, which are not enshrined in the Constitution.

While the civil service, scholarships, and business permits are mentioned in Article 153, housing is not. But when DAP MP Tony Pua recently suggested that the Selangor state government should abolish the bumiputera discount for purchase of houses costing more than RM500,000 (in a state where the average cost of housing in 2009 was RM267,000), an Umno Youth leader filed a police report and said that Pua's suggestion not only challenged Article 153, it was an offence under the Sedition Act. Of course, it is not.

Question: Should bumiputera residents be given discounts when they buy housing? If so, what should the percentage be? Do you have a “right” to a 10 percent discount as opposed to 5 percent?

Should there be a means test – that the discount is only given to people whose incomes are below a certain level, or when the value of the housing is below a certain level? If poor Malays are to be given housing discounts or subsidies, then should they not also be given to poor Indians and others? These are all legitimate questions to discuss.

If in the future the government decides that bumiputera may receive a 30 percent discount when they buy a Proton, but others may not, isn't it only fair to discuss this? If the government decides that 100 percent of the civil service has to be Malay, or that only Malays may head corporations in Malaysia, isn't that something that should be debated?

If others want to question such policies, they should not be told that they are violating Article 153 and are subject to arrest for sedition.

Bumi equity target has failed

Let's consider the policy of bumiputera ownership of 30 percent of the equity on the Bursa Malaysia. Article 153 talks about making special provision for bumiputeras to acquire licences and permits to engage in trade and business. But it does not talk about setting aside a special allocation of new stock issues for Malays and others, let alone how the value of the stock should be measured.

If the goal of the NEP is to raise the economic status and living standards of the Malay people, then how does this specific programme – setting aside 30 percent of stock issues – do that? If it were an effective programme, then why after all these years do so many Malays - and especially those in the rural areas - still live in poverty?

Why, as the New Economic Model (NEM) report pointed out, has the gap between rich and poor widened? Why has income for the bottom 40 percent of Malaysian households grown the most slowly over the past three decades?

Judged by these results, clearly the 30 percent equity policy has failed to do the job. Are there not better and more effective policies to raise the economic levels of the Malays and people of Sabah and Sarawak? And as others have pointed out, who decided what individuals could buy these shares? Where was the transparency? Why were the recipients not required to keep the shares, rather than sell them to others for a quick buck?

When MCA head Dr Chua Soi Lek called for ending the 30 percent quota, Perkasa's economic bureau director called for Chua to be arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for “disregarding national interests.”

In 2006, Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute (Asli) issued a report that said when the actual market value of stocks is used (the way that all of us determine our current wealth), rather than the artificially-determined par value, then the 30 percent target already has been reached. But under pressure, Asli withdrew the report.

'A fresh young voice'

In summary, even without challenging Article 153, it is perfectly legitimate to have a discussion of:

1) how that article has been implemented and should be implemented through government policies and actions;

2) how successful past and current policies have been in meeting the goals of Article 153; and

3) how success should be measured.

In a democracy, none of these topics should be "off limits."

On a personal note, I have known Nurul Izzah for 12 years, and it has been a pleasure to watch her grow into the remarkable woman that she is today. No one should underestimate her. Everyone sees her beauty, but I can attest that she also has brains, determination, and courage. And all of those characteristics are on display right now.

Perhaps an anonymous comment on the Internet, in response to her article, says it best: “She may well turn out to be the fresh young voice of conscience and courage… at a time when Malaysia needs a gentle, clear voice.”

JOHN R MALOTT was the United States ambassador to Malaysia 1995-1998.

TMI: Special rights can’t be erased unless the Malays agree to it, says Khoo Kay Kim

Special rights can’t be erased unless the Malays agree to it, says Khoo Kay Kim

The Malaysian Insider, September 06, 2010

 

KUALA LUMPUR, Sept 6 — The people, irrespective of race, who question Article 153 of the Federal Constitution, which spells out the special rights and privileges of the Malays and Bumiputeras, are blind about history and the constitution, an analyst said.

Prof Emeritus Tan Sri Dr Khoo Kay Kim said the special position of the Malays was recognised way back since the British era.

“When the British came to Malaya, they found that there were already Malay governments in several parts of the peninsula, and the British recognised these governments.

“These governments took care of a large number of people (the Malays). For the British, these people had their special rights. But those who came and lived in Malaya were not subjects of the Rulers and therefore, did not enjoy the same rights enjoyed by the Malays,” he told Bernama.

He said the non-Malays in the peninsula at that time were not citizens or subjects of the king, saying they only had the opportunity to apply for citizenship when the Federation of Malaya was formed on February 1, 1948.

“When the British planned the formation of the Malay Federation as a nation state, it was an extension of what already existed then, and by 1957, the Federal Constitution was formulated, incorporating the prevailing arrangement at that time,” he said.

The people, especially those from other races, should therefore respect the rights and privileges of the Malays as enshrined in the constitution because when it was first formulated, the various races had already agreed to what needed to be incorporated in it, he said.

“The special position of the Malays started since a long time ago and based on the system of government existed then. In the peninsula, nine Malay kingdoms existed since 1895, and continue to exist until today,” he said.

The Federal Constitution was formulated based on the recommendations of the Reid Commission. It took effect soon after the independence on August 31, 1957.

Article 153 spells out powers vested upon the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in safeguarding the special position of the Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, as well as the legitimate interests of other communities.

It also spells out in detail the functions of the King in ensuring quotas for the Malays and Bumiputeras in the public service, scholarships, public education as well as the provisions of permits and business licences.

Khoo said the reason why there were groups questioning the rights and privileges of the Malays was because the society of today was “blind about history”.

“They don’t understand (the constitution) and are ignorant of what they can or cannot do. There shouldn’t be any debate on the constitution because what is important is to follow what has been in use for so long,” he said.

He said that if the constitution was to be amended, it would require the agreement of two-thirds of MPs in Parliament and should be consented to by the King.

He added that anyone wanting to abolish or amend Article 153 should obtain the agreement of the Malays and Bumiputeras, the agreement of two-thirds of MPs in Parliament and the consent of the King. — Bernama

TMI: What social contract? — by Prof. Clive Kessler (UNSW)

What social contract? — Clive Kessler

The Malaysian Insider, September 06, 2010

 

SEPT 6 — “Najib warns against questioning ‘social contract’,” it is reported.

This claim is plain and simple “historical revisionism”.

To what “social contract” precisely is the PM referring?

In the 1980s a new political idea was created: that of “Ketuanan Melayu”, of Malay ascendancy, supremacy, domination.

Thereafter, especially from 2008 it has been ever more powerfully promoted, generally in association with the suggestion that a “social contract” had been entered into and constitutionally enshrined in the mid-1950s.

How was this manoeuvre executed? With what purpose and consequences?

It was, from 1986, now newly suggested that the notion of “Ketuanan Melayu” had been part of the “Merdeka process and agreements”, and that the nation’s non-Malay citizens had thereby consented to accept, and thereafter ever live subject to, Malay ascendancy and supremacy.

There was perhaps an implicit, but only implicit, “social contract” formed in 1955-1957. If that is how one chooses to denote the core political substance of the Merdeka process, then that implied “contract” was about inter-communal or inter-ethnic power-sharing and the secular nature of the Malaysian state.

It was not about notion of “Malay supremacy”. That notion was only subsequently, indeed very much later, confected.

If there was at that time a “social contract”——if that is how some people later may choose to characterize the Merdeka process and agreements——then what they are referring to is merely a retrospectively imputed or implied social contract.

This term was now offered as a new way of denoting, and seeing, that national political legacy and foundation, that core political substance. But, when reached, in their own time, those agreements, that subsequently implied “contract” (to use the new, and newly inflated term) was not about and did not provide for “Ketuanan Melayu” — nor for the supremacy of Islamic shari’ah law as the supreme and uncontestable law of the land either, for that matter, as some creative constitutional revisionists also now like to suggest.

Yet there was no “social contract” as such at the time.  People have only inferred and argued subsequently that there was, because there somehow must have been, such a contract at the time of Merdeka — and, driven by retrospective wish-fulfilment, they have then “filled in” what it pleases them to believe, or passionately desire, that its terms must have been. They “read back” the politics of the present, and their preferred political future that they like to imagine for themselves, into the historic past.

Yet nobody talked at the time, in 1955-1957, about there being concluded any such “social contract”. Nobody seriously imagined that any such contract formally enshrining and constitutionally entrenching Malay domination was being entered into by all the people. Nobody suggested that people, or the nation as a whole, had signed up to and agreed to be bound by any such “contract” providing for enduring Malay ethnocracy — for Malay domination in perpetuity and with the unalterable assent over the generations of the dominated.

Subsequently, from the mid-1980s, the idea that there had been an implicit “social contract” was fashioned. It was suggested that the notion of “Ketuanan Melayu” had, by inference, been part of or implied by that contract.

In this way, born only in the 1980s, the new idea of “Ketuanan Melayu” was “read back”, or subsequently “smuggled”, into the Merdeka agreements and process, or into now authoritatively offered but very questionable claims about what those agreements had provided for and “locked in” as the solemn foundations of nationhood . If there was an implicit contract at that time (it was at first subliminally and then explicitly suggested) then universal assent to “Ketuanan Melayu” was and must have been part of it.

This, quite simply and evidently, is historically erroneous. It is sheer revisionism. It is retrospective meddling with national historical truth and the nation’s constitutional foundations.

Never has the need for clear historical study, analysis, accuracy and faithfulness to the facts been greater.

* Clive S. Kessler is Emeritus Professor, Sociology & Anthropology at The University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

Malaysian Insider: Non-Malay citizenship not given at behest of Malays —P. Sivakumar

Non-Malay citizenship not given at behest of Malays —P. Sivakumar

Malaysian Insider, June 18, 2010

JUNE 18 — I refer to the article entitled, “The Tunku, Merdeka and Malaysia,”  by V. Chakaravarthy in Aliran Monthly Vol 30.No1 where he stated,  “Tunku was able to convince the Malays and they showed their magnanimity by granting citizenship to the non-Malays in exchange for the ‘special position’ of the Malays .This was the social contract which was bequeathed to us by our founding fathers”.

Although the article was written in praise of the Tunku, certain aspects of the article, with particular reference to the granting of citizenship to the non-Malays, need to be addressed and put in proper perspective as the above statement is generally the theory propounded by the Malays. At the same time it is also pertinent to reaffirm certain relevant issues regarding the role played by the non-Malays in achieving independence for Malaya.

Distortion
While the non-Malays are without any reservation grateful to the Malays  for accommodating them as citizens of this nation, but to say that it was by the magnanimity of the Malays that enabled the non-Malay to enjoy citizenship status is, to say the least, an exaggeration and a distortion of a historical fact. Some Malay politicians even keep harping now and then that the granting of citizenship by the Malays was a great favour done to the non-Malays for which the latter should remain indebted to them for life.

This sentiment is also echoed at the Biro Tata Negara (BTN) courses conducted by the Government where it was alleged that some Malay speakers had blatantly told the non-Malay participants that they should be grateful to the Malays for their magnanimity in granting them citizenship. It looks like even the Government is tacitly reiterating this fact to the non-Malays openly. Such a preposterous statement will not help to foster harmonious relationships between the Malays and non-Malays but will only mar the goodwill that exists between them.

First of all, the Malays do not have the legal authority to grant citizenship to others as the granting of citizenship is governed under the Constitution. It is quite clear that under the Constitution citizenship may be acquired by a person by (a) operation of law (b) registration (c) naturalization and (d) incorporation of territory.

However, it must be pointed out that prior to the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948 there was no Federal Citizenship. One was either a citizen of one of the Malay states or a British citizen if residing in the Straits Settlement states of Malacca, Penang or Singapore.

However, by virtue of the Federation of Malaya Agreement 1948, non-Malay residents in Malacca or Penang, who were British citizens, were entitled to acquire Federal citizenship automatically by operation of law. Thus the acquisition of citizenship by the non-Malays by operation of law is a vested right under the Constitution and not something given at the behest of the Malays as claimed by some.

To support my statement I quote below from the book entitled, “The Constitution of Malaysia “written by Harry E Groves, Head, of Department of Law and Dean, Faculty of Law, University of Singapore, which is self-explanatory.

“Malays are subjects if born in the State. Others are subjects if born in the State and one parent was born in the Federation of Malaya. Malacca and Penang, being without Rulers, did not have any State citizenship. Those who came within the terms of the Federation of Malaya Agreement , 1948, recognized operation of law, registration and naturalisation as methods of acquiring citizenship of the then Federation of Malaya. In addition to all subjects of rulers having Federation citizenship by operation of law, so did citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who had certain designated contacts with the Settlements of Malacca or Penang or with the Federation of Malaya.’’

Social contract
The so-called Social Contract is a term used by latter day Malay leaders like Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad to refer to the reciprocal concessions agreed to by our Malay and non-Malay founding fathers to safeguard the interest of the respective communities, as a sequel to independence. Only our founding fathers would know exactly in what context the concessions or compromises were made as the Constitution only speaks of “safeguarding the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interest of the other communities” — and nothing more.

However, some Malays claim that the Social Contract was a pledge to confer citizenship rights to the non-Malays upon their agreement to recognise the special position of the Malays. It is a pity that our founding fathers are not around to-day to confirm the true position. Nevertheless going by the version propounded by some Malays it would appear that the granting of citizenship to the non-Malays was compromised on a quid pro quo basis and not by the sole decision of the Malays. If so, then what is there for these Malays to insist and state that the Malays were the ones who gave citizenship to the non-Malays and to that extent they were very magnanimous.

What about the magnanimity shown by the non-Malays in agreeing to recognise the special position of the Malays in reciprocation to give them a better life? Wasn’t that a magnanimous act on the part of the non-Malays? What if the non-Malays had from the outset refused to concede to the Malay demand on this issue and had remained unyielding till the end. Would the Malays be enjoying the sort of life they are leading without the goodwill of the non-Malays? So, the question of magnanimity did not rest with the Malays alone but with the non- Malays as well. This fact must be appreciated by the Malays at all times. The majority of Malays of goodwill have no problem recognising this fact.

Furthermore, when the NEP was passed in 1970 after the May 13, 1969 debacle, didn’t the non-Malays unselfishly agree to pass over to the Malays 30 per cent of their business equity in the interest of the Malays, as required by the Government? Wasn’t that a magnanimous act and a great favour done to the Malays by the non-Malays in order to uplift them from their poor economic standing?

Giving citizenship alone is not a bounty for the non- Malays have reciprocated in no small measure by developing and contributing immensely to the economic progress of this nation, the fruits of which are also enjoyed by the Malays. Hence, it may not be an exaggeration to say that the non- Malays have given more to the Malays than taken from them in the form of just citizenship only. Yet, the non- Malays do not brag or crow about it as it is everyone’s duty to help one another.

Independence
There is also an erroneous perception on the part of some Malays that independence for Malaya was fought by the Malays only. This view is not only unfair to the non- Malays but is without any foundation. Although it must be admitted that the Malays were the ones who initiated the Merdeka movement, they could not, on their own, have succeeded in their mission as the British government was not inclined to grant independence without the participation of the other races namely, the Chinese and Indians. As such the Tunku, as leader of Umno and the Merdeka movement had to seek the support and co-operation of MCA and MIC respectively to achieve his goal.
These non-Malay political parties  gave the Tunku their whole-hearted support in his hour of need. If the Chinese and Indians had dissented they could have left the Tunku in the lurch by telling the British that they were not interested in independence and preferred to remain as British subjects. But the non-Malays, being magnanimous, didn’t do that. Instead, they  co-operated with the Tunku to lift the country from the colonial yoke. To pursue their goal, the three political parties namely, Umno, MCA and MIC formed a coalition, known as the Alliance to ask for independence from Britain and what followed next is all history, with Malaya attaining independence on Aug 31,1957 to the jubilation of all the races.

I quote below the relevant passage from Harry E.Groves book  (pages12 and 13) which reveals that the quest for Merdeka was the joint effort of all the races and not that of the Malays alone. To say otherwise is tantamount to ignoring and dismissing the non-Malays and their loyal support to the Tunku in his effort to gain independence for Malaya.

“The sentiment for independence continued to grow during the ‘emergency’ period of Communist warfare. In time it became apparent that independence could only be achieved through some joining of forces of the communal parties; and in 1952 the United Malays National Organisation, the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Malayan Indian Congress formed a political coalition, the Alliance, which carried a number of State and Settlement elections. The British Government in 1954 agreed to make a majority of the seats in the Federal Legislative Council elective rather than appointive as formerly. Of the fifty-two seats to be filled in the first such election in July, 1955, fifty-one were won by the Alliance, with voting across racial lines being one of the most striking features of the elections. Discussions were begun in August,1955, between the British Secretary of State, the Rulers and the new Alliance Ministers on the next steps toward self-government.

Reid Commission
It was agreed that a Commission to review the Constitution of the federation should meet in London early in 1956. The Federation of Malaya Constitutional Conference met in London in January and February,1956. Agreement was reached on full self-government  and independence within the Commonwealth. A Commonwealth Constitutional Commission was agreed upon to make recommendations for a constitution. Only five members served on this Commission: Lord Reid, a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, as Chairman, Sir Ivor Jennings, Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, Sir William McKell, a former Governor-General of Australia, Mr. B. Malik, a former Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, and Justice Abdul Hamid of the West Pakistan High Court . No Malayans served on this Commission.

The Commission was given five specific terms of reference : (a) the establishment of a strong central government with some autonomy in the States, (b) safeguarding the positions and prestige of the Rulers, (c) providing for a constitutional head of state, (d) creating a common nationality and (e) safeguarding the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the other communities.

The Commission met in Malaya in the summer of 1956. It solicited memoranda from organisations and individuals and received 131 such memoranda. It held 81 hearings in support of the memoranda throughout the peninsula. It visited each State and Settlement conferring with officials, British and Malay, and met informally with other official and private persons

• The Commission went to Rome to prepare its report.
• The new constitution came into being with the new nation on Aug 31, 1957 ,Merdeka Day.

However, notwithstanding the fact that independence was achieved some 53 years ago, it is lamentable that we are still living as Malays, Chinese and Indians and not as one people. It will be noted that an interesting feature of the terms of reference to the Commonwealth Constitutional Commission, as revealed in Harry E. Groves’s book, at page 13 (see above extract) was the creation of a “common nationality”, following independence. It is regrettable that the Government has failed to achieve this noble objective hitherto. On the other hand the Government has divided the people into Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras to be treated differently contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.

Perhaps the Government prefers to run the nation on ethnic lines as it brings advantages to certain groups of people. This kind of classification certainly does not augur well for the future of the nation as it is bound to create chauvinistic instincts in some people, especially among some Bumiputeras, and keep them apart from the others forever.

If Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak is really sincere about uniting the people under his 1 Malaysia concept then it is high time we dismantle racial borders and treat all as one people.
In conclusion, suffice to say that ours is a wonderful nation where all the races have been living together harmoniously for generations in the spirit of give and take. Hence, let not a few overzealous Malay leaders distort historical facts on the pretext of seeking glory for their race by portraying themselves as the only magnanimous people on earth. What these misguided individuals are doing is using the name of the Malay community to promote their own selfish interest. Thinking people can see through them..

* The intention of the writer in writing this article is not to criticise anyone but to stress that historical facts should be projected in the right perspective without any bias so that our harmony and peace can be preserved for our mutual benefit.

* P. Sivakumar is a member of Aliran and President of the Malaysian Indians Business Association.