fmt: Just Hot Air.... by Leanos Fernandez

Just hot air

June 28, 2013

The World Bank warned early this month that South- East Asia, one of the few prosperous economic zones on earth today could have to be bracing for more forest fires and clouds of smog.

By Leanos Fernandez

Climate change has been a subject of ridicule, disbelief and anger in many parts of the globe, engaging opposing sides that include political parties, non-governmental organisations and a whole army of researchers, scientists and environmentalists.

The reasons are obvious, as greater more dreadful fires rage on for days and weeks, flood waters inundate coastal and internal regions, tornadoes, hurricanes and earthquakes wreak untold material destruction while claiming hundreds if not thousands of lives. In all this, actual climate change continues to be overriden by business agendas and expansionary policies.

The realistic outcomes of years of promised actions and literal implementation have been deplorable. As governments agree to change and submit to findings by experts, the followup has been twofold — agreements ending up in renewed verbal assurances to “co-operate in future” — and inaction because of the need for further revisions.

Climate change, the Washington DC-based World Bank warned early this month that South- East Asia, one of the few prosperous economic zones on earth today could have to be bracing for more forest fires and clouds of smog.

Other parts of the globe have also not been spared the dire effects of climate change as evidenced by recent developments in the US. With American farmers, ranchers and agricultural operators facing increasing risks to their livelihoods as a result of climate change, attitudes too are changing, albeit too inadequately and slowly.

So, when the bank came up with the 255- page report last Monday, many developed and developing countries saw it as an ominous sign of things to come in the near future. Poor countries especially saw the report as not just bad news but felt it addressed disastrous conditions that may further hamper economic growth.

Some of the report’s more salient highlights were not unfamiliar, but reassuring. For example, the International Energy Agency had concluded that there’s a 40% chance temperatures will rise more than 4°C by 2100, while the United Nations (UN) reckons it could higher, around 5°C (from 3.5°C) by then.

What is especially of concern is that the fallout is expected to reverberate across the three regions mentioned in the report and would hit the cost of food, producing severe if not unbearable human conditions for those living in poverty.

“4°C may not sound like a lot, but it almost compares to the temperature difference between the last ice age and today, and is happening during one person’s lifetime,” Kaisa Kosonen, advisor and energy campaigner at the Netherlands-located Greenpeace International said.

In particular, she added, it will not be a comfortable nor healthy state of affairs for the three targeted areas — South-East Asia, South Asia and the Sub-Saharan Africa.

Losing sleep

What the president of the World Bank said in the report is worth taking note of in the light of the gravity of what is taking place on the climate front. Jim Yong Kim’s words are as haunting as they are a shot across the bow.

He said there was a 97%-98% consensus among scientists that global warming was real and caused by human activity.

“If you disagree with the science of humancaused climate change, you are not disagreeing that there is anthropogenic climate change (chiefly of environmental pollution and pollutants) originating in human activity. What you are disagreeing with is science itself,” Kim said.

In his press release, Kim said climate change, which is already unfolding, would batter the slums even more and greatly harm the lives and hopes of individuals and families.

“The conclusions in the report should make all of us lose sleep over what our world will look like in our lifetime. A possible scenario is a world 2°C warmer in 20-30 years that could ruin vast fields of African farmland while submerging large cities in South Asia, killing off fisheries in South-East Asia,” he warned.

The report was based on scientific analysis and computer simulations conducted by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics.

What did the World Bank highlight in its latest climate report that should either scare us into taking proactive measures or compel us to seek the intervention of legislators? The short answer is — unprecedented heatwave, widespread food shortage, more intense shifting rain patterns and unpredictable changes in weather conditions that can likely take a heavy toll on human life and property.

The above are just few of the main impending disasters that can descend on the global population if relevant agencies and governments don’t act. What is relevant to the subject of climate change and what ought to persuade undecided minds is that much of the research and study gone into it (the subject of climate change) has been done by experts who have had decades of experience and exposure.

Kim couldn’t be more blunt in his expectations of a world in which so many still doubt the role of climate change in both human life and industrial expansion.

“It is time to stop arguing about whether climate change is real or not,’’ he said.

The Copenhagen fiasco

Some of the biggest emitters of CO2 are also some of the most reluctant to press aggressively for climate change measures at both the micro and macro levels. It is becoming increasingly difficult to get China, the European Union (EU) and even the US to fully and persistently cooperate on the matter even as they are some of the worst emitters.

In terms of air quality, the World Bank has reported that 16 out of the 20 most polluted cities in the world are in China, and the country is also the biggest greenhouse gas-emitter. Meanwhile, the EU operates the world’s largest carbon market.

To get China, the US and the EU to agree on a price for CO2, there needs to be a “market mechanism” to check and eventually eliminate the negative elements causing drastic changes to global climate.

“The data on the progress made in the area of climate change point to positives and negatives. For example, the rate of warming since the turn of the century has declined more than many experts and scientists had expected. This was after significant hikes in the 1980s and 1990s,” a prominent science journal noted.

Which brings us to the question — why were attempts to agree to a concerted plan of action to combat climate change such a failure at a UNsponsored conference in Copenhagen in 2009?

One answer seems preponderant. And, it was the disagreements “over the economic impact”. James Hansen, the world’s leading climate scientist commenting on the conference once said: “Any agreement would be deeply flawed, and it would be better to start from scratch. The whole approach (conference) is fundamentally wrong that its better to reassess the situation.”

He said one of his primary concerns was that relating to developing economies and the question of funding, a matter that remains deadlocked till this day.

Conferences and such like do have an impact, but very minimal, only because there remains severe disagreements between the developed and developing economies. Basically, such conferences are “bureaucratically organised” and therefore bureaucratically implemented, meaning taking as much time as possible.

Meanwhile, land are burning and the air is being polluted on an unimaginable scale. What happened at Copenhagen was the manufacture of a document — the Copenhagen Accord hammered out by a small group of countries that included the world’s two most biggest greenhouse gas polluters, the US and China.

In the end, the conference did not adopt the accord, but voted “to take note of it” meaning the Copenhagen Accord. However, it managed to achieve one minor feat which was that it “united the US, China and other major developing countries to curb global greenhouse gas emissions, something the Kyoto Protocol failed to do.

This content is provided by FMT content provider The Malaysian Reserve

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TMI: The English Speaking ruling class of Malaysia - by M Chih

The English Speaking ruling class of Malaysia - by M Chih

TMI: JUNE 27, 2013

On May 19, 2013, 2 weeks after GE13, Wong Chun Wai's On the Beat column in The Star, 'Bring back English schools' candidly stated the widely established pros of bringing back English medium schools in our country. This was followed by several pro English groups reinforcing Wong Chun Wai's take on May 20, 2013 in the Star (Page 12).

At the bottom of the same page the Deputy Education Minister P. Kamalanathan said' "It's an interesting idea that I think is progressive." Kamalanathan went on to say that, "Due to the complexity of the nation, it would require very detailed dialogue with all the stakeholders before any concrete decision is made."

Isn't this just so typical BN style of addressing the numerous requests for English medium schools over the years? After so many promises by the Education department, the rakyat is curious to know just how many detailed dialogues have the policy makers sat through to assess the pros and cons of having English medium schools in Malaysia.

Perhaps Wong Chun Wai has his hands tied behind his back being the Group Chief Editor of an MCA hence, BN owned newspaper.

He seemed retrained from the way he was skirting around the real issue why our education policy makers have steadfastly refused to offer English medium public schools.

Come on, lets not insult the intelligence of our esteemed policy makers by offering them a long lists of pros on an English medium syallabus. I honestly CANNOT believe that Malaysia's education policy makers are so daft as to be ignorant of the importance of the English language.

So, please everybody, we really must stop implying that our education policy makers are stupid, ignorant or delusional. They are so absolutely not. They know exactly what they are doing.

Let me get straight to the point. First point - for all those ministers and policy makers who are so pro Bahasa Malaysia, how many of their own children attend or attended the Sekolah Kebangsaan? If the very people who adamantly insist that the current Bahasa Malaysia syallabus is the best option for the nation, they should be so proud to lead by example and send their own children to such schools and ultimately aspire to see their children graduate from the local universities. Is this the case? Secondly, even in Malaysia, the top executives in the country's biggest corporations speak fluent English. Bear in mind, as a result of the pro-Bumi NEP ruling since 1971, just about all the biggest and most lucrative businesses across the board are now Bumi controlled. Even rice, flour and sugar are monopolized by Bumi owned companies.

The Malay CEOs, Directors, Senior Executives and senior managment people here speak English fluently. These people grew up aiming to master the command of the English language.

Hence, they were able to further their higher studies later in English speaking countries.

It is a fact that those Bumi students who received full scholarships to get their degrees at the legendary University of Cambridge (England), MIT (Massachusettes Institute of Technology, USA), Columbia University (New York), Harvard University (Massachusettes, USA), and other creme de la creme universities in England and the US were even able to take up such opportunities in the first place because they are fluent in English.

Usually, these kids come from the upper class Bumi families where they speak English at home. When these students graduate, they have a huge head start in their careers. Thus, further widening the gap between them, the elites and the poorer Malaysians.

The government for years has been saying that usage of the English language would lead to disunity and disrupt the peace in the country.

Then I really don't understand why our wealthy ministers can't wait to send their kids off to study in England? Those ministers who have way too much money send their young children to expensive English medium International schools in Malaysia or English boarding schools at primary and secondary school levels.

It is so totally OK for these elite Bumis to embrace everything English to the hilt. These are the very same people who turn around and say go Bahasa Malaysia to all the rest of Malaysians who have to eek out a living. What hypocrites!

As reflected by the GE13 results, the people know exactly what this ruling government is up to. It is not because the policy makers are clueless as to the benefits of mastering the English language.

Clearly, there is a systematic strategy in place that is very sinister and unfair to the rakyat. In July 1969, after the May 13 riots, the then Minister of Education, Dato Abdul Rahman Ya'akub declared that starting January 1970, all English medium schools would be phased out. By 1985, all former English medium schools would become Malay medium schools.

Here's the real reason why the Malaysian government has been so unwilling to offer the masses the option of the English medium education.

The desired outcome of depriving the ordinary Malaysians from mastering a language that even China has made leaps and bounds forward in tackling this English language was to create an overall 2 classes of people - the ELITE, the ones who own and control the biggest and most lucrative businesses in the country and end up ruling the country, and the LESSER HAVE NOTS, those who are impeded by their poor English language skills and consequently end up being perpetually dependent on the government for handouts.

We all know only too well the crippling detrimental effects to a society which has grown accustomed to handouts. This is exactly the poison-laced icing on the cake that Malaysia's BN has been feeding us since independence from the British rule.

What better method to control the masses under the guise of a democratic government than make a selected segment of the population desperate for subsidies? From there on, the ruling party can do whatever their whims and fancies dare to concoct.

Forty-three years later, this divide and rule system has become the bloodline for the BN elitists.

They dictate that the rakyat pay super premium prices for poor quality national cars which have obsolete engines.

They dictate that those who don't know how to ride motorbikes and can't afford the very tinest 800cc super overpriced national cars have no access to a reliable public transport system. (Singapore commuters get FREE MRT services before 7:45am on weekdays)

They dictate that the taxi drivers who slog for more than 12 hours 7 days a week earn less than the consortium companies (Bumi owned of course) that issue the taxi licences.

They dictate that taxi drivers be forced to buy those overpriced 1.6L Proton Saga cars which cannot endure the high mileage racked up without costly repairs.

They dictate that taxi owners pay oh such a ridiculous prices for lousy cars because the taxi drivers are forced to buy cars through the taxi consortiums.

They dictate that the taxi drivers must go to workshops which are owned by the same consortium owners and those workshops are more expensive than non appointed workshops.

They dictate that taxi drivers waste countless hours every day lining up at the far and few Petronas stations that sell the cheaper liquified gas.

They dictate that Malaysians pay through their noses just to get to KLIA and LCCT. By not allowing cabs to pick up returning passengers, the taxi drivers have to work longer hours and the passengers are forced to pay exorbitant cab fares.

Yes, although buses from Sentral to LCCT costs RM9.00, those who do not have their own transport to get to the various pick up points will be slaughtered by the cabbies.

Just on the taxi issues alone, all those ridiculous rates and conditions imposed on the taxi drivers are simply passed on to their passengers. Again, again, the rakyat suffers.

They dictate that the rakyat pay at least 3 or 4 times more for a 2.0 Litre Toyota Camry than what it costs in countries where their exchange rate is 3 times stronger than the ringgit and their country's minimum wage is over USD9 per hour.

They dictate that the poorer Malaysians have no access to proper roads and decent schools (Sarawak & Sabah).

They dictate that Malaysians who can't afford private hospitals have to bear with the few ill equiped public hospitals (Sarawak & Sabah).

They dictate that Malaysians pay for very, very expensive landline telephone & internet services in the name of speed & efficiency.

They dictate that Malaysians pay for overpriced cable TV services (ASTRO - basically, there's only one provider and we all know how weather dependent ASTRO's broadcast signal is).

Malaysians should take note that Singaporeans, who ejoy the SGD1:RM2.50 exchange rate, are delightfully paying less than SGD60 a month for a basic Bundle package of (1) a handphone line with a data plan, (2) home internet wifi (minimum is 30mbps), (3) Digital cable TV (rain or shine, the broadcast is uninterrupted) that offers more channels than our most expensive ASTRO package. Their pre-paid handphone packages would make you drool !

They dictate that it is possible for the masses (who can't speak English) to live in Malaysia at today's cost of living on a minimum wage of RM900 (W Msia) & RM800 (E Msia) working 10-14 hours 6 days a week. The cunning reality is that few employers in Malaysia would pay for overtime. They just allow the employee to clock in later the next day, discounting the fact that the 2 hours overtime put in the previous day is worth more than the 2 hours he can come in later the next day.

Last but not least, they dictate how weak the ringgit has become so that these elite Bumi companies can export their products and services competitively. The point is, weaker buying power of the ringgit and higher cost of living don't affect them and their families one bit because they have super turbo charged earning capacity. Their lifestyles are not even slightly grazed while the ordinary Malaysians' struggles to just live a basic life worsens each year.

So one might ask why on earth would Malaysia's English speaking ruling elite (bearing in mind the posts of the Prime Minister and his Deputy are not contested) want to ruin all the goodness in their rarefied world which they had doggedly built up by implementing unfair policies amidst numerous vehement protests since 1969?

The answer : THEY WON'T. It is in their very best interest to deprive the masses of equal access to the English medium education. Their divide and rule system has become their precious Aladdin's Lamp. They must continue to make the majority of the people ever so more dependent on subsidies and Ang Pows of all sorts.

English medium education for the non-elite rakyat shall remain "an interesting idea which is progressive" as it has been since January 1970 .

Well, at least until many, many more of the lesser fortunate Malaysians wake up from their passive mode, the future can only promise more of the unfathomable easy non-halal money, and magnificently colorful lifestyles in the fast and furious lane for the ruling class in Malaysia.

* M Chih reads The Malaysian Insider.

The Star: Multiculturalism – how can it be wrong? ..... By NG KAM WENG

The Star Friday August 25, 2006

Multiculturalism – how can it be wrong?

By NG KAM WENG
Research Director,
Kairos Research Centre

THESE must be worrying times for Malaysian citizens if an official from Ikim, a government think-tank dedicated to the task of disseminating Islam as a tolerant religion, can come out with an article entitled “Debunking multiculturalism” that appeared in The Star (Aug 22, 2006).

Credit must be given to the writer, Md Asham Ahmad, for his forthrightness in arguing that Islam – rather than multiculturalism – be the framework for social policy in Malaysia.

Nevertheless, it is evident that the writer’s forthrightness is not accompanied by accurate facts, given his skewed reading of Christian history.

Md Asham suggests that religious pluralism and multiculturalism is the outcome of a weak religion (Christianity) that does not stand comparison with Islam, given Islam’s strong relation with the State.

I am always suspicious of mono-causal interpretations of history that purport to explain how the existing condition of a society arose from a particular ‘ism’.

A more nuanced reading of the history of the rise of liberalism and religious liberty would take into account the multiplicity of factors including the new discoveries of Oriental civilizations in the European age of exploration, the power struggle between hegemonic states (Spain and France) and new nation-states in Germany and the Netherlands, the rise of the merchant class and independent trading cities (like Geneva) and the conflict between tradition and critique of the Enlightenment thinkers.

Above all, multiculturalism, exemplified by toleration, was the outcome of ‘religious’ wars that led to the treaty of The Peace of Westphalia (1648). Notably, the provisions for religious freedom were called articles of peace.

It should be of interest to note that the challenge of managing religious plurality (a fact rather than an ideology) is not a unique problem of Western Christianity. We see ongoing conflicts in Asia and Africa – such as in Sudan, India and Iraq – that cry out for equivalents of the historic Peace of Westphalia.

It would do well for Md Asham to adopt a modest attitude of willingness to learn from the past rather than judge it with sarcasm, when it is evident that we Asians/Africans continue to be plagued by religious and cultural conflicts.

Md Asham suggests that non-Muslims are motivated by ideology when they commend multiculturalism as a valuable framework to promote social harmony.

He writes: “Multiculturalism, as understood and propagated by its proponents in this country is not based on diversity, but rather it strives to debunk Islam as a socio-political order.” By using words like ‘hostility’ and ‘subversion’ he also suggests that non-Muslims are imbued with an adversarial attitude.

The problem is, Md Asham has inverted the dynamics of rational debate in this country by suggesting that the non-Muslims’ call for multiculturalism is driven by an ideology inherently hostile to Islam.

The reality is that our nation was a plural society at its inception in 1957 and more so in 1963 when Malaysia incorporated the many tribal communities in East Malaysia.

One plainly cannot deny the existing social condition (plurality) that needs to be addressed. Hence, the stress on multiculturalism as the best modus vivendi for developing a national identity that expresses unity in diversity and equality for all peoples regardless of their culture and religion.

Since concepts have different meanings in different contexts, the onus is on writers to define their terms in a fair and accurate manner.

For example, Allan Bloom (The Closing of the American Mind) castigates western multiculturalism that leads to relativism, and results in the demise of “solidarity in defence of the truth”.

On the other hand, Malaysians and other Asians tend to describe multiculturalism as “the view that various cultures in a society merit equal respect and scholarly interests” cf. Dictionary of Cultural Literacy (1994).

Such sensitivity to contextual meanings would have cautioned Md Asham against making the suggestion that supporters of multiculturalism are merely motivated by hostility towards Islam based on family, neighbourhood and school.

Perhaps, Md Asham wrongly equates liberalism with libertarianism. Libertarianism is the view that individuals should be free to do whatever they wish so long as they do not infringe on other people’s freedom or property.

However, Md Asham would be remiss if he tars political liberalism with a form of libertarianism that undermines social relationships; bearing in mind that liberalism has a range of meanings.

It should be noted that classical liberalism as expounded by John Locke describes the essential theses of liberalism in the following terms: that the people are the source of all political power, that government cannot be justified unless it possesses their free consent, that all governmental measures are to be judged by an active citizen body, that men of government are to help them when they require it, but not to run their lives for them, and finally the State must be resisted if it steps beyond its political authority.

More importantly, political liberalism and multiculturalism in the Malaysian context envision the flourishing of citizens based on the preservation of fundamental liberties from encroaching State authoritarianism, if not totalitarianism.

Md Asham may find the theses objectionable, but a robust set of philosophical propositions demands careful and rational response rather than a debunking couched in loaded and emotive words.

Md Asham ends his article with a call for a polity that must be rooted in local history. But taking local history seriously must surely mean honouring the consensus on the specific form of secularism engraved in our Malaysian Constitution in 1957 and 1963.

Unlike some places in the West, secularism in Malaysia does not reject religion. It was the social consensus back in 1957 and 1963 that there should be no establishing of one religion above others in a multi-cultural, multi-religious society like Malaysia.

Secularism in Malaysian history as such commends a benign neutrality and benevolent support for religious plurality.

I find unacceptable Md Asham’s suggestion that, “it is through Malaysia, as an Islamic state, that other religions would thrive, and that we have a better chance of fostering national unity based on a common religious worldview.”

Firstly, it is undeniable that religions are presently flourishing in Malaysia under the existing Constitutional arrangement.

Secondly, national unity remains strong so long as State polity is based on overlapping consensus of diversity of religious worldviews (John Rawls).

I write this to contrast Md Asham’s call for unity under a common religious worldview, which suggests imposition by a dominant religion. In short, Md Asham’s suggestion is both unnecessary and counterproductive.

In conclusion, even though Md Asham’s article in debunking multiculturalism may be a legitimate academic exercise, I reject his suggestion that multiculturalism as historically understood and practiced in Malaysia is incongruent with our local cultural aspiration.

Indeed, I wish to stress that open debate on public philosophy is itself testament to the robustness of our national Constitution that envisions the task of nation building to be inclusive and open to positive contribution from all citizens regardless of race, culture and religion.

It is an affirmation of the politics of recognition, mutual respect and reciprocity.

malaysiakini: Police douse flames on 'KL 6th most dangerous city'

Police douse flames on 'KL 6th most dangerous city'

10:43AM Jun 21, 2013

The Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM) have denied the claim by a website that has listed Kuala Lumpur as the sixth most dangerous city in the world.     

A statement issued by the PDRM Facebookyesterday claimed the allegation was untrue, and urged the public not to believe the information or disseminate it.     

"The public is urged not to easily believe and spread information from the website, which is not validated, as it was not referred to the police.     

"Malaysians should also be responsible and ethical disseminators of information by ensuring any information obtained and shared out is from an official source," it said.     

The police Facebooktrumpeted its crime statistics, saying “from 2010 to 2012, PDRM successfully reduced the crime index in Kuala Lumpur by 31.8 percent”.

The website '10 Amesome', which ranked Kuala Lumpur as number six, claimed, “the state’s capital is said to be one of the most dangerous cities in the world, as the crime rate increased 70 percent in the last three years.”

“Malaysia also takes pride in its spectacular landscapes, a culture that begs to be discovered and explored and… a history of violence that made way too many victims,” the posting reads.

However, the article’s author, stated only as Deea, did not list the source for her information, or provide any examples to verify her claim.

Crime index debate

A description on the site, which produces 'Top ten' lists on a wide range of obscure topics such as 'Top ten facts about our planet', and 'Top ten most dangerous dogs in the world', stated it was created in 2009 by one ‘Paul’.

It also stated that “four prolific young authors” had joined the team in 2012, however, the link to the list of writers was directed to a ‘404' error page.

Even so, ‘10 Awesome’ boasts that it has a monthly viewership of 100,000 and up to 7,700 fans on its social media platforms.

This is not the first time the issue of crime rate in the country has been the topic of debate, despite police's continuous assurance that the numbers have reduced over the years.

Early last year, then Home Minister Hishammuddin Hussein (above) had revealed that overall crime index and street crime index for 2011 had dropped by 11.1 and 39.7 percent respectively, two years after the implementation of the National Key Result Areas (NKRA) to combat crime.

However, various quarters then accused police of manipulating this figure, a claim which was denied as police claimed to follow the same standard as the United States' FBI, to index crime.

In January, NGO Malaysian Crime Watch Taskforce (MyWatch), of which former inspector-general of police (IGP) Musa Hasan is patron, alleged that serious crimes like kidnapping and extortion are being classified as non-index crime in an effort to lower the crime index.

A month later, My Watch released claimed an internal police circular indicated incidences of crime in 2011 was more than double the statistics released to the public.

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Life Hacks: 10 Dangerous Cities In The World

10 Dangerous Cities In The World
Posted In Life Hacks - By Deea On Wednesday, June 5th, 2013 With 0 Comments
http://10awesome.com/10-dangerous-cities-in-the-world/


Making a top of the most dangerous cities in the world is not an easy task, the lists change year after year. Some time ago, Chicago was, and still is considered the world’s crime capital. But let’s face it, just because Chicago has an interesting crime history and something that looks like a proneness to violence, there are other cities in this world that are basically imbued in constant acts of crime. There are cities out there which can scare even the most spectacular team of super heroes and if you think the Expendables can take a quiet walk in the park in some of these towns, think again! Today we will see (from the distance, as nobody dares to travel in those virtually war zones) the top ten most dangerous cities in the world.


1. San Pedro Sula – Honduras

It takes first place as the crime rate was established at 169 deaths at 100.000 inhabitants. Despite the touristic attractions, Honduras is a dangerous country and San Pedro Sula is not something we’d visit without the Terminator (Arnie’s version to be exact) to tag along.




2. Ciudad Huarez – Mexico

It is not a myth in Hollywood movies that Mexico is that type of country you should visit only if you have a weapons’ permit and some shooting skills. Full of cultural attractions, with a history and surrounding legends that appeal to everybody, Mexico loses a lot of attention and potential touristic development due to the violence it is characterized by. Ciudad Huarez isn’t the first time when makes the top ten list of the most dangerous cities in the world, as drug traffic and gang wars are current news.




3. Maceio, Brazil

Many years, Rio de Janeiro bared the stigmata of danger, crime and unthinkable violence, together with Buenos Aires even. Did you happen to see the famous and most disturbing movie Citade de Deus? Did you hear about the Brazilian favelas? Well, Maceio seems to be the peak of them all, as it hit the list with proven facts that people actually contract paid killers to solve some of their business.




4. Acapulco, Mexico

Don’t get us wrong, the beaches in Acapulco still make the top touristic destinations in the world. The paradox is that despite the beauty, the fame and the world-renown publicity Acapulco benefits of, it is still one of the most dangerous cities in the world, statistics showing an incredible crime rate of 128 victims in 100.000 inhabitants.




5. Sharm el Sheikh
You can find there not only ones of the most spectacular landscapes in the world, tourist luxury services that redefine the concept of luxury, vacation offers that attract millions of people, but also, and unfortunately this is the truth, armed attacks, broad daylight street robberies, assault and rape. It is indeed a shame, as this corner of Heaven is still considered one of the best outcomes of nature and man teamwork.




6. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Malaysia also takes pride in its spectacular landscapes, a culture that begs to be discovered and explored and… a history of violence that made way too many victims. Presently, the state’s capital is said to be one of the most dangerous cities in the world, as the crime rate increased with 70% in the last three years. It wasn’t a peace on Earth display before either, but now things seem to keep getting worse.




7. Johannesburg, South Africa

This South African city almost competes with New York in infrastructure, economy expansion, touristic attractions and way of life. Still, Trip Advisor listed this beautiful city among the most dangerous in the world as people still can witness street shootings and physical assaults in broad day light.




8. Caracas, Venezuela

Back in South America, among the world’s records nominees in crime and violence. Caracas is the playground of numerous drug cartels and gangs and street fights, wars and assaults are a constant preoccupation for the inhabitants and authorities, who explicitly warn people not to hang for long in some specific neighborhoods.




9. Marrakech, Morocco

Morocco is a beautiful country and a lot of people go there to get a taste of the Orient, learn about ancient traditions, see the desert with their own eyes and feel the magic atmosphere. Marrakech is, however, a very dangerous city and even on the governmental official web site the authorities warn future tourists to consider carefully their visit, as they might find themselves in threatening situations.




10. New Orleans, U.S.A

It is a pity to find this incredible beautiful city among the top 40 most dangerous cities of 2012, but unfortunately, the facts and numbers show New Orleans as being one violent city and the only one in the U.S. that made it to the list.

fmt: ASEAN Liberalisation AEC 2015: Risk of missing talent opportunity.... by Paulius Kuncinas

Risk of missing talent opportunity

Paulius Kuncinas

 | June 19, 2013

Giving access to labour markets to foreigners can help to address Malaysia’s problem of brain drain.

COMMENT

The biggest opportunity that South East Asia is at risk of missing when it launches the Asean Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 is liberalising its 285 million labour market to allow free movement of skilled labour to address acute shortages in growth sectors.

Most recent Asean Summit in April in Brunei Darussalam was largely silent on this important issue. Despite an encouraging slogan ‘Our People, Our Future Together’ strategic energies were consumed by efforts to find common ground on South China Sea disputes.

One step in the right direction was the signing of the Asean Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA) of Tourism Professionals and a fresh initiative to establish visa-free travel in Asean countries which could help business professionals to move around the region.

However these measures still lack the visionary boldness required to transform Asean’s labour market to meet its future skill shortages. A truly ‘People-Centred’ Asean appears to be about people within national boundaries rather than an integrated labour market.

Recent economic history shows this could prove to be a major policy error. The Eurozone economic crisis which is still playing out in Italy, France and Spain has shown that labour market rigidity is a major drag on future growth potential as it stifles creativity and productivity.

Closed professions in Greece such as pharmacies and transportation for instance have been identified by the IMF as the main structural reason for underperformance of its notoriously weak economy.

Italy has seen practically no real growth in more than a decade because of lack of labour competition within protected sectors despite its indisputable prowess in design, engineering and manufacturing. France faces very similar problems.

Meanwhile Germany is a shining positive example of how labour flexibility and open borders can drive productivity growth without sacrificing commitment to social responsibility. Germany is the only country today in Europe that is capable of delivering growth even when the rest of Eurozone is still in recession thanks to competitiveness of its labour force.

Though Asean has said it does not want to adopt the European Union integration model it could take away a few valuable lessons from the current problems in Europe.

One of the main achievements of the EU in the 2000s was to remove obstacles to talent flow which allowed many bright and young professionals from countries such as Poland and Hungary to migrate to stagnating economies in Italy, Spain and France.

Although Poland for instance initially experienced brain drain, after a few years many were returning home with new skills and savings to tap opportunities in their own country.

During the last recession Poland was in fact one of the few countries in the EU that was able to post growth because of strong domestic consumption underpinned by returning nationals.

Addressing Malaysia’s brain drain

The main takeaway from this story is that free flow of labour allows migrants to explore opportunities both at home and abroad and helps to stabilize countries during recessions.

The main weakness in the EU was that the labour reform did not go far enough and several states encouraged an entitlement culture based on a system of unsustainable benefits that led to a full blown debt crisis in 2009.

While at first it may seem counter-intuitive, giving access to labour markets to foreigners can also help to address Malaysia’s problem of brain drain.

Research from other emerging countries shows that a more vibrant and international labour market tends to attract young professionals back to their home country.

A survey done by the World Bank back in 2011 showed that 40% of Malaysians with tertiary education who have moved abroad regard skill flow and labour competition as an important factor in returning to their country.

Allowing skilled foreigners to compete for top jobs changes the whole perception about upward mobility within a labour market.

If there is no discrimination against foreign workers it must mean the corporate world is genuinely interested in finding talent as opposed to simply protecting their own.

This is particularly true in talent-hungry ‘globalised’ sectors such as finance, education, health as well as research and innovation that intrinsically require a free flow of ideas across borders to be successful.

It is hugely important in the booming aviation sector in Asean which requires a borderless approach to professional exchange to address phenomenal demand we have seen in the last five years.

Malaysia is arguably already ahead of its Asean peers in moving towards this goal with initiatives such as TalentCorp helping to attract relevant skills. However delivered at a national level they do not go far enough to realize the full value of regional growth.

As a net brain drain middle income country, it is easier for Malaysia to see the value in flexibility especially as it aspires to become an Advanced Economy by 2020.

The questions is how to persuade other Asean peers such as Indonesia the value of free movement in skilled labour?

One of the most compelling arguments is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). FDI, flexible labour markets and access to talent pool nearly always go hand in hand.

Lack of skilled labour is the most often cited reason not to invest in a particular country.

It is one of the factors that persuaded Research In Motion (RIM), producer of the Blackberry smart mobile phone to locate its factory in Malaysia rather Indonesia despite Indonesia being the last big growth market for Blackberry in the world.

Supply-demand gap

European experience shows protecting local workers goes against the interest of their long term prosperity because it leads to loss of competitiveness.

In a globalised world, jobs and companies simply move to other regions that offer better access to specific skills.

There is a big opportunity for Malaysia and Indonesia to work together to attract large multinationals into Asean instead of competing against each other.

For instance Indonesia is currently experiencing acute shortages in labour supply in nearly every sector of its economy.

A sharp case in point is an acute shortage of engineers due to mega infrastructure and construction projects ranging from airports, housing, roads, water and power generations.

Chairman of Engineering Association in Jakarta said recently that Indonesia requires 2.4 million new engineers next five years. Its education system is only capable of delivering 800,000. A gap of 1.6m jobs is impossible to fill unless you rely on imported skilled labour.

As it happens the Philippines next door enjoys an excess pool of highly skilled engineers. Malaysia has the capacity through its education system to help Indonesia educate and train additional few to meet this explosive demand.

However due to labour market restrictions today the private sector companies cannot address this structural supply-demand gap.

The links between Malaysia and Indonesia universities are improving, however without a strategic push from above, remain inadequate to address this regional challenge.

Asean decision makers have not yet fully taken on board how urgent this situation has become. It seems as one private sector participant observed “until this problems will hit them hard they will not respond”.

There is therefore a major risk that Asean will miss an opportunity to unleash its economic potential by preventing free flow of skilled labour when it launches AEC in 2015.

It is in Malaysia’s best interest to use its strategic leverage to put this issue forward as one of the main catalysts for economic transformation in the region that could indeed be true to the slogan ‘Our People, Our Future Together’.

Paulius Kuncinas is the Regional Editor, Asia at Oxford Business Group

TMI: GE13 - What happened?... -- Clive Kessler

GE13: What happened? And what now?  ― Clive Kessler

JUNE 12, 2013

JUNE 12 ― In a brief commentary elsewhere (“Malaysia’s election result — no surprise to the knowledgeable,” Asian Currents, June 2013), I have noted one paradoxical but hugely important consequence of Malaysia’s recent national elections held on 5 May.

A paradox: anomalous domination

The remarkable, perhaps “counter-intuitive”, fact is that, while the election result itself ― namely, a fairly close but nonetheless comfortable victory of the Umno-centred Barisan Nasional side over the Pakatan Rakyat opposition ― came as no great surprise, that unremarkable result nonetheless had one quite surprising, even paradoxical, consequence. From GE13 an electorally weakened Umno emerged politically even more dominant than it had been before. While still embattled in the broader political arena, Umno was delivered a dominant position within the parliament, ruling coalition and government.

By bestowing it with that now dominant parliamentary position, GE13 had delivered into Umno’s hands an ascendancy over the governing BN coalition, government policy, Parliament’s agenda and parliamentary process, and thereby over national political life ― over the nation’s affairs and direction ― of a quite unprecedented and perhaps irresistible kind.

What are the relevant facts here?

The immediate challenge facing Najib Razak, it had been said in the run-up to GE13, was at best to win back the two-thirds majority (or 148 of the 222 seats in the Dewan Rakyat), or at least to improve on the 2008 yield of 140.

More modest and realistic than demanding recovery of the two-thirds majority, some suggested that even 145 would have been a “good result”, good enough to ensure his immediate political survival against critics, adversaries and doubters in his own camp.

In the event, worse even than at GE12 in 2008, Umno/BN won only 133 seats. For those who might be satisfied with nothing less than assured domination ― a constitutionally unassailable and impregnable position ― a shortfall of eight seats had now almost doubled to 15.

Yet ― as I noted in my summary review ― behind all its archaizing ceremonialism and cultural nostalgia, politics and political thinking within Umno is nothing other than Realpolitik of the most ruthlessly pragmatic kind. And realistically, Umno (if its interests, and nothing else, are to be the focus of analysis, as the party “hard men” insist) did not do at all badly.

Why?

Because, paradoxically, its political domination was enhanced, not diminished, by the election result ― despite the further decline in the government’s parliamentary numbers and the opposition’s advances.

Drawing a contrast between the post-election situation of Umno/BN and its Pakatan Rakyat (PKR) adversary is instructive here.

The PKR coalition won a total of 89 seats. The opposition coalition’s parliamentary numbers are reasonably balanced. All three of its constituent parties have a sizeable and, if not an equal then a comparable, presence in the Dewan Rakyat (DAP holds 38 seats, PKR 30, PAS 21). The smallest of the three, PAS, contributes about a quarter of the opposition’s parliamentary numbers, while the largest, DAP, more than two-fifths but less than a half.

Contrast that with the situation on the government side.

Of BN’s 133 seats, Umno now holds 88 (up from 79 in 2008). Its MPs amount to two-thirds of the total BN parliamentary representation.

Umno alone has a parliamentary presence that is virtually the same as that of the combined opposition. Its shortfall of a single seat, if that troubles anybody who matters, is one that might be readily reversed through a by-election victory, the timely defection of an “unhappy” opposition MP, or even a successful appeal against the result in, say, Bachok or some other constituency where the Umno candidate had fallen narrowly short of victory in the election night count.

Now compare Umno’s situation among its governing BN partners with the more balanced situation in the opposition coalition’s parliamentary numbers.

After Umno, the next largest party on that side of the house holds only 14 seats. The Umno’s customary “primary partners” going back to Alliance Party times even preceding independence, the Chinese MCA and the Indian MIC, now together hold only 11 (7 and 4 respectively) and its newer ally Gerakan, 1 ― the decline in their public plausibility and electoral viability coming as the result of, and signifying, the increasing Umno dominance over its old BN partners in deciding national policy over the last decade.

After GE13, more even than before, the Umno’s ability to head a government, and rule over the nation’s core in peninsular Malaysia, now rests disproportionately upon the seats that its fractious East Malaysian partners hold in Sarawak and Sabah (34 seats, together held by 8 different parties, many of them loose, unstable personal alliances of mercurial, opportunistic and “gymnastic” leaders.)

Umno’s task will be to satisfy, appease and manage its increasingly assertive, and at times even restive, East Malaysian partners who now so heavily underwrite BN’s, and hence Umno’s, ability to rule.

But provided it can do that, in numerical and political terms Umno now dominates ― perhaps as never before ― the national government.

Provided it can decide without internal strife what it wants to do, provided it “knows its own mind”, it will be in a powerful position in the years ahead to have its way on all significant political and policy issues, so long as its Sabah and Sarawak allies can be kept “in line”.

In national government, an era of unprecedented Umno domination may now be in the offing.

Umno’s oddly empowering victory

Some indication of the nature and sources of the Umno’s success ― of how it stands to grow greatly in effective power from its diminished parliamentary base ― is suggested by the relative size of the three components within the opposition’s parliamentary delegation.

The Pakatan delegation is reasonably balanced, but not entirely so. It displays one anomalous feature. What is in many ways the most substantial member of the opposition coalition, the Islamic Party PAS, has the smallest parliamentary representation.

This is because, in Malaysia’s imbalanced and “malapportioned” electoral system, PAS unlike its coalition partners competes directly against Umno for “bulk” Malay votes: that is, for support from the core, more traditionally-minded and less cosmopolitan Malay voters in the rural Malay heartlands. They are direct rivals for the support of the core part of the nation’s Malay political core component, the core of the core.

Those rural Malay areas are hugely favoured in the drawing of electoral boundaries ― which is to say in their size, meaning the smaller number of votes that is necessary for them to elect an MP. It is in those parts of the country, in those electorates, that Malay domination of national political life is grounded.

And, of the opposition parties, only PAS competes directly against Umno for those votes.

Their struggle is a “zero-sum game”. It is an “up and down” thing, a constant long-term oscillation. When Umno does badly, PAS numbers increase and PAS political influence grows (and vice versa).

That has always been the basis of PAS’s political strength and long-term strategy. By its ability to win popular Malay support, and so to deprive Umno of the credibility and legitimacy that substantial Malay support ensures, PAS can at times exercise enormous influence over Umno, over its policies and direction, from outside.

But when Umno does well, PAS numbers and its immediate influence upon Umno thinking are diminished. When Umno does well electorally, it denies PAS this important leverage. PAS’s ability to force itself upon its rival’s thinking in the setting of national priorities and direction ― even to set terms that Umno cannot resist ― declines.

When it succeeds in this way in freeing itself to some degree from the constraints imposed by PAS ― from the strategic stranglehold that in its “good years” results from PAS’s political success and ensuing Malay “moral credibility” ― Umno wins for itself some significantly increased political “room for manoeuvre”.

That is what happened at the recent GE13. The question to ask is why? How was it done?

The winning campaign

The key to the election result, and to Umno’s improbable feat of drawing increased political strength from reduced parliamentary numbers and a weakened parliamentary position, was Umno’s success in its head-on clash with PAS for Malay votes in the Malay heartlands ― for the “core Malay vote”.

Much has been made of the fact that the two members of the Malay ethno-supremacist pressure group Perkasa whom Umno directly or indirectly endorsed ― Zulkifli Noordin in the Klang Valley “beltway” seat of Sham Alam and Ibrahim Ali in PAS “crown jewels” seat of Pasir Mas ― lost to their adversaries. There was no comfort for Umno in those two results.

This has prompted some commentators to suggest that the GE13 results signal a clear repudiation by the national electorate as a whole, Malay as well as non-Malay, of Perkasa, its approach and what it stands for

But the matter is not so simple or clear.

The nature of the winning campaign has to be more closely considered.

(i) The international level

The government’s GE13 campaign operated at several levels. For international consumption, notably the foreign investment and diplomatic communities, one story was developed.

This was the beguiling story of Prime Minister Najib as the heroic but still shackled economic reformer, the eager and available driver of administrative transformation ― and also of taxation reform, in the form of reduced corporate and personal taxation, all to be made good by the reasonably prompt post-election introduction of a goods and services tax (GST).

Glued onto this portrait was another. This was the picture of Najib as the self-proclaimed, and internationally acclaimed, “global moderate”, the champion of interfaith conciliation and the determined enemy of all forms of political extremism, but especially that driven by religious militants and fanatics.

This “international campaign” projecting Najib as a soon to be unbound economic Prometheus and also a fastidious moderate who would “have no truck” with any crude, populist extremism was offered with a clear objective.

Its purpose was to win for the prime minister and his party a sympathetic hearing overseas and, with it, the indulgence of a free hand at home to wage the other parts of their multilevel campaign.

Overseas, that portrait of Najib was reassuring, and people there would be satisfied with it. Nothing more to be asked for. Its plausibility had simply to be upheld. For example, against the free-lance meddling of a rogue Australian senator.


(ii) The domestic pantomime

While this “image campaign” was offered internationally, the Najib who was seen for months on the campaign trail at home was something different. At home the prime minister cut a benign and ever-avuncular figure as he campaigned up and down the country by recourse to a kind of “Santa Claus politics” (as some called it). Its simplicity was that of a holiday pantomime. Or perhaps a travelling circus: “Every few minutes something new, something different, something dramatic! Something for everybody!”

There was something, something new, for somebody every day, a new inducement or “softener” for yet another interest group or finely drawn demographic category.

This was a campaign to the nation’s socially disaggregated parts, to its separate disarticulated elements, not to the nation as a whole.

It was not a campaign that projected any distinctive concept that the prime minister may have had, and wished to promote, of the Malaysian nation and its evolving destiny.

It was instead a campaign directed to every individual voter and every special interest-group or social element. It was one that encouraged them all to ask “What is in this for me? For us?” ― and which then provided an answer. Concretely and immediately, tangibly. An answer not in words or ideas but in palpable material benefits and ― “just for you and people like you, in your same situation or predicament” ― specified provisions.

Prime Minister Najib offered vast menu of hand-outs and rewards ― at prospectively huge cost to public expenditure, to the national accounts and the government’s coffers ― in the hope of attaching ever more securely to himself his own side’s loyal political followers, and of attracting the undecided to join them in supporting him and his cause.

This was hardly the kind of campaign that international investors, eager to see clear evidence of some sort of advance pre-election commitment to fiscal austerity and economic responsibility, can have been hoping to see Umno run. Not what they had in mind!

But, though it involved huge public expenditures and costly promises, those promises had been accompanied by assurances of reduced corporate tax levels. So, overall, it may have pleased those foreign bystanders anyway: as a strategy that would make prompt Malaysian adoption of a GST to pay for it all inevitable.

It may have appealed to them as a neat way to make the fickle, imprudent and gullible people pay for all the offered benefits and promises that they had so unwisely and unaffordably chosen to accept. (Significantly, mention of the impending introduction of a GST was no part of the election campaign, neither Umno/BN’s nor the opposition’s.)

So allied to Najib “the great transformer in waiting” and Najib the global moderate was Najib “the great dispenser of treats and inducements” ― who was also, or so it was hoped by some, “the canny, crafty promoter of a GST”, the masterful maker of traps and ambushes who was making the GST’s introduction necessary and laying the grounds for its general acceptance.

“Of course we may all have these benefits. We Malaysians are entitled to nothing less. But we Malaysians too ― who else? ― must pay for them. In doing so we will not only reward ourselves and ensure our government’s fiscal viability from which every citizen benefits. We can make Malaysia, more even than before, the up-to-date model of a developing nation and the envy of the entire postcolonial world”. It is not hard to script the arguments that will need to be made and invoked.

(iii) The real campaign

Umno/BN’s was a multi-level campaign.

The first level projected Najib’s image internationally as an economic reformer and religious moderate. Here he was portrayed as an intelligent and polished progressive in a land where progressives were not conspicuously plentiful in official circles.

The second was a campaign that kept Najib ― not so much Najib himself as his “simulacrum”, his carefully constructed image ― prominent in the public eye. But only through very controlled and tightly managed situations. It projected him as a man less with a mission than with a wonderful “magic pudding” that might continually, without ever becoming exhausted, be parcelled out and distributed to the people for their enjoyable and cost-free consumption.

This second campaign, in many ways a media construct or artefact, was largely a diversion and a distraction. It was devised to create a plausible appearance of dynamism and momentum to what had become, among the world’s notable political parties, an ungainly, lumbering and sclerotic dinosaur. It was staged to divert unwelcome attention from the real campaign.

It was, of course, those two “show campaigns” that occupied and entirely seized the attention of the international media. Meanwhile, the real campaign was conducted with unremitting determination, even ruthlessness, beneath the “foreign radar”, out of view of most overseas reporters and commentators.

What was the “real” campaign?

The nature of Umno/BN election strategy was clear. Like all intelligent political analysts, those in the party’s “brains trust” and campaign “engine room” could see that the vast bulk of Chinese voters were lost to BN and were unlikely to be won back, no matter what the old ruling party bloc did or promised.

Much of the Indian vote too was lost, but not all of it was entirely beyond recall. Part of it might be won back with some dramatic gestures (most remarkable of which was the Hindraf rapprochement). But while winning back that partial Indian support might do Umno/BN’s political image some much needed good by providing some symbolic rehabilitation for its claims of intercultural accommodation, those Indian votes that might be won over would never be enough to secure an Umno/BN victory.

So the strategy of the real campaign was focused elsewhere.

It was a battle for Malay votes.

Umno/BN saw, as some who were not part of its campaign also understood, that the key to the election was Malay votes. In comparison, nothing else really mattered much at all.

The key question was whether Umno/BN, and especially Umno itself, could win enough peninsular Malay votes, and enough of them in the right places ― meaning in the right local constituencies ― for Umno, in association with its Sarawak and Sabah allies, to secure a clear parliamentary majority.

So the campaign was focused and conducted where it mattered.

It was conducted in Malay terms and directed to a Malay audience. Meaning, the campaign was projected above all in the daily Malay-language press, notably the Umno’s own Utusan Malaysia, and via the Malay-language programming of the television channels with the greatest Malay reach, principally TV3 and RTM.

It was a campaign conducted for the votes of Malays, mainly for those of the great bulk of the more “traditionally-minded” Malays, in the Malay rural heartland areas.

The Umno campaign was simple: “all is at risk!” There is no protection, it kept hammering away, for you and your family, for all Malays, for the Malay stake in the country, for Islam or for the Malay rulers who are the ultimate bastion of our Malay-Islamic identity and national primacy ― other than us here in Umno.

It was a campaign that appealed to their sense of themselves ― to their sense of Malay identity and of Malay centrality to national life. It was a campaign that sought to suggest how tenuous the basis of Malay identity had now become in national life, how insecure the Malay grip upon the Malay stake in the nation had become. Everything that was distinctively Malay about Malaysia, it was suggested, was now under threat.

It was a campaign that both cultivated and then also appealed to a Malay sense of political and cultural peril, even crisis. It was a campaign that consisted of a managed panic: that the Malays were now beleaguered in their own land, the Tanah Melayu. Their historic stake in the nation was being whittled away and was now in jeopardy.

It was a campaign that sought to suggest that, as political currents were now running, it was not fanciful but realistic to imagine that Malays might one day soon “hilang di dunia” (in the words of the classical formulation), that they might disappear from the face of the earth.

It was a campaign of controlled communal panic. Malays and their way of life are beleaguered, and, central to their way of life, Islam was in jeopardy. Malay historical primacy and political leadership, the religious ascendancy of Islam, and the constitutional position of the Malay state rulers as their “untrumpable” guarantors had become the sacred trinity of the Umno campaign.

Everything that mattered to the Malay majority and its conventional loyalties was now at risk, it was suggested. It was threatened by the opposition Pakatan Rakyat coalition ― of which of course, the Islamic Party PAS was a key component. In the division of political labour between the Pakatan partners, it fell to PAS to wage the direct contest against Umno for votes in the nation’s Malay heartlands core.

So, above all else, the national election ― an election that would decide the prime minister’s and his party’s future ― turned upon a contest for “the national Malay soul” between Umno and PAS.

That was the real campaign.

It was the campaign that won the election for Umno/BN.

And it was a campaign that the many overseas reporters and commentators who flocked to Kuala Lumpur for a week or two simply did not see or “read” or understand.

It went beneath their radar, it was beyond their social, professional and imaginative reach. It was outside their range of cultural accessibility ― and also that, to be fair to them, of the vast majority of “like-minded” and “sympathetic” young urban Malaysians whom they were delighted to meet: who captured their attention, won their sympathy, and shaped their view of Malaysian society and politics.

For many of those intelligent, persuasive and globally-networked young Kuala Lumpur cosmopolitans, the Malay heartlands and those who live there are just as foreign and remote a world as they certainly were to the visiting journalists. The young sophisticates with their congenial “discourse” and “narratives” were nice people, but a very poor guide to what the election was really about ― how it was being conducted where it really mattered.

But, to those who were running the “real” campaign, that inattention was no problem. On the contrary. Let the foreign press write the stories that might please them, that seemed to centre upon the overseas journalists’ own effete concerns, not those of the rural Malay voters. Let them chase after stories that led them away from the real story, the main action.

After all, the “real campaign” for Malay votes in the heartlands ― for a firm place within and a hold upon the Malay soul ― would prosper best if it went unrecognized and unreported by the meddling and opinionated visitors of the international press. Let them meddle instead where their own interests and sympathies were engaged, not where their intruding curiosity might prove inconvenient, even embarrassing.



JUNE 13 — The first part of this commentary analysed the paradoxical outcome of GE13. It traced how the election of a reduced Barisan Nasional (BN) presence and increased opposition numbers in Parliament has amplified, not diminished, Umno’s power — here meaning specifically its power within the nation’s government and over the formation of national policy. It then examined the nature of the election campaign that yielded this paradoxical outcome.

A rejection of Perkasa?

GE13 was a less than explicit, and often inchoate, engagement, or contestation, between two rival views of the Malaysian nation, of what it is and where it was, or might be, headed.

On the one side, Umno/BN, and especially in its appeals to its own power base in the core Malay electorate, maintained incessantly that the country is and has always been tanah Melayu — Malay land and the land of the Malays — and that the country’s defining Malay identity would now have to be upheld by a reaffirmation and, if necessary, even an expansion beyond previously existing understandings of what that characterisation as tanah Melayu might mean.

On the other side, the Pakatan Rakyat coalition stuck to the terms of the agreement binding together its three partners. In a less than fully worked-out way they insisted that Malaysia was, or must become, a land of and for all Malaysians, and was now ready to do so. Or at least to make a common start on that journey — that quest for a shared future based upon a new national understanding and, under the existing Constitution, a new principled foundation.

That was the choice that was placed on offer to the voters. If it was the campaign that was waged by Umno/BN that won the day, can it be said that the overall election result represented a rejection of Perkasa by the nation, especially the Malay electorate?

Hardly. That is simply not so.

Yes, two Perkasa men who received Umno/BN backing were defeated. But 88 Umno candidates won. And that is more important, that is what matters.

They won on the “Malays in danger, Islam under threat” campaign waged in the Malay media that, as its main election effort, Umno directed at the nation’s Malay voters.

The Perkasa position is in effect, as some put it, “Malays on top, now and forever. That is Malaysia, love it or leave it!”

It is a hard, uncompromising position. But that, too, if in slightly more polite and modulated terms, was the essence of the Umno campaign that was projected daily, with ever increasing determination and with increasingly disquieting effect, byUtusan and its media consociates to the ever more fearful Malay voters in the rural heartlands.

Two outright, upfront card-carrying Perkasa candidates lost, even though they enjoyed Umno support.

But Umno ran, and won handsomely upon, a campaign which can simply be described as “Perkasa Mild”. A Perkasa-type campaign detached from the perhaps dubious or extreme reputation of Perkasa itself. A Perkasa-line not, like the original, angry but one for the somewhat more polite and genteel, and for those gripped by a fearful, and artfully cultivated, collective cultural and political anxiety.

A Perkasa line, it might perhaps be said, for those who might hesitate, not out of fear but even out of basic decency and in good conscience, to be publicly identified with Perkasa.

On the contrary. Perkasa, they might well feel, may be extremists. But Umno is mainstream. And if that is what Umno is saying, if that is the campaign that it is running, well, that line and that campaign, being Umno’s, cannot be extreme. That, for some, was the psychology of supporting “Perkasa Mild”.

It proved a winning campaign.

A winning campaign, certainly, for Umno. And also, though in a different way, a winning campaign for Perkasa as well.

A winning campaign for Perkasa despite the loss of the two high-profile Perkasa members whose candidacy Umno was supporting.

How so?

In Umno’s 88 victories, Perkasa and its stance were lent an official respectability and “normalised” — and in that way given a kind of vindication. Or at least political and moral absolution.

That is how what some political scientists used to call “ginger groups” — or radical pressure groups operating from outside a party upon like-minded “true believers” and sympathisers within it — operate and succeed.

In France in the 1950s one such group — the forerunner of the Le Pen movement of recent years and today — for a while rode high. The Poujadist movement influenced and infiltrated the ruling Gaullists. As they did, as they succeeded in doing so, their strength declined. Challenged by a journalist that his movement had failed, one Poujadist leader powerfully responded: “Not so! We have not failed, we have succeeded! We have succeeded in ‘Poujad-ising’ the moderates!”

Perkasa, too, may soon be able to make the same rejoinder, the same boast.

With that tune borrowed from Perkasa but played in a minor key, the Umno in very difficult times did not just hold on to what it had but significantly increased its number of parliamentary seats. The costs of its doing so were paid by the plummeting plausibility of its main long-term non-Malay partner parties in BN. They may never recover.

But for Umno it worked well. Umno’s number of seats is up by nine, a number not far short of what is now the combined MCA, MIC and Gerakan parliamentary presence of 12.

BN representation from the nation’s primary zone in Peninsular Malaysia is overwhelmingly an Umno parliamentary presence: 88 of 100. The old partner parties — the MCA, MIC and Gerakan — are now in no position to restrain Umno or to resist its demands. To have its way, Umno has merely to “square things off” with its Sarawak and Sabah allies, operating not as a solid bloc but as a collection of mutually wary contenders who can, if need be, be played off against one another.

From the viewpoint of the practitioners of Umno Realpolitik it is a very satisfactory outcome — even if the party’s “hard men” did not exactly envisage this outcome and plan it down to the last detail.

It is, for them, a very satisfactory outcome that was delivered by the success of their “Perkasa Mild” strategy.


A “Chinese tsunami”?

Recourse to that strategy came, as indicated, with a cost.

It entailed a substantial “writing off in advance” of much of “the Chinese vote” — of the votes of the vast majority of Malaysian citizens of Chinese origins and cultural background. It deprived the leaders of the Chinese partner parties MCA and Gerakan of “face” and credibility and stripped their parties of what was left of their political plausibility.

Yet the movement of voters away from Umno/BN was not, as some have suggested, simply a “Chinese phenomenon”.

The same trend seems to have been characteristic, in greater or lesser degree, of a significant number of Malaysians of all backgrounds who reside in and around the main cities, and in their adjoining semi-urban zones.

It was displayed, that is, by most of those whose lives are grounded outside of the electorally “over-represented” rural Malay heartlands and whose cultural orientations are focused upon concerns that lie beyond where the Umno andUtusan “Malay anxiety campaign” had great cultural reach and political “traction”.

The results of GE12 in 2008 had come as a great surprise to some. While some people had seen it coming, others, including those who then ran the Umno/BN campaign, did not. And, as if it had come suddenly from nowhere, they dubbed it a “tsunami”.

Things were different this time. The Umno/BN side knew that they were in “the fight of their lives”, a fight for political survival. Anti-Umno/BN currents were running strong in 2013. When they showed up in the election results, it could have been a surprise to nobody.

But in politics there are few things harder to resist than a convenient cliché. When the massive falling away of government support became clear, and BN in the peninsula was left looking very much like a club with only one member attended by a few bemused janitors, the official response, orchestrated by Umno and Utusan, was that what had happened was a “Chinese tsunami”.

The Chinese had defected, it was claimed, they had abandoned Umno/BN. The Chinese were to blame. “What more can the Chinese possibly want [beyond what they already enjoy under Umno/BN]” was Utusan’s furious banner headline.

One thing needs to be made clear here.

The expression “Chinese tsunami” is a polite — meaning inexplicit, since it does not use those words directly — way of saying that kaum Cina kita sudah memberontak dan menderhaka, that our Chinese community has rebelled and committed treason.

That is what people who use the expression “Chinese tsunami” mean.

So the issue to be discussed is not whether this second “tsunami” of 2013 was a “Chinese” or a more general and widespread “storm”.

What is needed is to bring into the clear and explicit light of day the underlying meaning of that coded expression and to call to account — for what they mean to say, and what political objective they intend to accomplish by saying it — those who are trading subliminally in this notion of Chinese treason (derhaka Cina).

To react by shouting in exasperation, “how dare they, how dare the Chinese presume to behave disloyally, to indulge in treason!” ignores the fact that those who voted in ways that Umno and Utusan may not have liked were, as Malaysian citizens, fully entitled to cast their votes as they pleased, and to use their votes to say that they did not like what they were seeing — that they did not like the direction in which Umno now seemed determined to drag the country.

The attitude and response displayed by Umno and Utusan are those of a different situation. They are those of the Ottoman Empire. There, every millet (meaning every “encapsulated” national or cultural or religious minority) had the right to manage its own internal affairs autonomously, free from outside interference — so long as they remained monolithically loyal under their own leaders to the sultan and his government.

But Malaysia in Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak’s time is not the Ottoman Empire in the age of Suleyman the Magnificent or Abdul Majid I.

The point is obvious, but its implications are difficult for some to grasp.

The expression “Chinese tsunami” may be rhetorically evocative. But it is logically and empirically dubious, and its use is politically and morally inexcusable.

What was GE13 really about?

If, as was plainly the case, the Umno/BN campaign pitched to the key, or core, Malay heartland electorate was the “Perkasa Mild” message, how should the Pakatan opposition have responded? What should its central campaign message have been?

If Umno/BN was content to run in effect on the Perkasa stance of “Malays on top, now and forever. That’s Malaysia, love it or leave it!”, then Pakatan should have offered a clear response, a compelling alternative, and a challenge to the Umno/BN line.

It might have said: “Historically and culturally, Malaysia is and of course remains a Malay-centred society. We do not question that. But at the same time we are all Malaysians, Malaysia is all of us. Malaysia as a nation is the common, shared inheritance of the children of all of its citizens, regardless of the path which they took towards citizenship. Malaysia is a state that is made up of all of its citizens and which belongs alike to all of them.”

That was, in effect, the position taken and promoted by Pakatan when campaigning among voters outside the Malay heartlands. But it had to take that position “across the board”, everywhere, as the central plank of its platform.

Certainly, it would not have been easy. It is a more complex position than the Perkasa mantra. And, in these matters, simplicity is what works, while complexity invites misunderstanding, both unintended and wilful. And it would also have been risky.

Running with this formulation would have required Pakatan, and especially the DAP, to make clear that this position was very different from the old “Malaysian Malaysia” notion — an accusation that Umno/BN strategists would certainly have levelled and tried to pin on it as a damning label.

But, hard as it was, that was what had to be done, what needed to be said. For all the dangers, there was no alternative to that kind of courageous political self-definition and self-affirmation.

Instead, Pakatan seemed to hope that by sticking with its familiar themes, it might somehow just get enough votes in the right places and so “fall over the line” to victory. That was unlikely, and even if it had succeeded in getting the basic numbers, it would not have been a convincing victory. Not a basis for assuming authoritatively the reins of national power.

Pakatan needed to put this clear challenge to Umno/BN — on well-prepared ground, as a prospective so-called “game-changer” — in the last week of the campaign. It should have tried in that way to put Umno/BN on the back foot, presented it with a challenge that its people would have had to scramble to address.

Doing that would not have been easy. How might Umno/BN have responded to that challenge?

Either they would have had to say, “yes, we agree with you, that it our position too” — in which case they would have had to distance themselves from Perkasa and dissociate themselves from their own and Utusan’s “Perkasa Mild” line. But if that is now your claim, it might then have been put, why are you not acting consistent with your principled position? Why have you so long failed to do so? Either you have been sincere but have failed, or else you have never meant it, then or now.

Or else they would have had to say, “No, we do not accept that view” and then they would have been forced to live with the consequences. Many Malays, urban and rural, might have been happy to see them do exactly that. But, equally, and most awkwardly for Umno, many of them along with many non-Malays would not have been. These people would have considered it the last straw, if Umno had pulled back from the formulation offered by Pakatan or tried to fudge and bluff their way around it.

Doing so would perhaps have cut their core Malay base off, and even morally isolated the Umno itself, from the rest of the country. That was not a price that Umno would have been wise to risk having to pay.

A courageous opposition that was ready to present a clear alternative and which, by offering it, was able to show that it was ready to govern would have put that clear challenge to Umno/BN.

At GE13 in 2013 the Pakatan opposition did not.

It did not even try. Which was strange.

After all, the entire Pakatan campaign embodied and implicitly sent that message anyway.

Their rallies not only said that, in principle, another Malaysia was possible. They were in effect saying in action, by how they chose to campaign, that Pakatan itself was the proof that that other Malaysia was now coming into being; that they themselves and their campaign were tangible evidence that its time had come.

Yet they did not dare say it directly, clearly, explicitly, in plain words. A strange choice.

In sum

In the final analysis, the Umno/BN side, despite the stupendous expense of its campaign and all its related activities, failed to present any clear argument why it deserved to be re-elected, nor any new vision of common national purpose and direction.

It did everything but that. For some it must have been great fun. For some it must have been very rewarding and profitable. But, even though the election was in the end won, the staggeringly expensive campaign simply did not do the job.

Meanwhile, for its part, the Pakatan opposition gave no sign that it was yet ready to govern: that it was sufficiently cohesive and was of a sufficiently clear and coherent common mind to lead the nation.

The outcome of GE13 sent a clear message to both sides. To Umno/BN, the message was that it will have to do better next time, possibly with far less money and spectacle but far more thought and insight, as well as a deeper appreciation of the good sense of the voters and increased respect for their judgment.

And the Pakatan opposition, or whatever opposition may next take up the baton, will have to demonstrate that it is capable not simply of cobbling together an improvised “no contests, no enemies, amongst ourselves on polling day” agreement that in many ways is no better than the long-tested Alliance/Barisan Nasional model, but of doing more and better.

Which means: generating a new kind of inclusive, democratic Malaysian politics, creating an effective political vehicle to promote it, and devising new policies (and approaches to policy-making) that might give some plausible and substantive reality, were they ever to be elected, to that “new Malaysian politics”.

That is the challenge to the Malaysian opposition. Will it be addressed? Will it ever be mastered? And under whose aegis? Under the leadership of Lim Kit Siang and Anwar Ibrahim? Or under new leaders, some whose faces are already familiar and some who are yet to emerge between now and the next great Malaysian contest for government?

Meanwhile, as after past elections, Umno will just get back to the business of governing, in its own distinctive and (so some would say) increasingly anachronistic way. But, this time after GE13, it is now placed to do so freshly unleashed from some old constraints and able — whether for good or ill remains to be seen — to do far more readily what and as it pleases.

How will Umno use its latest and ambiguous victory? How will it use its suddenly, and perhaps unexpectedly, augmented domination of the nation’s political life?

There are grounds for both fear and hope. As always, the challenge will be to resist opting for the easy thing in order, on principled grounds, to choose to do the right thing.

That is not something that Umno has always found it easy to do. That way of acting has often not seemed to come naturally to its tough-minded strategists. Whatever chances may offer themselves, the hard-headed pragmatists in Umno do not often refuse the dubious ones when they are attractive, seem capable of realisation, and look likely to prove politically rewarding.

In the final analysis, if something appealing can be done, they usually say, let us do it! The ability to get it done itself provides — nothing more! — all the legitimation and justification that may be needed in order to go ahead and do it.

When the opportunities that may present themselves are likely to involve some long-standing objectives and aspirations grounded in the mindset of the exclusionary early and mid-twentieth Malay nationalism, the case for prudent reflection, rather than the hurried seizing of the moment and of whatever easy prizes it may have to offer, will not be easy to make.

Let us hope that it will be made and also heard. — New Mandala

An afterword

Some readers have already asked why I have not mentioned alleged “vote rigging”, manipulation of the election process and the like in my discussion. They add that the analysis that I have provided will be incomplete, defective and misleading if it fails to address those questions.

My account given here of GE13 does not go into those matters.

It does not because so much of the immediate post-election analysis has been about, and indeed has been largely pre-occupied with, precisely those questions.

I saw no need, and see no reason, to go over all that same ground once again here.

More, I chose to omit any discussion of that aspect because, after the continuing focus upon those issues in so much of the post-election commentary and analysis so far, it is now important, in my view, to shift attention to some other matters and some more deeply-seated dimensions of the complex GE13 experience.

But I am not insensitive to the importance of those matters.

For the record, I therefore append here to this discussion two paragraphs from the brief commentary on GE13 (“Malaysia’s election result — no surprise to the knowledgeable”) that I wrote for “Asian Currents”:

“ .. .. .. International press comment often seeks to highlight instances of government skulduggery on election day. Sharp practice clearly occurs, far too often. But Malaysian elections have never been a ‘level-playing field’. And, despite the growth of ‘new media’ that mitigate the government’s long-standing domination of the official media, in other ways things are now less level than ever.

“Yet attention needs to focus not on election-day malpractice but on the nature f the electoral system itself: on the delineation of boundaries and the distortions entailed by the ‘first past the post system’. More, it is not what the Election Commission may or may not do during the course of the election, whether it acts impartially or in a partisan fashion, that is of concern. Before it even begins to swing into action to arrange the polls, the EC is an inherently compromised and flawed body. It is a contradictory beast with a dual nature. It is the statutory body appointed to stage elections with due propriety; but it also operates — by requiring citizens to vote in specific ‘streams’ by age and ethnicity within every polling station — as the producer of a massive ‘national political demography’ database whose findings are not made available to the public or other political parties but which is developed as the primary strategic instrument of the ruling Umno party and its partners. So long as this remains the case, the EC will never be universally seen as impartial and will never enjoy sufficient public trust. It needs not simply to be reformed but replaced, root and branch.”


* Clive Kessler is Emeritus Professor of Sociology & Anthropology at the University of New South Wales, Sydney.


* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of The Malaysian Insider.