APRIL 11 — In the 
Sun newspaper of Friday, 2 April 2010 I  came across this story:
Dr M’s ex-aide starts jail term for contempt
KUALA LUMPUR: Matthias Chang, former political secretary of  ex-premier Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, was sent to prison after he refused  to pay a RM20,000 fine for contempt of court.
Chang was served the committal order by the High Court before he  was taken to Kajang prison.
The lawyer was cited for contempt of court on March 25 when he  failed to apologise to the court during cross-examination in his  defamation suit against American Express  (Malaysia).
The committal order stated: “At about 2.30pm to day (March 25) …  when the court refused your request to address the court as a witness,  you lost your cool and walked out of the witness box and thereafter left  the court during the proceedings. Your conduct is a contempt in the  face of the court by virtue of Order 52 (1A) of the Rules of the High  Court.”
Judge Noor Azian Shaari had ordered Chang to pay a fine of  RM20,000 within seven days, in default [to serve a] month’s jail  sentence.
The judge says that Chang had committed contempt in the face of the  court.
I will first tell about how the law of contempt came into being. Then  I will tell about how it had evolved into what it has become in 
modern times. But before  that you may wish to know,
What is contempt in the face of the court?
If you have read my book How to Judge the Judges, 2nd edition, Sweet  & Maxwell Asia, you will come across this passage on page 61:
Contempt in the face of the Court
If you attack the character or conduct of a judge it could be termed a  contempt by scandalizing the judiciary. If you make the same attack in  court or if you disrupt proceedings in court it is called contempt in  the face of the court.
This was what the judge Noor Azian Shaari meant when she told  Matthias Chang “Your conduct is a contempt in the face of the court.”  Chang had disrupted court proceedings as a witness when he walkout in a  huff.
The difference between contempt by scandalising the judiciary and  contempt in the face of the court is that the latter is dealt with  summarily, that is to say, done or made immediately and without  following the normal procedures — this is the dictionary meaning. And  this is how Lee Hun Hoe CJ (Borneo) put it in Cheah Cheng Hoc v Public  Prosecutor [1986] 1 MLJ 299 (SC), at p 301:
The power of summary punishment is a necessary power to maintain the  dignity and authority of the Judge and to ensure a fair trial. It should  be exercised with scrupulous care and only when the case is clear and  beyond reasonable doubt. As Lord Denning, MR said in Balogh v Crown  Court [1974] 3 All ER 283, at 288:
“It is to be exercised by the judge of his own motion only when it is  urgent and imperative to act immediately – so as to maintain the  authority of the court — to prevent disorder, to enable witnesses to be  free from fear, and jurors being improperly influenced, and the like …”
This power must be used sparingly but fearlessly when necessary to  prevent obstruction of justice. We feel that we must leave the exercise  of this awesome power to the good sense of our judge. We will interfere  when this power is misused.
Now that we know what is contempt in the face of the court better  than any other uninstructed person, we should not listen to a  non-lawyer, like Che Det, giving pompous legal advice and telling-off  the judge that “no one should be the prosecutor, the judge and the  executioner.” Doesn’t our former prime minister know that summary  decisions are part of living in a civilized society? The umpire in a  badminton match does it all the time, so does the referee in a soccer  match and other sporting activities, but most of all, and he should know  as he was a parliamentarian, the speaker of the House of  Representatives or Legislative Assembly does it all the time at every  sitting; they are all, to use his own words, “prosecutor, judge and  executioner.”
Contempt in the face of the court means “the power of summary  punishment to be exercised by the judge of his own motion only when it  is urgent and imperative to act immediately” so as to prevent – as in  the case of Matthias Chang — disruption of the court proceedings. This  is a necessary power to be exercised only in the most pressing cases so  as to deal with the circumstances or situations stated by Lord Denning  in Balogh v Crown Office.
The history of this awesome power of the judges
But first let me relate the historical evolution of this awesome  power of a judge at common law. I won’t say it is a draconian power  because nowadays, that is, ever since 1936 – since Ambard v A-G for  Trinidad & Tobago, a more tolerant attitude is taken by the common  law towards critics of the judiciary.
On how the law of contempt came into being
At the beginning, before 1936, it was an excessively harsh power; one  could say it was a draconian power. But why was it so? Because during  the time of despotic kings of England, the king’s judges were lions  under the throne of the king, and they were wielding the power of the  king in the administration of the king?s notion of justice – do remember  that the common law of England is entwined in the history of England.  This was how Mr. Justice Wilmot (in an opinion which was not delivered  because the prosecution was dropped) explained the purpose of this law  in R v Almon 97 ER 94, 100 (1765):
The arraignment of the justice of the Judges is arraigning the King’s  justice; it is an impeachment of his wisdom and goodness in the choice  of his Judges, and excites in the minds of the people a general  dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations and indisposes their  minds to obey them; and whenever men’s allegiance to the laws is so  fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and most dangerous  obstruction of justice, and, in my opinion, calls out for a more rapid  and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsoever; not for the  sake of the Judges, as private individuals, but because they are the  channels by which the King’s justice is conveyed to the people.
In 1788 in the case of R v Watson 2 Term Reports (Durnford and East)  199, 205 (1788) Mr. Justice Buller expressed similar sentiments:
Nothing can be of greater importance to the welfare of the public  than to put a stop to the animadversions and censures which are so  frequently made on courts of justice in this country. They can be of no  service, and may be attended with the most mischievous consequences. …  When a person has recourse … by publications in print, or by any other  means, to calumniate the proceedings of a Court of justice, the obvious  tendency of it is to weaken the administration of justice, and in  consequence to sap the very foundation of the Constitution itself.
And how from such beginnings the law of contempt had evolved  to what it is today
Despite the demise of the reign of despotic kings where it ended with  the flight of King James II from the realm (James II was the last of  the Stuart Kings of England, 1603-1714) – “the grandiloquent fear that  criticism of the courts may endanger civilization” had continued right  up to the early twentieth century. “The branch of contempt of court  known as ‘scandalising the judiciary’ served to inhibit criticism of the  courts by laymen. To a limited extent it remains a fetter on freedom of  expression about judicial performance.” — see Pannick, Judges, page  109.
In R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36, 40, Lord Russell of Killowen CJ laid down  the law of contempt in this way:
“Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a  judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a  contempt of court.”
This is nicely summed up by David Pannick in his book Judges, at page  110:
“The grandiloquent fear that criticism of the courts may endanger  civilization has, in the twentieth century, continued to lead to the  punishment of persons who have insulted members of the judiciary or  impugned their impartiality.”
The book then goes on to say, pp 110-112:
English law remained unwilling to leave it to public opinion to  assess whether criticism of the judiciary had any basis.
Mr Justice Darling was the presiding judge at the Birmingham Spring  Assizes in 1900. Before the start of a trial for obscene libel, he  warned the press that they should not publish indecent accounts of the  evidence. After the conviction and sentence of the defendant in the  criminal case, Mr. Gray wrote and published in the Birmingham Daily  Argus, of which he was the Editor, an article [in which he described]  how Mr. Justice Darling,
“ … filled in a pleasant five minutes yesterday. … Mr Justice Darling  … [warned] the Press against the printing of indecent evidence. His  diminutive Lordship positively glowed with judicial self-consciousness. …  He felt himself bearing on his shoulders the whole fabric of public  decency. …
There is not a journalist in Birmingham who has anything to  learn from the impudent little man in horsehair, a microcosm of conceit  and empty-headedness. … One of Mr. Justice Darling’s biographers states  that ‘an eccentric relative left him much money.’ That misguided  testator spoiled a successful bus conductor.”
This splendid piece of invective effectively punctured the vain  pretensions of Mr Justice Darling whose injudicious behaviour on the  Bench was frequently a disgrace. …
Mr Gray’s prose was not appreciated by the courts. He was brought  before the Queen’s Bench Division
charged with contempt of court. He  swore a groveling affidavit of apology, no doubt on sensible legal  advice that otherwise there would be even more serious consequences for  him. …
Lord Russell, the Lord Chief Justice, … gave a solemn judgment,  noting that it was “an article of scurrilous abuse of a judge in his  character of judge – scurrilous abuse in reference to the conduct of a  judge while sitting under the Queen’s Commission, and scurrilous abuse  published in a newspaper in the town in which he was still sitting under  the Queen’s Commission.” He concluded that there was no doubt that the  article amounted to a contempt of court. … he was fined 100 pounds and  ordered to pay the costs.
The above case was reported in the Law Reports series as R v Gray  [1900] 2 QB 36, 39-42. This is the case where Lord Russell of Killowen  had laid down the draconian law of contempt which had stifled criticisms  of the judiciary in the early part of the twentieth century until the  judgment of Lord Atkin inAmbard v A-G for Trinidad & Tobago ended it  in 1936.
Here are a couple of examples of those pre-1936 cases:
i) In R v Vidal, The Times 14 October 1922 a dissatisfied litigant  who believed that the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty  Division of the High Court was a party to a conspiracy against him  walked up and down outside the Law Courts with a placard accusing the  judge of being “a traitor to his duty.” He was sentenced to four months’  imprisonment.
ii) In R v Freeman, The Times 18 November 1925 another dissatisfied  litigant sent a letter to Mr. Justice Roche, who had decided a case  against him, accusing the judge of being “a liar, a coward, a perjurer.”  He was held of being in contempt of court.
But the tide of the pompous attitude of the judges in their  own conceit and self-importance changed abruptly in 1936
At page 114 of David Pannick’s book Judges: “More recently, courts  have emphasized that only in very exceptional cases will charges of  contempt be brought against those who criticize the judiciary.”
Lord Atkin explained it in the Privy Council case of Ambard v A-G for  Trinidad and Tobago [1936] AC 322, at p 335:
… whether the authority and position of an individual judge, or the  due administration of justice, is concerned, no wrong is committed by  any member of the public who exercises the ordinary right of  criticising, in good faith, in private or public, the public act done in  the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way: the  wrong-headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the  public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in  the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of  criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the  administration of justice, they are immune. Justice is not a cloistered  virtue: she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful, even  though outspoken, comments of ordinary men.
This case was decided in 1936, so it is embodied in our common law of  contempt by virtue of section 3(1) of the Civil Law Act 1956 which  says:
(1) Save so far as other provision has been made or may hereafter be  made by any written law in force in Malaysia, the court shall:
(a) in Peninsular Malaysia or any part thereof, apply the common law  of England and the rules of equity as administered in England on April  7, 1956;
(b) in Sabah, apply the common law of England and the rules of  equity, … as administered or in force in England on December 1, 1951;
(c) in Sarawak, apply the common law of England and the rules of  equity, … as administered or in force in England on December 12, 1949, …
But tragically, to the many who have suffered at the hands of the  judges, the blame has to be placed on our Supreme Court for being under  the delusion that the common law of England on contempt was that as  stated in R v Gray[1900] 2 QB 36 and they have applied it as the common  law which applies in this country by virtue of section 3(1) of the Civil  Law Act 1956. They were oblivious of Ambard v A-G for Trinidad and  Tobago which was decided in 1936 and which has since then completely  changed the way the common law world looked at the law of contempt of  scandalising the judiciary.
The result that Ambard v A-G for Trinidad & Tobago has brought  about is that all previous Supreme Court cases that depended on R v Gray  were decided per incuriam (by oversight, failure to notice). The effect  is that all those cases of contempt mentioned in the judgment of the  Supreme Court in Attorney-General, Malaysia v Manjeet Singh [1990] 1 MLJ  167 have failed to apply the common law of England on contempt as it  stood in 1956 – in other words, our courts by applying R v Gray, a 1900  decision, have consistently applied an obsolete law.
The judgment of Mohamad Yusuff SCJ at pp 177, 178 belies the  mediocrity of the judgment itself. He said:
The Supreme Court has this far consistently applied the common law  principle of contempt of court as seen in the judgments of these cases,  viz: 
Arthur Lee Meng Kwang v  Faber Merlin (M) Bhd & Ors [1986] 1 MLJ 193, Lim Kit Siang v Dato’  Mahathir Mohamad[1987] 1 MLJ 383 and Trustee of Leong San Tong Kongsi  (Penang) Registered & Ors v SM Idris [1990] 1 MLJ 273. All these  cases dealt with contempt in scandalizing the court. … the common law,  as has been expounded, applied and decided by our courts after April 7,  1956, by virtue of the Civil Law Act 1956, has become part of our law. …  On the law applicable to this case … as mentioned earlier, the  principle of common law of contempt as stated in R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36  still applies in our country.
This judge and all the other judges who have decided the cases of  Manjeet Singh, 
Arthur Lee, Lim Kit  Siang and Leong San Tong Kongsi did not realize that R v Gray had been  superseded by Ambard v A-G for Trinidad & Tobago. This judgment of  the Privy Council as to the obsolescence of the offence of scandalising  the judiciary has demonstrated that R v Gray is no longer good law.
Therefore, the common law of England on the law of contempt of  scandalising the judiciary as it stood in 1956 is Ambard v A-G for  Trinidad & Tobago; the judgment of the Privy Council by Lord Atkin  allows for criticism of the judiciary even in the ferocity of the  language used. The common law of England on the law of contempt as  administered in England in 1956 is not R v Gray (which is obsolete) but  Ambard v A-G for Trinidad & Tobago.
Poor 
Arthur Lee, and poor Lim  Kit Siang, and poor Manjeet Singh and poor Murray Hiebert (Murray  Hiebert v Chandra Sri Ram [1999] 4 MLJ 321), they have all been  convicted of the offence of scandalising the judiciary on an obsolete  law.
Tragically, the obsolescence of the offence of scandalizing the  judiciary has escaped the uninspired minds of our judges.
Mr Martin Jalleh has suggested that I be charged with contempt of  court. I think it was an unreasonable request because such an event  would put the entire judiciary in a quandary. Those cases, such as 
Arthur Lee, Lim Kit  Siang, Manjeet Singh, and even Murray Hiebert are over, bar the  shouting, ? the phrase is used when any controversial event is said to  be technically settled but arguments about the outcome continue, albeit  with little effect on the result: see Red Herrings and White Elephants,  Albert Jack, Metro Publishing Ltd, London, 2004. I would suggest that it  is best to let sleeping dogs (or should I say, lions) lie.
Even our former prime minister Tun Mahathir admitted in Che Det that  when he gave his opinion that the judge should not be prosecutor, judge,  and executioner in Matthias Chang’s case — he did so with trepidation.  Actually, he has nothing to worry about. We are both on the same boat.  Our defence is this:
By virtue of section 3(1)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956, the common  law of Peninsular Malaysia is the common law of England as administered  in England on April 7, 1956. The common law of England on the law of  contempt of scandalising the judiciary as administered in England in  1956 is Ambard v A-G for Trinidad & Tobago which allows for  criticism of the judiciary even in the ferocity of the language used.
This briefly tells the history and evolution of the law of contempt  up to the present time.
We can now proceed to look at Matthias Chang’s case with a broader  and better understanding.
How does the law of contempt in the face of the court apply  to Matthias Chang?
As far back as in 1527 there is this tale of Sergeant Roo, “a great  lawyer of that time, more eager to show his wit than to be made a  Judge,” who had composed a satire on the abuses of the law for which  Lord Chancellor Wolsey was responsible. The satire was delivered in the  presence of the King. Roo was summarily dispatched to prison — see  Judges by David Pannick, Barrister; Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford,  OUP, 1987, at page 105 to which he has also included the rider:
Nowadays a more tolerant attitude is taken towards critics of the  judiciary. Nevertheless, lawyers and non-lawyers remain reluctant to  emulate the critical approach of Sergeant Roo.
In times past — as I have explained in the history above — lawyers,  “If they have suggestions for reform of the judiciary, or comments to  make on judicial performance, they whisper them to each other over lunch  in the Middle Temple or in professional journals remote from the public  gaze. Such heresies are expressed cautiously, in deferential language.”  – see Judges, pp 105, 106 where it also said:
In one case, after Lord Mansfield (Chief Justice of the King’s Bench,  1756-88) had given judgment for a Bench of four judges, he asked  Sergeant Hill, who appeared for the unsuccessful party, to “tell us your  real opinion and whether you don?t think we are right.” Hill replied  that “he always thought it his duty to do what the Court desired and …  he … did not think that there were four men in the world who could have  given such an ill-sounded judgment …
More often, it is only in fiction that the conventions of politeness  to judges are defied. The judges before whom John Mortimer’s Rumpole  appears are perverse and malign. They are ignorant of the ways of the  world. They are differential or rude to witnesses depending on the  social status of those who have the misfortune to give evidence in their  courts. … Only a barrister of Rumpole’s experience (and lack of  ambition) can afford to reply in kind to the discourtesy emanating from  that fictional Bench.
Ever heard of the expression “truth is stranger than fiction”? In  this country we have experienced for real perverse and malign judges,  not the fictional ones experienced by John Mortimer’s Rumpole.
In 1680, Nathaniel Redding accused two judges of “oppression” and was  condemned in Court to pay the King 500 pounds and lie in prison till he  paid it, seeNathaniel Redding’s Case, Sir Thomas Raymond’s Reports 376  n. (1680). Later that term the court remitted the fine and the sentence  of imprisonment.
In the Matter of Thomas James Wallace (1866) LR 1 PC 283, a Nova  Scotia lawyer wrote a letter to the Chief Justice complaining that “I  can’t help thinking that I am not fairly dealt with by the Court or  Judges.” He added that he “could also recall cases where the decision  was, I believe, largely influenced, if not wholly based, upon  information received privately from the wife of one of the parties by  the judge. Is this justice?” Lord Westbury, in the Judicial Committee of  the Privy Council, remarked that this “undoubtedly was a letter of a  most reprehensible kind … a contempt of court, which it was hardly  possible for the Court to omit taking cognizance of.”
I have found a case after 1936, it is R v Logan (1974) Crim LR 609. A  man on being convicted shouted from the dock, that it was “a carve up”,  was held to be a contempt of court.
But why am I telling this?
Was Matthias Chang charged with contempt for discourtesy to  the Bench?
I should think so too. It was crass impertinence of him to behave in  such an unruly manner towards a judge. As a lawyer he should know better  than to be discourteous to the court.
If I remember correctly he was charged with disrupting the court  proceedings while giving evidence as a witness by stomping out of the  witness box in a huff and left the court because the judge refused to  allow him to deliver a submission or speech from the witness stand.
The only modern case (post 1936) of disruption of court proceedings  that I am aware of is the case of Morris v Crown Office [1970] 2 QB 114  where the English Court of Appeal allowed an appeal against their  sentence of imprisonment imposed on Welsh students who had disrupted  court proceedings. Davies LJ said, at page 127:
On occasions one has the misfortune to encounter someone who makes a  disturbance in court. Usually when that happens it is a case of a  disappointed litigant who, from a sense of rage or disappointment at the  result of his case, loses control of himself and gives vent to his  feelings by an outburst either by word of mouth or physically.
In Balogh v St Albans Crown Court [1975] QB 73, a young man was  sentenced by Mr. Justice Melford Stevenson to six months’ imprisonment  for contempt of court by planning to release laughing gas into the court  to disrupt proceedings. He was released by the Court of Appeal because  his conduct was not a contempt as he had not disrupted court  proceedings. His plan was foiled by 
the police.
So now we know that the atrocious behaviour of Matthias Chang in  court is a contempt in the face of the court. As he did not appeal  against the sentence, could it be assumed that he was happy with the  sentence of one month’s imprisonment?
Had he appealed, who knows, he could have succeeded following Morris v  Crown Office.
I suppose he wants to be a martyr without a cause. — loyarburok.com
* Datuk Chan Nyarn Hoi is a retired Court of Appeal judge.
* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication. The  Malaysian Insider does not endorse the view unless specified.