| The Islamisation of Malaysia: religious nationalism in the service of ethnonationalism 2 |
| Commentary |
| Written by Michael D. Barr & Anantha Raman Govindasamy |
| Friday, 31 December 2010 00:00 |
 Islamisation of education Let us start our study of the education system, not in education proper, but at an educational display in Malaysia’s Museum of National History as described by Virginia Hooker (2003: 4-6) in the opening pages of her A Short History of Malaysia. The most significant feature of this display for our study is that it represented the history of Malaysia as beginning with the coming of Islam. The peninsula’s pre-Islamic history was not denied, but it was effectively discarded. For instance, the Srivijaya Empire, which ruled both the peninsula and what is now East Malaysia from the seventh to the twelfth centuries, was only admitted to have left behind historical remains that show its ‘influence’ (Hooker 2003: 5). This ‘influence’ was put into sharp relief by a nearby map with flashing lights showing the spread of Islam throughout South-East Asia, and a replica of what Hooker describes as ‘the famous Terengganu Stone’ (Hooker 2008: 5). This archaeological artefact is a stone pillar dating from the early fourteenth century, which uses Jawi script (Malay written in Arabic script) to say that Islam was at that time already the local religion of the peninsula. Hooker (2003: 5) tells us that ‘the Terengganu Stone is the earliest record of the presence of Islam on the Peninsula and is cited [in the museum display] as evidence that Malaysia has one of the oldest links with Islam in Southeast Asia.’ Hooker was making the point that the display was presenting a skewed, Islamised version of Malaysian history that overplayed the place of Islam in the peninsula’s history, but as distorted as the Museum’s display might have been, it was much less Islamised than what has been taught to secondary school students in their history lessons since 2003. In that year, a new history syllabus and a new series of history textbooks were introduced in all secondary schools across Malaysia. The only significant point of difference between the old and the new versions was in the Form 4 syllabus and textbook.15 Form 4 is the year when schools teach the history of civilisations under the title ‘World Civilisations’, but since 2003 this has not so much been a course in ‘World Civilisations’ as a course in ‘Islamic Civilisation’. The old textbook, which was used until 2002, was titled Sejarah Peradaban Dunia: Tingkatan 4 (World Civilisation History: Form 4) (Ministry of Education Malaysia 1999), and was a broad civilisational history of the world. It contained six chapters titled (in English translation): ‘Early Human Civilisation’, ‘Islam Changed Human Civilisation’, ‘The Transition of the European Society and Its Impact’, ‘Revolution and New Phase of Human History’, ‘Western Imperialism and Local Reactions’, and ‘Moving towards International Cooperation’.16 In this textbook, Islamic history was presented conceptually as having a central place in world history as the religion that ‘changed civilisation’ by contributing to an improvement in world civilisation, but this conceptual centrality was not allowed to overwhelm the syllabus: it was studied in only one chapter out of six, with other chapters studying, for instance, Indian, Chinese and European civilisations. The syllabus also discussed in detail the pre-Islamic period in South-East Asia, with much emphasis on Hindu-Buddhist influence in the Malay world. In the revised version, however, Islamic history was given an unprecedented prominence, occupying fully half of the book. This textbook, titled prosaically Sejarah Tingkatan 4 Buku Teks (Form 4 History Textbook) (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002a), consists of ten chapters, five of which focus on Islamic history: ‘Islamic Civilisation and Its Contribution in Mecca’, ‘Islamic State in Medina’, ‘The Formation of Islamic Government and Its Contribution’, ‘Islam in South-East Asia’, and ‘Islamic Reform and Its Influence in Malaysia before the Arrival of the Colonial Powers’. The other five chapters survey the early development of civilisation per se: Indian and Chinese influence in South- East Asia (in Chapters 1-3), ‘Developments in Europe’ (Chapter 9) and ‘The British Policy and Its Impact on the National Economy’ (Chapter 10). The chapter on the British in Malaysia sits incongruously in a book on civilisational history, but its presence, along with Chapter 8 (‘Islamic Reform and Its Influence in Malaysia before the Arrival of the Colonial Powers’) serves to articulate the rest of the book very firmly into the history of Malaysia. As Milner noted in his brief analysis of this textbook:
Indeed, the final two chapters of the book provide a direct link between the civilisational history studied in Form 4 and the Form 5 syllabus, which is a more traditional celebration of Malay nationalism, with barely a mention of Chinese or Indians (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002b). The tight pathway from religious nationalism in Form 4 history to ethnic nationalism in Form 5 should come as no surprise. It provides evidence to support the argument being made in this article that Islamic identity is being kept subservient to Malay identity in official discourses and is being used by the governing Malay elites to bolster the conventional Malay-centric nationformation mythology, especially since history textbooks have always reflected official state-driven agendas of nation-building, emphasising the primary importance of an almost egalitarian multiculturalism during Tunku Abdul Rahman’s rule before 1969 (Milner 2005: 132-3), a more Malay-centric multiculturalism after 1971 when Tun Abdul Razak was prime minister, and promoting the strong Malay-centric national identity of 1987 while Anwar Ibrahim was Minister for Education (Abdul Rahman Haji Ismail and Badriyah Haji Salleh 2003: 184-6). The output of this overtly Islamic textbook was therefore shocking to minority political leaders (Lim 2003) and prompted debates in Parliament because it was recognised that it was not the result of a whim on the part of the authors, but part of a systemic program. The direction of the content of this textbook was, in fact, determined at the time the authors were appointed. Fully half of the co-authors (two out of four) are Islamic scholars: Mohammad Bukhari bin Ahmad and Rosnanaini binti Sulaiman, who trained in Islamic civilisation and Islamic education, respectively. Mohammad Bukhari bin Ahmad obtained his PhD from the University of California and also studied at Ferdowsi University (Mashhad), Tehran University in Iran and Bosphorus University in Turkey. His scholarly writing includes Qasidahs in Honor of the Prophet (1983) and The Ocean of Unity (1993). Rosnanaini binti Sulaiman is a specialist in Islamic history and education, and has been teaching Islamic history for two decades. Currently, she is affiliated to the Maktab Perguruan Perempuan Malayu (Malay Women’s Teachers’ Training College) in Melaka.17 With half the authors Islamic scholars, no one should be surprised if half the textbook is on Islamic civilisation. The decision to appoint this panel of authors must have been taken at a high level in the Ministry of Education, suggesting that even though we are talking about only one year of the history syllabus, this was part of a broader program of Islamisation. If confirmation of the presence of this broader program is needed, it could be found in a 2008 statement by Datuk Alimuddin Mohd Dom, the Director General of Education for Malaysia, when he foreshadowed the systematic promotion of Islam Hadhari in the school curriculum (New Straits Times Online 2008), a program that is, in fact, an effort to create an image of a ‘big Malaysia’ that spiritually, if not actually, traces its roots back to the Prophet Muhammad in seventh-century Mecca. If we look at the Sejarah Tingkatan 4 Buku Teks (Form 4 History Textbook), it is, in fact, an exemplary manifestation of Islam Hadhari. Tour of a textbook Yet, despite the imposition of this religious nationalist construction on Malaysia’s history syllabus, it is still ostensibly directed towards enhancing Malaysian unity, just as the old syllabus had been (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2000: 3, 2002c: 3). The 2005 National Education Policy has even elevated the teaching of history per se to the status of a ‘core subject at secondary school’, with the specific intention of using it in the promotion of ‘National Unity’ (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2005c: 40). The approach of the 2003 Form 4 textbook makes it clear that this ‘unity’ is to be built around the centrepiece of Islam. Even before opening the book, the front cover confronts us with a picture of the same Terengganu Stone that featured in Hooker’s account of the Museum of National History’s display, set against a background that is dominated by pictures of Islamic architecture. Once this civilisational history book is open, we find that the opening three chapters present a superficial overview of ancient civilisations, with accounts of the Mesopotamian, Roman, Greek, Mauryan, Gupta and Chinese empires interspersed amongst each other, and rarely an entire page devoted exclusively to a single subject (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002a: 1-64). Islamic civilisation is absent from these chapters, probably because it cannot be easily construed as being ancient, but Islam itself is nevertheless treated in the final three pages of Chapter 2, which offer a cursory survey of world religions. These few pages are very significant in our study, consisting of less than a page each for Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Confucianism and Taoism (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002a: 65-8). The importance of this feature is that it is the last mention of Confucianism and Taoism in the book, and consideration of Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity is thereafter restricted to contextual references in Chapter 3 (on ‘Ancient South-East Asian Civilisations’) and Chapter 9 (on ‘Developments in Europe’) (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002a: 71-97, 214-42). Turn to Chapter 4, however, and the reader faces an entire chapter just on the development of Islam in Mecca-before it even took the 200-mile journey to Medina (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002a: 98-116). It is obvious that this marks the beginning of a radically different approach, but the full significance becomes apparent only when we read the instructions to teachers conveyed in the Ministry of Education syllabus about the teaching of this chapter. The purpose of this chapter, teachers are told, is to understand the development of the ummah and the importance of leadership for its well-being (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002c: 31). The word ummah is an exclusively Muslim term, referring to the ‘community of believers’ and its unqualified use in the context of Chapter 4 already carries the clear message that the Muslim perspective is being privileged in this history. The message is reinforced by the stated purpose of the following chapter, which is to convey the message that ‘Muslim solidarity strengthens national prosperity’ (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002c: 35). This is an explicit claim by the Malaysian ummah to the centre stage of Malaysian society: claiming that prosperity for the rest of the country must be built around the solidarity of the Muslim centre. Yet, after two chapters, this coverage of Islamic civilisation still has not progressed beyond the lifetime of the Prophet or the borders of the Middle East. Students still have ahead of them two more chapters in which they follow Islam to Europe and Asia, and, in Chapter 8, they finally get to read of Islam being established in Malaysia (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002a: ch. 6-8). This chapter is the grand denouement of the arc of chapters on Islam: the faith has arrived in Malaysia and is accepted by the Malays, beginning in Melaka and working through the peninsula. The word ummah is never used in this chapter, but the anachronistic term masyarakyat Melayu (‘Malay community’) is used to great effect.18 After four chapters of prelude, there is no need to make explicit the assumptions of the centrality of Islam in the national history. It is nevertheless made explicit in the syllabus, which speaks at one point of the religious education system as ‘our national heritage’, and instructs teachers to impart an appreciation of the current national education system on the basis of this heritage (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2002c: 49). History is a compulsory subject, and all children passing through the education system are examined in it externally when they sit for the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (Malaysian Examination Certificate) at the end of Form 5. The imposition of an Islamic metanarrative at this point can be neither accidental nor incidental. It must be regarded as a deliberate attempt to impose a new form of identity on both the Muslim and non-Muslim children. This conclusion becomes even more pointed if we look beyond the teaching of history, and consider that the Islamisation process has permeated the entire schooling experience for those students who attend national schools. At this level, there is no need to look very far to find an official statement of intent, since as recently as 2007 then Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak declared explicitly ‘the government’s aspiration to empower Islamic education in the country’ (New Straits Times 2007b). To this end, the government is not only providing compulsory Islamic religious education for Muslims, but is also in the process of introducing the Arabic language in primary and secondary schools as a compulsory subject for Muslims and as an option for non-Muslims (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2005c: 16-7). These programs, along with training in Jawi script, Quranic recitation and Fardhu Ain (‘Islam’s obligatory duties’), are being taught making full use of information and communication technologies through a new RM150 million program that was intended to build 1666 special teaching laboratories in national primary schools across the country (Ministry of Education Malaysia 2005c: 17; New Straits Times 2007b). With a program like this in train, it is no wonder that the Form 4 history syllabus asks teachers to present the traditional system of Islamic schools as part of the national heritage: by the time the upgrade is finished, the national school system will have become a twenty-first-century version of the old eighteenth-century madrasah, except, of course, for the increasingly awkward presence of non-Muslim children. These are very contemporary initiatives, but they have not appeared in isolation. Since the early 1980s, national schools have become increasingly Islamic in their ambiance and ethos, under the explicit direction of successive prime ministers and ministers of education. Islamic education is now compulsory for all Muslim children in national schools with five or more Muslim pupils (down from the previous threshold of 15) (Government of Malaysia 1985: 48; Ministry of Education Malaysia 2005c: 16-7), and courts have confirmed that no consideration will be given for personal or parental wishes regarding the element of compulsion (New Straits Times 2007a). The general ambiance is now so thoroughly Islamic that even some Malay parents are keeping their children out of the national schools because so many of them are, in the words of one such parent, ‘more like Islamic religious schools’ (New Straits Times 2007c). According to this parent, some schools hold Muslim prayers during assemblies, while others refuse to organise school concerts for fear it might be un-Islamic to make music. At the moment, non-Muslims are exempt from compulsory attendance at Islamic and Islam-related classes-and, indeed, non-Muslim children cannot attend an Islamic class without the written permission of their parents-but there are grounds to be concerned that this could change. It is suggestive that in a 2003 seminar on ‘Education and Religion’, the President of the Malaysian Muslim Lawyers Association felt confident putting the view that Muslims and non- Muslims should be taught ‘the same moral values’ and that Islamic classes be opened to non-Muslims as an option, ‘just as you would choose another language as a subject because you would like to learn about it’ (Zaitoon 2005: 112-3). The significance of this episode is not that this was a particularly strong indication of forthcoming change-seven years later the suggested reform has not been introduced-but simply that this leading Muslim professional felt that this was an appropriate suggestion to put on the table and it was published in a book coedited by someone (Abdul Razak Baginda) who was closely identified with then Deputy Prime Minister (and now Prime Minister) Najib. Even more worrying is the fact that this suggestion is very much in the spirit of a series of specific initiatives taken by former Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammad over the The Islamisation of Malaysia 1980s and 1990s designed to ‘Islamise’ education. In 1982, Dr Mahathir tried to introduce a new tertiary subject on Islamic civilisation and make it compulsory for all university students in Malaysian universities. He repeated the exercise in 1997, once again trying to make it compulsory for all students. Both moves faced political backlashes from non-Muslims and both were watered down-the 1982 course was quickly made optional for non-Muslims (Mauzy and Milne 1983-4: 640-1) and the 1997 course was superficially broadened to include a notional coverage of Indian and Chinese civilisations (Milne and Mauzy 1999: 89-90)-but the direction and spirit of the moves is clear. It is, in fact, the direction and spirit of the whole religious nationalist project in Malaysia-placing Islam and the Muslim community at the centre and making it very clear to the minorities that their place in society is in a position of subordination. This is not the full story of Islamisation, nor does it give an adequate account of some of the more aggressive or oppressive aspects. Somemention has been made in passing of custody battles, and the destruction of non-Muslim places of worship, but this does not convey the full flavour: systematic and violent destruction of Hindu temples (Farish 2008); the current import and publishing ban on the Christian Bible and any Christian use of the word ‘Allah’ as Malay for God (AFP 2009a, b; New Straits Times 2009); and the episodes of bodysnatching as Syariah courts posthumously declare recently deceased people to have secretly converted to Islam and then insist on burial with Muslim rites (Associated Press 2006). These episodes and many others like them represent the sharp thorns of Islamisation, but they are not central to the program. Barr had the chance to ask a fairly senior member of the Malaysian elite about these incidents in early 2008 and found him apologetic, explaining these actions as the result of a disconnection between Malaysia’s modern elite and its more backward grassroots: either autonomous actions by overenthusiastic local authorities or highlevel political responses to grass-roots expectations. Although his response was highly political in itself, there is probably a lot of truth in it. After all, these actions are not sensible or prudent, and it is difficult to see much point in most of them. If we take this explanation at close to face value, we should relegate the more extreme of these actions to the periphery of our analysis, even though they will be at the front of the minds of victims and potential victims. The significance of our study of developments in the education system is precisely that these measures cannot be dismissed as peripheral. They were planned years in advance and administered from the highest levels of government. Furthermore, they are undoubtedly one set of drivers that are feeding the grass-roots reactions that were bemoaned by Barr’s confidant. Conclusion What our study of the education reforms reveals is not an assimilation program designed to assimilate people into Islam, let alone into ‘Malayness’, but a systematic attempt to assimilate non-Malays and non-Muslims into Malaysian society on terms dictated by the hegemonic core national grouping: Malay- Muslims. The religious nationalism of Malay-centric Islam feeds directly and explicitly into traditional Malay nationalism, reinforcing the self-confidence and sense of entitlement of the Malay-Muslim community, and exaggerating the message to non-Malays (and especially to the Chinese and Indians) that they are not core participants in the Malaysian nation. Neither part of the ummah nor the Malay masyarakat, they are subordinate, vulnerable and marginalised in their own country, yet expected to contribute to the Malaysian national project from the margins. Part I of this paper appeared yesterday. It was first published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.64, No.3 of June 2010. ************************* Notes: 15. The history textbooks for Forms 1 to 3 are designed to provide a basic overview of Malaysian_____________________________________________ |
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