Showing posts with label Malaysian Judiciary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Malaysian Judiciary. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Speech by Ragunath Kesavan, Bar Council Chairman, at The Opening Of The Legal Year 2011

Speech by Ragunath Kesavan, Chairman of The Bar Council, at The Opening Of The Legal Year 2011 (15 Jan 2011)

Yang Amat Arif, saya dengan rendah diri memohom izin meneruskan hujah saya dalam Bahasa Inggeris.

My Lord,
I am honoured to speak not only for the Bar Council but also on behalf of the Sabah Law Association and the Advocates Association of Sarawak, who are represented here today with the presence of their respective Presidents, Datuk John Sikayun and Khairil Azmi bin Mohd Hasbie.

It gives me great pleasure to be able to address this distinguished gathering on the occasion of the opening of the 2011 Malaysian legal year.

A year on from the historic first ceremony in January 2010, we cannot rest on our laurels but must continually strive to improve the administration of justice and the rule of law in Malaysia. We cannot be satisfied with pioneering first steps, but must be sufficiently courageous to extend boundaries. This may transgress well-worn customs and traditions, and may find displeasure among those with vested interests in preserving the status quo. However, we cannot be inhibited by such considerations. If adjustments are required we must be bold and mature enough to stand up for such corrections purely in the interest of justice and fairness.

The introduction of court mandated mediation, court recording transcription services, structured and uniform case management directions and the introduction of the “New Civil and Commercial” courts have increased the efficiency of our judiciary. The changes brought about by Your Lordship have, by and large, been welcomed by the legal fraternity.

We were plagued with problems of public distrust and disdain of the judiciary for reasons of judicial indiscipline, alleged corruption even at the highest level of the judiciary, judge fixing, an administration system that had not been revamped for decades, inconsistent case management styles and directives issued at the whims and fancies of each judicial officer. The appointment of three inept and unacceptable chief justices post Tun Salleh Abas led to the near complete breakdown and destruction of our judiciary.

We can stand tall and reflect that we had firmly and consistently spoken out and acted against the massive decline in judicial independence.

Your Lordship had the most arduous task of instilling discipline, order and direction in the judicial system.

However, we caution that reform including the pace of such reform, must always be in tandem with the needs of all stakeholders, including the capacity of the judges, lawyers and court system. Speed alone cannot be the sole and overriding factor, for there must be no miscarriage of justice in the prompt completion of cases. In the matter of postponements and adjournment of cases, it is a critical part of the individual independence of judicial officers that they have sole control of cases before them, including the discretion whether or not to grant an adjournment because they must be guided by the need to do “substantial justice” between the parties.

The criminal justice system requires a much more detailed and tempered approach. The problems faced there are considerably different from those of the civil courts and expediting hearings may not entirely be in the public interest if this results in more instances of acquittals, or an accused is denied the right to a proper and full defence.

The paramount objective of the administration of justice must be to achieve qualitative justice in every instance. An excellent justice system requires a combination of a fair conduct of cases, their prompt disposal and well reasoned decisions so as to ensure that justice is done and seen to be done.

As we consider the challenges that lie ahead, we would do well to reflect on the following words, taken from Chapter VI of Machiavelli’s “The Prince”:

“. . . there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.”

The reforms that have been implemented have resulted in a significant improvement in the quality of the administration of justice. We welcome such changes even though disagreements are bound to exist from time to time. We do not always agree or achieve consensus on issues but we have a good working relationship with the Judiciary and the Attorney General’s Chambers upon which we can build, and we look to continued constructive dialogue and discussion with both parties.

Judicial temperament

My Lord,
The life of a Judge requires independence of thinking and fearlessness of character. It is indeed a high challenge and a very lonely pursuit. A judge must be independent, impartial, conduct him or herself with integrity, act with propriety and must at all times ensure equality of treatment to all before the Courts.

We would do well to recall the one of the guidelines issued to AbuMusa al-Ashari, the then-Governor of the Iraqi port city of Basra, by Umar bin al-Khattab, the second Khalifa of Islam (13-23AH) (634-644 CE). The thirdh guideline reads as follows:

Treat the people equally in your court and give them equal attention, so that the noble shall not aspire to your partiality, nor the humble despair of your justice.

Judicial boldness

My Lord,
Our judges in taking their oath of office set out in paragraph 1 of the Sixth Schedule of the Federal Constitution undertake to …….“faithfully discharge [their] judicial duties in that office to the best of their ability, they will bear true faith and allegiance to Malaysia, and will preserve, protect and defend its Constitution.

The judiciary must boldly uphold this duty to adjudicate any dispute before it guided solely by the Federal Constitution. In all such deliberations, the underlying principles of the rule of law must remain fundamental and omnipotent.

In many jurisdictions, it is the Courts that lead in expanding the rights of individuals and curbing the excesses of the executive. In 1995, the South African Constitutional Court in the celebrated case of The State v T. Makwanye and M. Mchunu held that the death penalty breached the “right of life” provision contained in the Section 9 of the South African Constitution. Significantly, the Court did not abdicate its constitutional role and leave it to the legislature to abolish the death penalty.

An independent judiciary is an indispensable element of a working democracy as it is not beholden to constituents who elect it into office. There are no shackles of loyalty to any particular group and therefore the Judiciary can and must fulfil its primary duty of upholding the Federal Constitution. Judges must rule on the basis of the law within the context of the Federal Constitution and not be influenced by public opinion and they must be indifferent to pressures of the times.

My Lord,
We have our own challenges, Shamala Sathiyaseelan v Dr. Jeyaganesh C. Mogarajah was a recent matter before the Federal Court, involving essentially conflict of laws between the separate jurisdictions of Syariah and civil laws, in respect of the custody and guardianship of children arising out of the conversion of one spouse to Islam.

This matter presented the Court with a clear occasion to resolve fundamental questions that affect public interest. The Federal Court refused to decide on the matter, on the basis that Shamala, by leaving the jurisdiction with her children, was in contempt of an earlier High Court order giving the father the right of access to the children.

The Federal Court abdicated its role as the ultimate arbiter in this dispute. Politicians have dithered and wavered in looking for a solution, pandering to the various interest groups. The Federal Court missed this opportunity to lead the way and set down the law in accordance with the Federal Constitution.

The Judiciary ought to have stepped in to fill the legal lacuna. The Court must fulfil its responsibility to right an injustice, no matter how difficult or divisive the issues are.

In PP v Anwar Ibrahim, the Federal Court rolled back statutory amendments introduced in Section 51A of the Criminal Procedure Code to augment the rights of accused persons. By enacting this provision that imposes a statutory duty on the prosecution to provide documents to the defence prior to the commencement of trial, Parliament made it plain its intention to level the playing field between the prosecution and the defence.

In a regrettably regressive decision, the Federal Court refused to allow the defence access to documents other than the usual basic documents pre-dating the amendments. The full and timely disclosure of documents and statements would surely assist in a speedy disposal of the trial. More crucially, courts must exercise their discretion in favour of enhancing an accused person’s right to a fair trial, and increasing transparency and fairness in the country’s criminal justice system. Non production of documents and information merely gives rise to the perception, in the public mind, of a cover up and will not assist in enhancing public confidence in the criminal justice system.

Access to justice

My Lord,
Access to justice remains a central priority for the Bar Council. Currently, too many persons are unrepresented in criminal trials, a situation that is very troubling. With the coming into force of the amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code formalising plea bargain and introduction of pre-trial conferences, it will be critical to ensure that legal representation is provided to all accused persons.

Constitutional guarantees of the right to legal representation are meaningless if one is unable to access legal representation because of insufficient means. All developed nations have in place some form of a comprehensive legal aid structure for those who cannot afford legal services. This has not been quite the case in Malaysia.

We are proud to be one of the few law associations in the world that runs a fairly comprehensive legal aid scheme funded solely by a levy imposed on all our members. However, in order to be effective, any legal aid system that is introduced must be sustainable, and far more comprehensive than the current Bar Council legal aid scheme has the means to be.

We are therefore heartened by the establishment of a national legal aid foundation, to be known as Yayasan Bantuan Guaman Kebangsaan, a collaborative effort involving the Government, the Malaysian Bar, and the private sector. The Foundation will be an independent body that will fund the provision of legal aid, enhance services for lawyers to represent those needing legal representation, determine the guidelines for the administration of the national legal aid scheme, and initiate and carry out educational programmes designed to promote understanding amongst members of the public of their rights and duties under the laws of Malaysia. The Foundation will focus on obtaining representation for persons from the point of arrest to court hearings – and those who do work for YBGK will be remunerated.

I must place on record our greatest appreciation to the learned Attorney General for his relentless push and the efforts of his officers in setting up the the Foundation.

We are also heartened that the Inspector-General of Police, Tan Sri Ismail Omar at a recent dinner he had hosted for the Bar Council emphasised the need for all stakeholders to work together to improve our criminal justice system. The Inspector General had also reiterated that human rights and the rule of law must be an integral part of the criminal justice system. His commitment that the Police will work in tandem with the Foundation is most welcome.

Justice for all

It is important to understand and accept that the future of Malaysia must be built on a multi-racial, multi-religious approach of respect and acceptance.

Ultimately we have to ask ourselves this question: What kind of country do we want to be? In order to answer this question, we have to understand the rules and regulations that govern the relationship between the government and the people. We need to go back to the basics.

One of the most important projects the Bar Council had undertaken in the last two years is the “MyConstitution” campaign, where the Constitutional Law Committee of the Bar Council has gone round the country to promote knowledge and understanding of the Federal Constitution. The aim is to create awareness and to simplify the Constitution for all, and to empower the people to take charge of the Constitution, which is rightfully the peoples’ document.

The campaign projects the essence of democracy in which the government, whatever its political composition, is bound by a higher set of rules, embodied in a constitution. Although democracy is based on the principle of the rule of the majority, at the same time, democracy also requires that the rights of minorities are safeguarded.

We affirm the two tenets of the Rukunegara which are relevant here, namely “Keluhuran Perlembagaan” or “the Supremacy of the Constitution” and “Kedaulatan Undang-Undang” or “Upholding the Rule of Law”.

The way forward is to assure the people that there is a place for everyone in Malaysia regardless of race or religion. This assurance must be reiterated not only by the government of the day but by all of us.

We must believe and must commit and unite in our efforts to build a nation that progresses on diversity.

We have consistently, over the years, reiterated that our objective is the betterment of Malaysia. We want to see a Malaysia coming together in unity of purpose, through upholding the rule of law and the Federal Constitution.

I stand here to reaffirm and reiterate that we shall proceed to uphold the Rule of Law without fear or favour.

We accept and understand that there is so much more to be done and we strive to remain independent and engage and interact with any and all groups, with the objective of building a stronger and better Malaysia for all.

Conclusion

My Lord
As we collectively mark the first anniversary of the Opening of the Legal Year on a Federal level, I must take this opportunity to record our appreciation for Your Lordship’s openness, humility and tireless effort to achieve change which has resulted in a renewed vigour in the judiciary. Your Lordship has always been approachable and sympathetic to the issues we have raised, and Your Lordship has always been open to criticism.

We welcome this new judicial environment, and want this to continue, as it is vital that all of us work together for a common objective, that of strengthening and enhancing our judicial system, towards a better Malaysia. We are committed to supporting this process, and look forward to opportunities for us to contribute in this regard.

We shall continue to uphold the rule of law and to act in the best interest of Malaysia.

It remains for me on behalf of the Bar Council, the Advocates Association of Sarawak and the Sabah Law Association to wish you good health and every happiness in the New Year.

Monday, March 15, 2010

Malaysian Insider: Aliran: Jaundiced judiciary — Martin Jalleh

Jaundiced judiciary — Martin Jalleh

Malaysian Insider, MARCH 15 — There has been no shortage of court jesters in the all-year-round judicial circus, observes Martin Jalleh.

In 2009, the judiciary allowed her courts (supposed portals of justice) to be turned into a playground of political expediency and the perversion of the rule of law.

There was no shortage of court jesters in the all-year-round judicial circus.

As was so aptly put in December 2009 by Abdul Aziz Bari, a constitutional law expert, the judiciary has been reduced to one that “takes its cue from the government”. He likened Malaysia to Zimbabwe, a country ruled by President Robert Mugabe, who has subverted the judiciary to shore up his sinking government.

During the Perak constitutional crisis certain judges disregarded constitutional provisions and the doctrine of separation of powers — in stark contrast to five occasions when brave judges ruled it had no jurisdiction over decisions made in legislative assemblies.

Even when certain judges chose to interpret the Federal Constitution correctly, they appeared to do so when it best suited Umno. The judiciary left behind a dead constitution, “bad” and “perverse” decisions, dubious declaratory orders, judgments devoid of reasoned grounds, and disgraceful double standards (such as the examples given below).

Less than a day after the KL High Court had ruled in Nizar’s favour, and three hours after Zambry had filed for a stay of execution, a one-man Court of Appeal readily heard the latter and granted him a stay two hours later! Nizar had to wait for nine days before his application to set aside the stay order granted to Zambry was heard!

Zambry won his appeal 11 days after the KL High Court had declared Nizar as the rightful MB of Perak. The Federal Court which heard Nizar’s appeal has to date (more than 30 days later) not given a verdict! It has been seven months since Nizar’s lawsuit was first heard, but the occasionally super-efficient judiciary remains silent!

Three times the Federal Court rejected Nizar’s request for a full panel (it being a case of such paramount importance). No reasons were given for the rejection — yet the Federal Court has convened panels of seven judges to hear drug-related cases in the past!

Further, as was pointed out by columnist Kim Quek, the ‘Perak cases’ were made the exclusive domain of the few judges who were already looked upon with increasing dismay by the public for their perceived political partisanship. He quite rightly asked why the well-regarded judges in the Federal Court were kept out.

The public viewed the judiciary with greater suspicion, scepticism and even scorn when many perceived in 2009 that the judiciary appeared once again ready to be manipulated for the political purpose of getting rid of Anwar Ibrahim — as it happened 10 years ago!  The stage for the Sodomy II trial or show-trial was set.

What was initially filed as a non-consensual offence was later changed to consensual sodomy – without the other party being charged! The case was transferred to the High Court when the Sessions Court judge who ruled that the AG’s transfer certificate was invalid and that the case should remain in her court went on leave!

The High Court, which ordered the public prosecutor to allow Anwar’s lawyers to inspect documents and evidence pertaining to the case, dismissed Anwar’s application to strike out the sodomy charge — in spite of the medical reports by four medical specialists showing no anal penetration.

The High Court judge fixed the trial dates disregarding a pending appeal at the Federal Court on the Court of Appeal’s decision to overturn the High Court judge’s earlier decision granting Anwar access to the documents related to the case! An exasperated Anwar responded: “The very least is for him to respect his own previous decision…”

The judiciary also seemed more interested in mere technicalities than truth and justice. Decisions on the merits of cases were often avoided on the basis of “mere technicalities”. The Court of Appeal struck out Anwar’s RM100 million defamation suit against Dr Mahathir on the technicality that the memorandum of appeal was not in Bahasa Malaysia. Presiding Judge Abdul Malek Ishak stressed the supremacy of the national language as he delivered his 31-page written judgment in English!

In the case of Kampung Buah Pala, the presiding judge in the Federal Court, the late Augustine Paul, in June 2009, rejected the residents’ application for leave against a Court of Appeal decision that had overturned a landmark High Court verdict in their favour. The rejection was based on technical grounds although there were substantive triable issues that should have been addressed and determined.

The courts were often perceived as being biased towards the Umno-led government. It became so obvious to many that subordinate and High Court judgments by a few brave judges which were favourable to Pakatan Rakyat would certainly be overturned by the appellate courts.

Transfers awaited three judges who made rulings that the Umno government took umbrage to — Justice Alizatul Khair Osman Khairuddin, Lau Bee Lan and Mohamad Ariff Md Yusoff. Chief Justice Zaki Azmi insisted the transfers were “promotions” — though he admitted all three had yet to be shortlisted for promotion!

Alas, 2009 was a year when the courts were clogged, hogged (by political cases), bogged down by cases related to the Perak Constitutional crisis, dogged by accusations of bias and double standards and flogged by public opinion. — www.aliran.com

* Martin Jalleh is a well known political commentator.

Saturday, March 13, 2010

malaysiakini-Judge NH Chan: Court erred in dismissing Anwar's bid for review

Court erred in dismissing Anwar's bid for review
NH Chan
malaysiakini, Mar 9, 2010, 1:12pm
 
comment On Feb 25, 2010 Malaysiakini reports that Anwar Ibrahim failed to convince the Federal Court to review its Jan 29 decision to bar him from obtaining more key evidence from his sodomy trial.

The report quotes the judges saying: "Rule 137 (of the Rules of the Federal Court) does not confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court to review its own decision."

Why not? Why can't the earlier decision of the same Federal Court be reviewed? Rule 137 of the Rules allows it. This is what it says:
137. Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to hear any application or to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court
Aren't the words, "Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court … to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court", in Rule 137 clear enough? Those words clearly allow the Federal Court to review its own decision so as "to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court".

We, the ordinary citizens of this country, are stunned by the ignorance of our judges of the highest court in the land for saying "Rule 137 (of the Rules of the Federal Court) does not confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court to review its own decisions". What utter nonsense are those ignoramuses talking about?

These inane judges cannot even understand plain English when even a child can understand the plain meaning of ordinary words. Now you can appreciate what I have been saying all the time that the ordinary people are better qualified than most of our judges when it comes to understanding the law. Since the common people are smarter than those judges, they can judge them. They would not be wrong if they think the judges are incompetent.

These three judges also say, "There must be finality. To re-litigate a case which has been heard and finally disposed of is not one of the circumstances as envisaged by Rule 137" (Star Online, Feb 25). No one is asking for the case to be re-litigated. All that the aggrieved party, in this case Anwar, was asking is for the earlier judgment of the Federal Court declared null and void because it was an unjust decision.

Court empowered to prevent injustice
Unequivocally, the Federal Court has the inherent power to prevent an injustice whenever it had been occasioned by an earlier decision of the same court. This is clearly defined in Rule 137 where it says "Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court … to prevent injustice".

As if this atrocity is not enough, there is yet another horror to come out of those three judges. Only an incompetent lawyer or judge could say something as silly as this, "Even assuming that there is a limited inherent power, the applicant has failed to come within the limited exceptions that have been distilled from earlier decisions of the Federal Court," said Judge Zulkefli Ahmad Makinuddin.

But what "limited exceptions" can there be? The inherent powers of the court to prevent injustice or an abuse of the process of the court have no limitations nor are they affected by exceptions.

The words in Rule 137 are so precise and clear that even a child could understand them. And the Rule says that nothing is to limit or affect "the inherent powers of the [Federal] Court … to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice".

Yet those three incompetent judges – perhaps they were clowns as their statements were laughable - still insist that the applicant, namely, Anwar, has failed to come within "the limited exceptions" when nowhere in Rule 137 are such preconditions imposed.

The Rule allows for review by the Federal Court of its own decision if Anwar, the aggrieved party, can show that the earlier decision of the Federal Court was unjustly made against him.

The errant judges do not even know that it is never the duty nor function of a judge to administer injustice

A wrong decision based on an error of law is not the same as an unjust decision. Anwar is applying for a review because the decision of the Federal Court is unjust and not because it is wrong in law.

When it comes to truth and justice, there is never to be any choice at all because falsehood and injustice must never be the alternative. It has to be Hobson's choice. So that for those who do not know right from wrong; who do not know justice from injustice, such lowly individuals should never be allowed to sit on the seat of Justice. They should never be allowed to be judges at all. And yet there are so many of them in the judiciary today ever since the rot begun.

I think I have said enough to prove my point. If our judges say that there are "exceptions that have been distilled from earlier decisions of the Federal Court", then they and those other judges of the Federal Court who have held that there are such exceptions are unfit to sit on the seat of justice as judges.

They are unfit to be judges because they do not know the difference between right and wrong; between justice and injustice and between truth and falsehood. Our country does not need imposters, who pose as judges, to deceive the common people any longer. The common citizenry can now uncover the imposters hiding beneath the mantle of the judicature.

Two instances
Having said that, I can now proceed to identify the errant "earlier decisions of the Federal Court" on Rule 137. There are two. The two misguided decisions are Adorna Properties v Kobchai Sosothikul [2006] 1 MLJ 417 and Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd [2008] 5 AMR 377.
Practicing lawyers will tell you that not too long ago the Federal Court have been exercising their inherent powers to right a wrong which is to prevent injustice as envisaged in Rule 137.

In the case of Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd v Kobchai Sosothikul [2006] 1 MLJ 417 (PS Gill and Rahmah Hussein FCJJ and Richard Malanjum JCA, as he was then) Mr Kobchai Sosothikul - who was substituted for his late mother Mrs Boonsom Boonyanit - applied under Rule 137 of the Federal Court Rules 1955 to review the Federal Court's decision in Adorna Properties v Boonsom Boonyanit. Justice PS Gill dismissed the application for review. He said:
Our reasons may be shortly stated. Firstly, although the consequence and effect of the main judgment [What main judgment? There is only Eusoff Chin's judgment] may be harsh when viewed without the benefit of the relevant statutory provision, we do not think this is a case where "grave injustice had occasioned" due to clear infringement of any principle of law thereby making it permissible for successive application to be made under the said rule.

Without going into the merits of this application we find that the substance of the main judgment revolves in the interpretation of section 340 subsection (3) including the proviso thereof of the National Land Code 1965.

And having read the reasoning therein and bearing in mind the words used in the said subsection including the proviso we are not convinced that the interpretation given in the main judgment is patently wrong thereby resulting in grave injustice thus warranting successive applications under Rule 137.

And even if we are wrong [in] our view it should be left to another occasion to further debate on the issue. For now we are of the opinion that … this is not a proper case for us to proceed to hear the merits or to grant the order as sought for.
This is the silliest judgment I have ever read. But then this is not surprising at all these days considering that we are being surrounded by a bunch of idiots in high places.

The facts of the Adorna case are well known. Recently the Federal Court has held in another case that Adorna is no longer good law. But PS Gill - the judge who has revealed himself to be an ignoramus in the law - was not convinced that the decision of Eusoff Chin in Adorna was patently wrong "thereby resulting in grave injustice thus warranting successive applications under Rule 137".

The late Mrs Boonyanit who is the registered owner had lost her two plots of land in Tanjong Bungah, Penang because some unscrupulous person had forged her signature and transferred the two plots to Adorna Properties.

Such registered titles now in the name of Adorna are clearly defeasible (it means "capable of being defeated or rendered void") because the registration of the transfer from the forger to Adorna was obtained by forgery. If it is defeasible it can be set aside.

Yet she lost her action to render void the registration of the transfer to Adorna. Is this not the gravest injustice committed against Mrs Boonyanit by Eusoff Chin who gave a perverse decision through a false interpretation of section 340 of the National Land Code?

Despite the unjust decision of Eusoff Chin in Adorna, PS Gill still holds that Eusoff Chin was not patently wrong as would result "in grave injustice thus warranting" the application of Rule 137.

The other errant Federal Court decision on Rule 137 is Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance (Malaysia) Bhd [2008] 5 AMR 377. This is what Abdul Hamid Mohamad, the then Chief Justice said, on page 381:
In an application for a review by this court of its own decision, the court must be satisfied that it is a case that falls within the limited grounds and very exceptional circumstances in which a review may be made. Only if it does, that the court reviews its own earlier judgment.
But that is not what Rule 137 says. Rule 137 is emphatic that the Federal Court has the power to hear or to make an order to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court.
However, this Federal Court ignored the Rule completely. Instead, it substitutes its own perverse prerequisite for any review of its own decision.

In a Rule 137 application, the aggrieved party is only concerned with whether an injustice was occasioned by the earlier decision of the Federal Court as in Adorna Properties v Boonsom Boonyanit or whether the process of the Court has been abused as disclosed in the Ayer Molek case.

The "limited grounds and very exceptional circumstances" has nothing to do with the application of Rule 137 at all. The conditions were manufactured by the bad judges of the Federal Court themselves in order to conceal the true intent or purpose of Rule 137 which is to avert an injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the court.

As usual the judges of the highest court in the land have shown their incompetence by missing the point altogether. The point is not "the limited grounds and very exceptional circumstances in which a review may be made". The point, in truth and reality, is whether the earlier decision has occasioned an injustice or whether it has abused the process of the court.

It seems that bad judges are birds of a feather. They flock together and support each other.

Uphill battle for Anwar
On Thursday 25 February 2010 the Federal Court unanimously decided not to review its January 29 decision barring Anwar from access to the documents “which would be tendered as part of the evidence for the prosecution” and “a written statement of facts favourable to the defence” which he is entitled to under section 51A(1)(b) and (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Such evidence would have included CCTV footage, medical reports and witness statements from the prosecution.

Anwar made the application for the evidence to be delivered to him by the prosecution under section 51A (1) (b) and (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Code was amended in 2006 to add this new provision: section 51A. It reads:
51A. (1) The prosecution shall before the commencement of the trial deliver to the accused the following documents:

1. a copy of the information made under section 107 relating to the commission of the offence to which the accused is charged, if any;
2. a copy of any document which would be tendered as part of the evidence for the prosecution; and
3. a written statement of facts favourable to the defence of the accused signed under the hand of the Public Prosecutor or any person conducting the prosecution. (The emphasis is supplied by me)

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (c), the prosecution may not supply any fact favourable to the accused if its supply would be contrary to public interest.
As rational members of the general public you would say at once that the words in section 51A (1)(b) and (c) are clear and unambiguous. They mean exactly what they say. Without a doubt Anwar is entitled to the documentary evidence and the statement he is asking under section 51A (1).

Yet when Anwar applied for the documentary evidence and written statement of facts to be supplied to him under section 51A(1)(b) and (c) the application was rejected by the Court of Appeal and by the Federal Court on the spurious ground that section 51 of the Criminal Procedure Code has restricted the application of section 51A to within the confines of section 51.
In other words, so say the Federal Court, section 51A has no meaning other than what case law has already determined on section 51. This is how the Federal Court puts it:
The Appellant cannot say at this stage that his defence is going to be so and so and that he needs to have access to such and such documents and materials to prepare for the defence. One settled principle attached to the application for discovery under s.51 CPC is that, at this pre-trial stage, a roving and fishing inquiry for evidence is not permissible. A catch all net cannot be cast.
The Appellant is not entitled to know by what means the prosecution proposes to prove the facts underlying the charge he faces. This remains the prerogative of the prosecution.
Mohd Azmi J, at the intermediate appeal in PP v RAYMOND CHIA (1985) 2 MLJ 63, described this situation neatly in this manner – "The important thing is to keep a proper balance between the right of the accused to know exactly what the charge is against him so as to give him reasonable opportunity to prepare his defence, and the right of the prosecution not to disclose their evidence and the manner in which they are to prove their case before trial in order to sustain our adversary system of criminal justice.
"To what extent the right of the prosecution not to disclose documents specifically referred to in the charge before trial is qualified by the right of the accused to be given reasonable opportunity to prepare his defence is of crucial importance in the administration of criminal justice."
In our view, the Appellant has thus not met the dual requirements of necessity and desirability laid down in s.51 CPC. We concur with the finding of the Court of Appeal on this issue.
The judgment of the Federal Court makes no sense at all. It is a non sequitur. It is gibberish to us all. Anwar Ibrahim is applying under section 51A of the CPC and not under section 51. Therefore, "the dual requirements of necessity and desirability laid down in section 51 CPC" does not apply to his application.

For one thing, section 51A came into force in 2006. The case law relied on by the prosecution on section 51 were those cases decided by the courts well before section 51A ever existed.

For another thing, section 51A states, "The prosecution shall before the commencement of the trial deliver to the accused … a copy of any document which would be tendered as part of the evidence for the prosecution" and "a written statement of facts favourable to the defence of the accused".
There is no ambiguity in those words. They mean exactly what they say. Now compare this with the wording of section 51 of the CPC. It reads:
51. Summons to produce document or other things.

(1) Whenever any Court or police officer making a police investigation considers that the production of any property or document is necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code by or before that Court or officer, such Court may issue a summons or such officer a written order to the person in whose possession or power such property or document is believed to be requiring him to attend and produce it or to produce it at the time and place stated in the summons or order.

(2) Any person required under this section merely to produce any property or document shall be deemed to have complied with the requisition if he causes the property or document to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any law relating for the time being in force or to apply to any postal article, telegram or other document in the custody of the postal or telegraph authorities.
Anwar entitled to documents
Anyone, unless he is an imbecile, can see immediately that section 51 and section 51A are as different as a chicken from a duck. Since section 51A stands separate and apart from section 51, Anwar is, therefore, entitled to make his application solely under section 51A for all the documentary evidence before the commencement of his trial that would be tendered as part of the evidence for the prosecution.

He is also entitled to a written statement of the facts favourable to his defence. Any denial of his statutory right by the Federal Court is an injustice to him. The decision of the Federal Court is unjust to Anwar because as a person who is the accused in a criminal prosecution he is entitled as of right, under the mandatory provisions of section 51A of the Criminal Procedure Code, to the documentary evidence "which would be tendered as part of the evidence for the prosecution" as well as to the "written statement of facts favourable to the defence of the accused".

Since Anwar has suffered injustice at the hands of both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court for not applying the mandatory provisions of section 51A of the Criminal Procedure Code as they stand, the decision of the Federal Court in defiance of section 51A is, therefore, an unjust decision.

On an application for review under Rule 137 the Federal Court has no option but to set aside the earlier decision of the Federal Court to prevent injustice. But in the instant case, the reviewing Federal Court has defied Rule 137 by not exercising the inherent powers of the Court to set aside the unjust decision of the earlier court and, as a result, has allowed an injustice to be perpetuated.

With judges such as these in the Malaysian judiciary where, to them, the principles of the law are not to be consonant with justice to be manipulated by them to uphold injustice, it is no wonder that the errant judges have forfeited the confidence of the people. The general public does not respect such judges anymore! They have put themselves beyond the pale. Just like pariahs.

Don't you think they should be despised?

NH CHAN was admitted to the Bar in 1961 and was a lawyer for almost two decades before becoming a High Court judge. He was then elevated to the Court of Appeal before retiring in 2000. He is the author of two books, Judging the Judges (2007) and How to Judge the Judges.